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This special issue of European Transport, edited by André de Palma, Edoardo 
Marcucci, Esko Niskanen and Erik Verhoef, introduces a selection of the papers 
presented at the Second International Kuhmo Conference and Nectar Cluster 2 meeting 
on “Pricing, Financing, Regulating Transport Infrastructures and Services”, which was 
held 12-13 July 2007 in Urbino, Italy. This meeting is growing into a tradition: the 
Third Meetings in Amsterdam have also been held in the meantime, and the Fourth 
Meetings in Copenhagen are in full preparation at the moment of writing this text. The 
meetings aim to bring together transport economists as well as transport scientists from 
other disciplinary backgrounds to discuss recent advances in transport science and 
policy. No surprise, then, that the conference is usually broad in terms of the range of 
topics covered, and the second edition, on which this special issue is based, was no 
exception. 
This special issue contains six papers. The rest of this introduction briefly introduces 
these six papers. 
 
Van den Berg, Kroes and Verhoef , in their paper “Choice of season cards in public 
transport: a study of a Stated Preference experiment”, start with the observation that, in 
the Netherlands, a large share of commuters and business travellers receive travel cost 
compensation from their employer. The authors focus on investigating a Stated 
Preference (SP) experiment on the choice of type of season card, conducted among 
current Dutch Railways season cardholders. The cardholders were asked to choose from 
the following three alternatives: (1) an unrestricted season card, (2) a cheaper season 
card with peak travel and travel frequency restrictions, and (3) not buying a season card. 
The authors use multinomial logit (MNL), nested logit and mixed logit models to 
analyse their choices. They found that MNL underestimates the price sensitivities (as 
measured by the price elasticities) of the respondents and overestimates their 
Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) for reductions in the restrictions. The mixed logit estimation 
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shows that there are (unobserved) differences in the marginal utilities of the price of the 
card (response heterogeneity), and the utility of owning a season card (preference 
heterogeneity). The authors found that travel cost compensation has a large impact on 
the price sensitivities and choices of the respondents.  
 
Catalano, Lo Casto and Migliore, in their paper “Car sharing demand estimation and 
urban transport demand modelling using stated preference techniques”, use the stated 
preference technique (SP) to analyse travel mode choice behaviour for commuting 
urban trips in Palermo, Italy. The authors calibrate a demand model to forecast the 
modal split of the urban transport demand, allowing for the use of innovative transport 
systems like car sharing and car pooling. In order to estimate the demand model 
parameters, the authors carried out a specific survey, which focussed on the morning 
rush hour and involved mainly employees, self-employed workers and students whose 
final destination is located within the historical centre of the city. The questionnaire 
focused on a choice between four alternatives: private car, car pooling, car sharing and 
public transport. A random utility model was developed by using data from the SP 
experiment. The authors found out that the multinomial logit proved to be the best 
model for their purposes. They applied the model to analyse the potential demand for 
car sharing and car pooling in Palermo. The analysis highlighted that the car club 
market share could increase up to the 10 % level, while car pooling could slightly rise. 
 
Boucq and Papon, in their paper “Assessment of the real estate benefits due to 
accessibility gains brought by a transport project: the impacts of a light rail 
infrastructure improvement in the Hauts-de-Seine department”, estimate the real estate 
benefits due to accessibility gains brought by a light rail infrastructure (the T2 tramway, 
in the Hauts-de-Seine). The authors set out to test the hypothesis that the accessibility 
improvements resulting from the transport project will influence the residential location 
choices of households, and eventually the land rents at equilibrium will include the 
valuation of accessibility gains made by the households. The authors note that, apart 
from accessibility, housing choice also depends on other characteristics: internal 
characteristics and external (environmental) characteristics. To take into account all 
these determinants, the authors estimate a hedonic price function of residential 
properties. The estimation also aims to take into account anticipation and learning 
effects. The hedonic price function obtained allows to measure implicit or “hedonic” 
prices of dwellings with a given group of characteristics, and isolates the pure effect of 
each characteristic on the price of a dwelling. The authors conclude that the T2 tramway 
accessibility improvements are capitalized into the housing prices. To measure this 
capitalization effect, the authors calculate the prices of dwellings with and without these 
accessibility gains. For the whole department, the authors estimate a capitalization of 
around 3%.  
 
Musolino, in his paper ”Modelling long-term impacts of the transport supply system 
on land use and travel demand in urban areas”, focuses on a two-way relationship 
between land use and transport in urban areas: land use affects transport, conditioning 
travel demand, and, conversely, transport affects land use, conditioning spatial 
distribution of activities and land market. The author surveys alternative modelling 
approaches that have been presented in literature. These are generally grouped into three 
main categories: spatial micro-economic, spatial interaction and spatial accounting 
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models. The author focuses on so-called Land Use Transport Interaction (LUTI) 
models. He presents a spatial accounting LUTI model, which relies on Multi-Regional-
Input-Output (MRIO) framework. The model has two main interacting components: an 
activity model and a transport model, which allow to endogenously estimate activities 
generation and location, land prices, travel demand and transport accessibility. The 
author applies the specified model to the town of Reggio Calabria (Italy), and estimates 
long-term impacts of the transport supply on land use and passenger travel demand 
patterns. 
 
Leck, Bekhor and Gat, in their paper “Welfare economic impacts of transportation 
improvements in a peripheral region”, study whether transportation improvements can 
trigger welfare economic impacts in a peripheral region. The authors address this issue 
through the development of a general equilibrium labor market model with a 
transportation component. The model is implemented to a set of 101 core and peripheral 
towns and cities in Israel. The authors carry out numeric simulations to test the research 
hypotheses regarding positive relationship between improved accessibility and 
enhanced economic welfare. The authors measure economic welfare in terms of 
efficiency and equity impacts. The authors conclude that transportation improvements 
in the form of auto travel time reductions may lead to substantial welfare benefits in the 
peripheral region considered in terms of increased output, productivity and wages. 
 
Ieromonachou and Warren, in their paper “Policy Packages as potential routes to 
urban road pricing in the UK”, focus on urban road pricing. The authors note that road 
pricing often gets delayed or abandoned due to low acceptability. They conclude that 
this may be due to the fact that complex interactions and drivers of change that affect 
road transport management and require cooperation within implementation networks, 
have too often been overlooked. The authors present a review of the UK urban road 
pricing situation. They define implementation network as a group of people (referred to 
as partners and actors) who co-ordinate the introduction of policy tools. The drivers of 
change include any internal or external factors that may influence the time, place, or 
‘shape’ of the policy measures being introduced. The authors state that demand 
management measures usually address a limited set of objectives and are often 
implemented alone i.e. are not necessarily combined with other policy measures. They 
analyse three existing UK road pricing examples - London, Edinburgh and Durham. To 
show the importance of combining policy tools, the authors contrast the emerging issues 
against six key implementation factors. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper studies a Stated Preference (SP) experiment on the choice of type of (Rail) season card, 
conducted among current Dutch Railways season cardholders. They were asked to choose from the 
following three alternatives: (1) an unrestricted season card, (2) a cheaper season card with peak travel 
and travel frequency restrictions, and (3) not buying a season card. Multinomial logit (MNL), nested logit 
and mixed logit models are used to analyse their choices. It is found that MNL underestimates the price 
sensitivities (as measured by the price elasticities) of the respondents and overestimates their Willingness-
to-Pay (WTP) for reductions in the restrictions. The mixed logit estimation shows that there are 
(unobserved) differences in the marginal utilities of the price of the card (response heterogeneity), and the 
utility of owning a season card (preference heterogeneity). In the Netherlands a large share of commuters 
and business travellers receive travel cost compensation from their employer.  However, empirical studies 
often do not control for the effect of travel cost compensation. We find, as expected, that travel cost 
compensation has a large impact on the price sensitivities and choices of the respondents. 
 
Keywords: SP experiment; Rail season card; Travel cost compensation; Public transport demand. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Season cards are often used in public transport systems as one of the ticket types.  Of 
the total passenger kilometres of the Dutch Railways (NS) in 2005, about 32% was by 
season cardholders. Furthermore, season cardholders are most likely relatively frequent 
train users, as this group predominantly consists of commuters (Steer Davies Gleave, 
2006a). Hence, this group of travellers is very important in public transport. With a 
season card a person can travel free of extra charge by public transport and for this the 
person pays a certain amount per period. 
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However, the empirical study of the preferences of season cardholders has been very 
limited. This paper studies a Stated Preference (SP) experiment, performed on current 
Dutch Railways season cardholders, on the choice of rail season card. The SP 
experiment was designed and carried out by Steer Davies Gleave (2007). In the 
experiment, the respondents chose between three alternatives: (1) a conventional 
unrestricted season card, which is the same as their current one but more expensive, (2) 
a (hypothetical) card which is cheaper than their current card, but has restrictions on 
allowed travel frequency and travel during the rush hour, and (3) the no card alternative 
(i.e. not buying a season card). 
An interesting aspect of the used survey is that it contains information on the 
proportion of the card’s price that is paid by the respondent. This makes it possible to 
control for the effect of travel cost compensation by third parties. This is important, as a 
large share of the Dutch travellers get their travel costs (partly) compensated by third a 
party (Steer Davies Gleave, 2006b). Empirical studies of price sensitivities of travellers 
often do not control for such travel cost compensation, despite the fact that it is often 
named as a reason for why (absolute) transport demand elasticities are so low.  
Table 1 shows that 58% of the respondents get the price of the season card fully 
compensated, whereas only 9% get nothing compensated. The remainder of the 
respondents is partly compensated. It seems unlikely that a respondent that is currently 
fully compensated would be just as price sensitive as a comparable respondent who is 
not compensated. The used survey enables us to control for such differences. 
Table 1: Distribution of the proportion of the price of the season card respondents pay of themselves. 
Proportion of the price paid by the respondent Number of respondents Percentage of the 
respondents 
0% 328 57.7% 
1%-25% 76 13.4% 
26%-50% 56 9.9% 
51%-75% 35 6.2% 
75%-99% 21 3.7% 
100% 52 9.2% 
 
Multinomial logit (MNL), nested logit and mixed logit estimations are used to study 
the responses in the SP experiment. The two card alternatives both entail owning a card 
and hence both produce the utility of owning a season card. It is found that the value of 
this shared utility component differs substantially over the respondents. In MNL 
estimations the alternative specific constants (ASC’s) measure (after controlling for the 
effect of the other variables) the average utility of owning a restricted or unrestricted 
card. Deviations from this average remain in the unobserved elements. The unobserved 
utilities of the two card alternatives are thus most likely related, as both contain the 
individual utility of owning a season card, and this violates the IID assumption of MNL. 
Nested logit and mixed logit estimations can control for this.  
From the estimations, elasticities to changes in the price and Willingness-to-Pay for 
changes in the card’s restrictions are calculated. Large and interesting differences are 
found between the elasticities and WTP’s from the MNL, the nested logit and the mixed 
logit estimations.   
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It is common to find in the empirical literature that MNL gives incorrect estimates, 
when unobserved heterogeneity is present. For instance, Bhat (1998) notes that if there 
is heterogeneity in the preferences for the alternatives (i.e. heterogeneous ASC’s) or 
response heterogeneity (i.e. heterogeneous marginal utilities), then ignoring this could 
lead to biased parameter estimates and choice probabilities. He found that for his dataset 
with MNL the WTP’s were larger and the elasticities lower than with mixed logit. 
Hence, the conclusion was that MNL underestimated the price sensitivity.  
Bhat (2000a) found that MNL severely underestimates the WTP’s for out-of- and in-
vehicle travel time and overestimates the “cost” elasticities, compared with his mixed 
logit which controlled for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Train (1998) found 
for his data that the compensating variations for the attributes are slightly to 
substantially larger with mixed logit than with MNL. He also found that the 
compensating variations from his mixed logit with correlated parameters are smaller 
than those found by MNL and mixed logit. He concludes that there probably is no 
general conclusion whether MNL gives good estimates for the Willingness-to-Pay and 
that the performance of MNL will be different for each dataset. 
This compares with the results of a theoretical study of Horowitz (1980), who used 
datasets created by Monte Carlo simulation. He found that ignoring heterogeneous 
marginal utilities causes no bias in ratio of coefficients (i.e. WTP’s) from MNL 
estimations. He did find, however, that ignoring heterogeneity causes the choice 
probabilities to be biased. He also found that correlated unobserved elements (i.e. a 
nested structure) cause the probabilities to be biased.  
With MNL and nested logit it is only possible to control for observed heterogeneity. 
In this respect, it is important that the used survey has data on travel cost compensation, 
which we expect to have a substantial effect on the marginal utility of price.  
This paper studies whether the WTP’s and elasticities from MNL are also biased for 
our data, as was found in other empirical studies. It also studies what the effect is of 
travel cost compensation on the price sensitivity and choice probabilities of the 
respondents.   
The next section discusses the SP experiment. Section 3 discusses the different 
methods we use. Thereafter, section 4 describes the season card utility functions. 
Section 5 analyses the MNL estimations. Section 6 discusses the nested logit estimation. 
Section 7 discusses the mixed logit estimation and Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. Discussion of the season card stated preference experiment 
 
This section discusses the used Stated Preference (SP) exercise. This paper uses the 
dataset from an SP season card experiment, in which 626 current Dutch Railways (NS) 
season cardholders participated. This NS tariff structure review stated preference survey 
was designed and carried out by Steer Davies Gleave (2007).  
The season card SP experiment was part of a larger survey, which also studied the 
preferences of discount card holders and single ticket travellers. The experiments were 
conducted among on members of the NS internet panel. Of the 13000 invitations send 
out for the entire survey, a total of 4571 respondents completed their SP experiment(s) 
and questionnaires, resulting in a response rate of 35%. The survey was carried out in 
June and July 2006 (Steer Davies Gleave, 2006a). Note that the experiment does not 
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cover people who might become cardholders in the future. Hence, the results of this 
paper are not representative for the entire population of potential cardholders.  
In the experiment, the respondents were asked to choose between three alternatives: 
(1) an unrestricted season card, which is the same as their current season card but more 
expensive, (2) a cheaper card, with travel frequency and rush hour travel restrictions and 
(3) no card (i.e. do not buy a season card).  The experiment was based on an orthogonal, 
fractional factorial design and there was no correlation between any of the design 
variables. The experiment had 32 different choice cards. To limit the risk of loss of 
concentration of the respondents, each respondent was shown only eight cards, each of 
which was randomly selected from the total of 32 (Steer Davies Gleave, 2006b). 
Background questions were asked on for instance age, trip purpose and in-vehicle 
travel time of their most frequent trip, the price of their current card, and the proportion 
of the price of their season card that they pay themselves. The price of the current 
season card was used as a benchmark in the creation of the choice cards. Table 2 gives a 
description of the SP experiment, and Figure A.1 in the appendix gives an example 
choice card. Note that the order in which the alternatives were presented was randomly 
determined for each choice card. 
Table 2: Description of the season card choice experiment 
Note: source Steer Davies Gleave (2006b) 
 
There are four levels for the price difference design variable (10%, 20%, 30% and 
40% of the current price). The price difference was divided over an increase, relative to 
the current price, for the unrestricted card and a lowering for the restricted card. This 
so called “split” of the price difference was randomly generated. The design variable 
was, hence, the price difference between the two alternatives as a percentage of the 
current price (Steer Davies Gleave, 2006b). For example, with a 30% price difference 
and a 2:1 split, the unrestricted card is 20% more expensive than the current card and 
the restricted card 10% cheaper. 
The restricted season card was invalid during the peak, the start and end of which 
were varied independently. A holder of this card thus would have to travel outside the 
restricted periods, or buy a single train ticket to travel during the restricted period or 
travel by a different mode. The start and end points of the AM and PM restricted 
periods varied independently around the references times of 8:00 and 17:00. Each of the 
four travel moment restriction variables has four levels, 0, 30, 60 and 90 minutes. In 
half of the choice cards, the restricted card had the limitation of maximum 5 days 
travelling per week with the card. In the analysis this experiment, the prices of the 
yearly season cards were divided by twelve, to obtain monthly prices (Steer Davies 
Gleave, 2006b). The average monthly price of the current season card of the 
respondents was 170 euros. 
Alternatives Design variables Levels of the design variables 
1 Unrestricted season 
   card 
Price difference between the 
two types of season card’s 
10%, 20%, 30% and 40% 
of the current price 
2 Restricted season card Travel moment restrictions 0 min, 30 min, 60 min and 90 min from 8:00 or 17:00 
3 No card Maximum 5 days of travel per week 
Yes a maximum or no maximum 
of 5 days per week 
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The respondents were asked, for the outward and return trip, if they could arrive 
earlier and later, and if so by how much. The possible answers are not earlier (later), 
max 30 minutes, max one hour, and more than an hour earlier  (later). 
Figure 1 shows how often the three alternatives were chosen. It is clearly visible that 
the unrestricted card is the most popular. 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Unresticted season card Restricted season card No card
 
Figure 1: Choice frequency of the alternatives in the SP experiment. 
 
 
3. Estimation methodology 
 
This study uses random utility maximization models. The utility function (Uiqt) for 
alternative i of respondent q in choice situation t is stated in (1). It has two parts, a 
deterministic part (Viqt) and an additive random part (εit), which is unknown to the 
observer. MNL bases its calculations on the assumption that the unobserved elements 
are independently and identically distributed (IID) and have the distribution form 
Extreme Value Type 1 (EV1) (Koppelman and Sethi, 2000). 
The deterministic utility function of alternative i, for individual q in choice situation t, 
is represented by (2). It is determined by a vector of k attributes (xiqt) and their 
parameters (vector βi). With MNL only one fixed parameter for each variable can be 
estimated. It is possible that the individual respondent (q) faces several choice situations 
(indicated by subscript t). The T in superscript indicates that the vector is transposed. 
Note that βiT xiqt may also contain an alternative specific constant (ASCi). Individual 
characteristics (zq) and their vector of parameters (δi) can be added to Viqt. These 
variables are added to control for observed heterogeneous preferences for the 
alternatives, by differentiating the ASC’s over observed characteristics. Matrix Ψi gives 
the effect of the characteristics on the marginal utilities of the attributes. This, hence, 
enables a control for observed heterogeneous responses to the attributes. 
 
 iq t
 
U =  V +  iq t iq t ε  (1) 
V = (  + )  + iqt i i iq qt i iqz x zβ δΨ T T  (2) 
(1 )P iqt ikqtiqt ikq iqt ikqtxikqt
ikqt iqt
P x
E P x
x P
β∂= = −
∂
 (3) 
 
The direct micro (choice situation specific) elasticity for Multinomial Logit (MNL) is 
given by (3). It can be interpreted as the elasticity of the probability that individual q, in 
choice situation t, chooses alternative i, with respect to a change in the kth attribute. 
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This formula gives a different elasticity for each respondent and in each choice 
situation. To aggregate the micro elasticities we calculate the choice probability 
weighted average of all the micro elasticities of all respondents and the multiple choice 
situations they face. An alternative would be to calculate the normal average or to use 
the average (sample) values of the variables and marginal utilities. Louviere, Hensher 
and Swait (2000) warn against the usage of the using sample averages and calculating 
the unweighted average. Logit estimations are non-linear, thus the estimated logit 
function need not to pass through the point defined by the sample averages. The 
unweighted average ignores that situations (and persons) with a higher choice 
probability have a larger influence on total demand. 
Nested logit is a popular alternative for MNL. It to some extent relaxes the 
assumption of independently distributed unobserved elements. Nested logit allows for 
correlation between the utilities of alternatives in predefined “nests”. This correlation 
comes from unobserved factors that influence the utility of the alternatives in the nest in 
the same manner. In our study there are three alternatives, (1) an unrestricted card, (2) a 
cheaper card with restrictions, and (3) do not buy a season card (i.e. the no card 
alternative). It seems likely that the two alternatives that entail owning a card have some 
unobserved similarities, and are hence in the “season card” nest. The (hypothetical) 
restricted card is by design the unrestricted card with a lower price and some validity 
restrictions added. This implies a nest tree with two levels. The scale parameters of the 
alternative level (µi) are normalised to one. Thus this study uses the version of nested 
logit with the scale parameters of the alternative level normalised to one and hence only 
the nest level scale parameters estimated.  
Under the said normalisation, the deterministic utility of nest l is Vlqt= λl*IVlqt. The 
IVlqt is the “Inclusive Value” variable and is equal to the natural logarithm of the sum of 
the exponentials of the deterministic utilities of all alternatives in the nest (i.e. it is the 
log sum). The λl is the scale parameter for the branch level. The correlation of the utility 
functions of two nested alternatives is corr(Vj-Vi)=1-(λl)2. The closer λl is to one, the 
lower the correlation. If the parameter is not significantly lower than one, the model can 
be estimated by MNL (Louviere, Hensher and Swait, 2000). The (choice situation 
specific) micro elasticity for nested logit, when the µi‘s are normalized and there are two 
levels, is following Greene (2002) given by  
 
λ * ( | )(1 ( )) (1 ( | )) .iqt
ikqt
P
l ikq qt qt ikqt ikq qt ikqtXE P i l P l x P i l xβ β= − + −  (4) 
 
The Pqt(i|l) is the conditional choice probability of alternative i, conditional on its nest 
l being chosen. The Pqt(l) is the choice probability of nest l. The total (unconditional) 
choice probability (Pqt(i)) is the product of the conditional choice probability of i and 
the choice probability of its nest (Greene, 2002). 
MNL and nested logit both suffer from their respective IID assumptions and that they 
can only control for observed heterogeneity. Mixed logit can allow non-IID unobserved 
elements and can control for unobserved heterogeneity (Bhat, 2000b).  
The utility function for mixed logit is given by (5). The xiqt is a vector of attributes 
and βiq a vector of individual parameters, which is the same for respondent q over all 
choice situations. The individual marginal utility of attribute k is determined by (6). The 
βik is the fixed parameter and ηiqk is the random individual component of the parameter. 
We thus used a panel version of mixed logit. Note that Revelt and Train (1998) 
developed the panel formulation of mixed logit. The panel version of mixed logit 
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controls for the fact that we use an experiment with repeated choices and thus that the 
unobserved elements will (most likely) be similar for a respondent over the choice 
situations. In contrast, the non-panel version would assume that the unobserved random 
elements of the marginal utility of price will be completely different for a respondent 
from one choice situation to the next. 
 
Uiqt= β iqT xiqt + εiqt  (5) 
sd_ik=  + *iqk ik ik q iqkv z
Tβ β β η+  (6) 
 
The distribution form of the random part has to be predefined. With mixed logit it is 
also possible to take into account systematic differences in the parameters. For this, a 
vector of background variables (zq) is multiplied by vector υik, which determines the 
effect of the background variables on the parameter. The ASC is part of β iqT xiqt, hence it 
is possible to differentiate the ASC’s over individuals (Hensher, Rose and Greene, 
2005). 
We use two types of distribution shapes of the random component in this paper. The 
first is the triangular distribution and the second the lognormal. The lognormal 
distribution has the useful property that the marginal utilities are constrained to have the 
same sign for all respondents. This is useful for variables for which it is implausible to 
have negative or positive effects on utility1.  
The mixed logit choice probability formula of equation (7) has an open-form integral 
in it. Consequently, this probability can generally not be calculated directly and has to 
be approximated by simulation (Train, 2003). Values for the random elements (the 
ηiqk’s) are drawn and then using the values of the variables and the predefined 
distributions of the random elements, the conditional probabilities (Liqt) are calculated. 
These probabilities are conditional on the draws of the random elements and hence the 
simulated outcome is different for each draw. Therefore, the process is repeated for 
many draws for each choice situation and the average probabilities are used as 
approximations of the choice probabilities. 
 
( )exp ( ) d L ( ) d
exp( )iq iq
iqt
iqt iq iq iqt iq iq
jqtj
V
P f f
Vβ β
η η η η= =
  
 
  (7) 
 
An important question is what number of repetitions results in a reasonably accurate 
and stable simulated outcome. The simulation for mixed logit traditionally uses pseudo-
random draws. This method has the disadvantage that it requires a very large number of 
repetitions to get stable results (Hensher, Rose and Greene, 2005). Bhat (2000b) 
proposes the use of Halton draws. Halton sequences are generated from number theory 
and are more uniformly spread than the pseudo-random draws. This causes the 
estimation to be stable with fewer repetitions. For this reason, we only used Halton 
draws. We used LIMDEP/NLOGIT to estimate the models in this paper, using 
maximum (simulated) likelihood and for our final mixed logit estimation we used 2500 
Halton draws.  
                                                 
1
 It is not directly possible to estimate negative coefficients with this distribution. However, this is easily 
be solved by multiplying the variable, which should have a negative marginal utility, by minus one. 
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The choice situation specific (micro) elasticity with mixed logit is given by equation 
(8). This elasticity has two parts that are in open-form integrals. One part gives the 
derivative of the probability to the independent variable and the second gives the choice 
probability (Train, 2003). To approximate these we perform a second simulation using 
100 Halton draws. Each draw results in a different derivative and probability for the 
same choice situation for the same person. The average derivatives and probabilities are 
then used as approximations and used to calculate the choice situation specific (micro) 
elasticities. These are then, following Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000), aggregated 
by calculating the choice probability weighted average.  
The Halton draws used the primes 2 and 3. The simulation with a 100 draws was very 
stable. When we ran the same code using different sets of primes the aggregate 
elasticities only differed from each other by a few thousands. 
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4. Utility functions for the season cardholders 
 
This section describes the used deterministic utility function (Viqt) for each alternative 
(i=1,2,3) for respondent q in choice situation t. In the first two alternatives, the 
respondent continues to own a season card. Accordingly, the utility functions of these 
two contain the benefit of owning a card. The price sensitivity, as measured by the 
parameter of the price attribute, is assumed to be the same for both alternatives. To 
control for differences in the proportion of the price that respondents pay themselves, 
the price variable is interacted with the proportion paid by the respondent and the 
proportion paid by others variables, to obtain two price attributes.  
The coefficient for “price paid by a third party” will be zero if the respondent does 
not care about the money spend by the third party. However, it could for example be the 
case that an employee fears that increases in the amount paid by the employer will 
induce him to make the compensation policy less generous, or that she fears a negative 
relation between the travel compensation and the wage. Than in those cases the 
coefficient will be negative.  
In (9a-c), the βp2q is the coefficient of “price*proportion paid” (representing “own” 
expenses) and βp3q is the coefficient of the other interacted price variable (representing 
the amount spend by the third party). It is expected that βp3q is negative, though smaller 
in absolute sense than βp2q. If the utility of individual q of owning a card is subtracted 
from each alternative, this results in the following utility functions: 
 
V(1=unrestricted card)qt= βp2q*price1qt*proportion paidq+βp3q*price1qt(1-proportion paidq), (9a) 
V(2=restricted card)qt    = βp2q*price2qt*proportion paidq+βp3q*price2qt(1-proportion paidq) 
                          
5
 
1
 * restriction + ASC_2 ,n nqt qγ+∑  (9b) 
V(3=no card)
 qt              =  - β1q* owning a cardq =ASC_3q. (9c) 
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In (9a-c), the constant of the no card alternative (ASC_3q) is defined as minus the 
utility of owning a card, and therefore measures the utility of owning a card 
(irrespective of whether or not it is restricted). The five “restriction variables” are added 
to the restricted card’s utility function. There are two variables measuring the beginning 
and end of the restrictions in the morning, two that do the same for the afternoon, and 
one dummy variable for if the restricted card has a maximum of five days per week of 
free of extra charge of travelling. The last restriction is a travel frequency restriction, 
whereas the earlier four are travel moment restrictions. These four variables are 
measured in minutes from some reference point.  
These reference points can be measured in two ways. With the first method the 
reference points are 8:00 in the morning and 17:00 for the afternoon. If the two 
variables are zero there is no travel restriction. This measurement gives the travel 
moment restrictions as they were shown in the choice cards to the respondents.  
The second type follows the specification proposed by Steer Davies Gleave (2006b), 
and is centred around the times the respondent reported currently to start and finish her 
(most frequent) round trip. Suppose that the respondent gets on the train at 8:00 AM for 
the outbound journey, at 18:30 for the return journey and her trip takes 30 minutes both 
ways. Further, suppose that the restricted card is invalid between 7:00-8:30 and 16:00-
18:00. Then, if the respondent wants to travel with the restricted card, she should 
displace her outbound travel moment to 60 minutes earlier or to 30 minutes later. 
Accordingly, the displacement times earlier and later are 60 and 30 minutes. The start of 
the return journey does not need alteration and thus the values for displacement times 
for the return trip are zero. The displacement times earlier for the outbound and return 
trip are centred around the current arrival times, whereas the displacement times later 
are centred around the current departure times. 
As the restrictions are defined in minutes before and after a desired moment, they 
should give disutility and hence their parameters are hypothesized to be negative. There 
might also be some constant disutility of the restricted option. For instance, because the 
restricted card limits travel flexibility. This fixed disutility is measured by the ASC_2 
of the restricted card.  
The parameters of the two proportion paid interacted price variables can combined to 
form the total marginal utility of price by calculating 
 
 2 3 * proportion paid  + (1-proportion paid )price q p q q p q qβ β β= .    
 
It is possible to control further for different responses to changes in the attributes, by 
differentiating the βp2q and βp3q parameters. It seems likely that the coefficients for the 
price variables also differ over the respondents for unobserved reasons. It is also 
plausible that people with inflexible travel moments receive more disutility from the 
travel moment restrictions. The utility of owning a card differs over the respondents and 
it is likely that part of this remains unobserved. Examples of unobserved differences are 
accessibility of the origin train station, accessibility of the final destination from the 
destination rail station and relative preference for rail travel. 
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5. MNL estimations 
 
Of the 626 respondents who completed the season card experiment, 568 respondents 
are actually used in this study. The other 58 respondent were filtered out because they 
reported that their most frequent trip made by the season card was for other purposes 
than commuting, going to school or a business trip. The focus in this study is on these 
three groups of “scheduled” travellers. Eight choice cards were shown to each 
respondent, hence there are 4544 observations. 
As explained the four travel moment restriction variables are formulated, following 
the specification of Steer Davies Gleave (2006b), in the “displacement time” format2. 
The advantage of the displacement time variables is that they make the effect of the 
restrictions more person specific, so that their value is more likely to reflect the 
concerns of the individual. Note that these displacement time variables cannot be 
directly used to measure schedule delay valuation. Even with the restricted card, 
respondents can travel in the restricted period by single standard tickets or by car. 
Table 3 shows the basic MNL estimation. This model does not yet control for the 
proportion of the price that respondents pay themselves. Coefficients for the three 
alternatives are depicted in separate columns. All six coefficients of the attributes are of 
the expected sign, and significant at the one percent level. 
Among the displacement time attributes, the later restriction of the outbound trip 
moment gives more disutility than the displacement time earlier of the outbound trip. In 
contrast, for the return trip the displacement time earlier gives more disutility than later. 
This probably reflects the fact that the scheduling constraints at the destination (e.g. 
work) are more tight than at the origin (e.g. at home). 
Both ASC’s are significantly negative. The control variables make the ASC’s group 
specific and hence control for heterogeneous preferences. The inflexible travel moment 
variable is a count variable for how often out of four questions the respondent answered 
that she could not change her travel moments of the most frequent trip. Thus, if she 
could start the outbound trip later or earlier, and if she could leave earlier or later for the 
return trip. The higher the value of this variable, the more inflexible she is and the less 
attractive the restricted card. This variable has a very significant negative effect on the 
utility of the restricted card. 
Dummies reflecting the journey length (in-vehicle travel time of the most frequent 
trip) are added to all MNL estimations. Note that these are not attributes, but 
background variables. The journey lengths were reported in minutes. The variable is 
represented by five dummies; 15 minutes or less, 16 to 30 minutes, 31 to 45 minutes, 46 
to 90 minutes and more than 90. The respondents with 15 minutes or less are the 
reference group. An advantage of using dummies is that it enables the study of non-
linear effects. Respondents with journeys that are shorter than 16 minutes are more 
likely to choose the no card alternative. Presumably, for these shorter trips there is more 
competition from more alternative modes of transport. The effect on the restricted card 
alternative is more unclear. Only the 46 to 90 minutes dummy has a significant effect. 
This indicates that this group has more difficulty coping with the restrictions. 
                                                 
2
 In an estimation not shown in this paper, the final MNL model was re-estimated using the absolute 
travel moment restrictions (i.e. relative to absolute clock times) instead of the displacement time 
variables. The replacement had very little effect on the coefficients of the other attributes. The only 
substantial effect was of the ASC of the restricted card alternative. 
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The car dummy is 1 if the household of the respondent owns one or more cars. It has a 
slightly significant effect in the restricted card’s utility function. Persons with a car 
available are more willing to accept the restrictions. Car availability does not affect the 
constant of the third no card alternative. This indicates that car availability does not 
alter the utility of owning a season card, though it does alter the possibility of coping 
(once in a while) with the restrictions. Finally, a categorical variable on the weekly 
frequency of the most often made trip is added. This variable controls for the fact that 
persons who travel more, should receive different utilities from the alternatives. The 
surprising result is that the variable has no effect in the MNL estimations, whereas we 
expected that a season card is more valuable for travellers with higher trip frequencies. 
Table 3: Estimation of the season card choice with one price variable. 
 Season Card (1) Card with restrictions (2) No card (3) 
 Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Attributes 
   
Price (generic) -0.0026*** -6.14 -0.0026*** -6.14  
Displacement time outbound trip 
earlier   -0.0085
***
 -3.70   
Displacement time outbound trip later   -0.0187*** -9.31   
Displacement time return trip earlier   -0.0119*** -6.35   
Displacement time return trip later   -0.0097*** -4.60   
Max 5 days travel   -0.2573*** -2.75   
Control variables 
   
Inflexible travel moment   -0.1311*** -3.91   
Journey time in 
minutes dummies: 15 min or less   Reference Group Reference Group 
 16 to 30 min   0.1250 0.84 -0.7405*** -4.62 
 31 to 45 min   -0.1426 -0.87 -0.8059*** -4.55 
 46 to 90 min   -0.3425** -1.96 -0.6717*** -3.69 
 More than 91 min   -0.1398 -0.85 -0.8373*** -4.50 
Car in household   0.1853* 1.76 -0.0221*** -0.20 
Frequency trip   0.0199 0.24 -0.0862 -0.94 
ASC   -0.9081*** -4.36 -2.7363*** -11.03 
Respondents   568        Choice cards per respondent   8        log-likelihood   -2840.65         Adjusted Rho2   0.5731 
Note: ***, ** and *, respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
The Adjusted Rho2 is calculated as (LL(estimation)-number of parameters) / LL(0), where LL(0) is the 
log-likelihood for an estimation with all parameters fixed at zero. 
 
Table A.1 in the appendix shows the estimation following the specification of (9a-c), 
with two price interacted with proportion paid by the respondent variables. The log-
likelihood for this estimation is much higher than for the estimation of Table 3. 
Respondents react much stronger to prices if they pay a higher proportion themselves. 
There is a marked difference in the price sensitivities of those who pay little themselves 
and those who pay a large share. The coefficient of Price*proportion paid is much 
larger in absolute sense than the coefficient of Price*proportion paid by others. 
However, the effect of Price*proportion paid by others is also significantly negative. 
Travel cost compensation has therefore the expected large effect on the price 
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sensitivities. However, even respondents who currently are fully compensated are not 
completely price insensitive. Whether this is because they do care about what third part 
pays, or because they fear changes in the compensation policy following price increases, 
is unknown. In any case, these results suggest that cost compensation has a large effect 
on the decision of purchasing a season card. 
Control dummies on occupation and purpose of the most frequent trip have no effect 
in the estimations. Interacting the attributes with the occupation, trip length, and 
purpose of trips variables does not alter the results. Especially interesting is that car 
ownership of the respondent’s household does not alter the price sensitivity. We 
expected that with an easily available alternative mode one would expect that the 
respondent would be more price sensitive.  
The estimation of Table A.2 tests whether there is a different valuation of the season 
card over the age groups. The 30 to 39 and 50 to 59 year olds value the season card 
significantly less than the 60 and older group. For the 18 and younger, 20 to 29 and the 
40 tot 49 no effect is found.  Note that the coefficients for the dummies for the age 
categories are not significantly different from each other. 
It seems possible that the effects of the price and travel restrictions variables differ 
with the gender of the respondent. The results of the final MNL specification are shown 
in Table 4. It interacts the gender dummy (one for women) with price*proportion paid 
and adds gender dummies to the utility functions. The price*(proportion paid)*gender 
interaction variable has a significant positive effect on utility. This indicates that women 
are less price sensitive than men. Conversely, the gender dummies alone have no direct 
effect. This predicts that there is no difference in the valuation of the alternatives over 
gender. There is again a clear difference in the price sensitivities of those who pay little 
themselves and those who pay a large share of the price of the season card. 
Interacting the restriction attributes with background variables does not lead to 
statistical improvements. It was expected that respondents with more restricted travel 
moments value travel moment restrictions more. This was tested by interacting the 
displacement time variables with their respective answers on the question on how much 
the travel moment could be changed. An example should make this arrangement clearer. 
The displacement outbound trip later variable was interacted with the answer to the 
question how much the respondent could start her most frequent outbound trip later. 
However, we found that the interacted displacement time variables have no effect on the 
utility of the restricted card. Similarly, car ownership, age, purpose of the trip and 
occupation do not differentiate the marginal utilities of the attributes. Interacting the 
gender dummy with the other attributes also does not improve matters.  
The effect of proportion paid on the price sensitivity is very large. However, 
interpreting the resulting coefficients is difficult. When the price is raised, it is uncertain 
how much of this raise is paid by the individual and how much by the third party. The 
proportion paid could remain constant. The respondent could have to pay the entire 
increase herself. It is also possible that following the increase the respondent will 
convince the third party to increase the share that it pays. Conversely, the third party 
could make its compensation policy less generous. In the discussion of the estimations, 
it is assumed that the proportion paid is constant, that it is just a background variable.  
The total marginal utility of the price attribute is given by 
 
 2 q 3(  + *gender )  proportion paid  + (1-proportion paid )total q p g q p qβ β β β=  (10) 
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Table 4: Estimation of the final MNL model. 
Note: ***, ** and *, respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
The betas in this formula are the same for everyone. The coefficient of 
price*proportion paid by others from the estimation of Table 4 is the βp3 (βp3 =-0.0023). 
The βp2 is the coefficient of price*proportion paid. The βg is the coefficient of 
price*proportion paid*gender. For instance, for men who receive no travel cost 
compensation the total marginal utility of price is equal to βp2.. The resulting group 
specific coefficient is used in the calculation of elasticities and WTP’s. On average the 
total marginal utility of price is -0.00288. This suggest that ignoring the heterogeneity 
caused by the compensation, as the estimation of Table 3 did, has no effect on the mean 
estimate of the marginal utility of price. However, ignoring the heterogeneity does cause 
the probabilities to be biased. When heterogeneous marginal utilities are ignored, the 
Unrestricted card (1) Restricted card (2) No card (3) 
 
Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Attributes 
      
price*proportion paid (generic) -0.0064*** -8.44 -0.0064*** -8.44   
price*proportion paid by others 
(generic) -0.0023
***
 -4.85 -0.0023*** -4.85   
price*proportion paid*gender (generic) 0.0043*** 4.01 0.0043*** 4.01  
Displacement time outbound trip earlier   -0.0085*** -3.72   
Displacement time outbound trip later   -0.0187*** -9.29   
Displacement time return trip earlier   -0.0118*** -6.33   
Displacement time return trip later   -0.0098*** -4.63   
Max 5 days travel 
 
  -0.2578*** -2.75   
Control variables 
   
Inflexible travel moment    -0.1342*** -3.99   
Journey time in 15 min or less   Reference Group Reference Group 
minutes dummies: 16 to 30 min   0.1166 0.78 -0.7542*** -4.65 
 31 to 45 min   -0.1603 -0.97 -0.8073*** -4.49 
 46 to 90 min   -0.3540** -2.02 -0.7452*** -4.02 
 More than  90   -0.1733 -1.04 -0.9741*** -5.10 
Car in household    0.1916* 1.82 0.0473 0.41 
Frequency trip    0.0273 0.33 -0.0736 -0.77 
Gender dummy 
(1=women)    -0.0658 -0.67 -0.0918 -0.71 
Age dummies 18 or less 
  
  0.8275 1.21 
 19 to 29     1.1382* 1.87 
 30 to 39     1.2101** 1.99 
 40 to 49     0.8267 1.36 
 50 to 59     1.1639* 1.92 
 60 and older    Reference Group 
ASC   -0.7514*** -3.59 -3.0454*** -4.79 
Respondents   568        Choice cards per respondent   8        log-likelihood   -2815.6        Adjusted Rho2   0.5700 
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unobserved elements of the two card alternatives will be correlated, as they both contain 
the deviation from the mean marginal utility (because of the travel cost compensation) 
multiplied by the price. Thus controlling for travel cost compensation is especially 
important when doing forecasting or calculating elasticities. Furthermore, by ignoring 
cost compensation one ignores an important source of heterogeneity and this 
heterogeneity might also be of interest in itself. 
Table 5 shows the average WTP’s for the restrictions. A Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) is 
calculated by dividing the coefficient of a (restriction) attribute by the (group average) 
marginal utility of the price attribute. A WTP measures how much of a price increase 
would give the same utility as a one unit increase in the attribute, and thus what price 
decrease the average respondent requires to accept a one unit worsening in that attribute 
and being equally well off as before.  
The fully compensated are willing to spend much more for reductions in the 
restrictions than those who are not fully compensated. Women are willing to spend 
substantially more than men. Men will on average accept a €2.92 per month price 
increase and women €8.19, for a one minute decrease in the displacement time later for 
the outbound trip. A one-minute decrease in the displacement time earlier for the return 
trip gives men on average the same utility as a price increase of €1.85. The value for the 
displacement later for the return trip for women is €4.28. The maximum 5 days of travel 
by season card is valued on average as much as a price increase of €40.34 by men and 
€113.03 by women. This is equal to a displacement time earlier and later for the 
outbound trip of 30 and 14 minutes. 
Table 5: Willingness-to-Pay for reductions in the restrictions for the final MNL model. 
Variable Coeff. / average total combined 
marginal utility of price 
 
Both 
genders Men Women 
For the fully 
compensated 
For those who 
receive no cost 
compensation 
Displacement time outbound trip 
earlier € 1.85 € 1.33 € 3.73 € 3.70 € 1.68 
Displacement time outbound trip 
later € 4.06 € 2.92 € 8.19 € 8.13 € 3.70 
Displacement time return trip earlier € 2.58 € 1.85 € 5.20 € 5.13 € 2.34 
Displacement time return trip later € 2.12 € 1.53 € 4.28 € 4.26 € 1.94 
Max 5 days travel € 56.06 € 40.34 € 113.03 € 112.09 € 74.26 
Table 6: Aggregate price elasticities for the final MNL model. 
 Unrestricted season card Restricted season card 
 Combined Men Women Combined Men Women 
For the whole group -0.132 -0.164 -0.088 -0.369 -0.427 -0.279 
For the fully compensated -0.091 -0.098 -0.082 -0.292 -0.304 -0.275 
For those who receive no travel cost 
compensation -0.216 -0.296 -0.058 -0.492 -0.613 -0.210 
 
The price elasticities of the unrestricted and restricted card are differentiated in Table 
6 by the “proportion paid” of the season card’s price and gender. The choice situation 
specific elasticities are calculated with (3). After the calculation of the micro elasticities, 
the elasticities are aggregated by calculating the choice probability weighted average. 
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The price elasticities are rather low (in absolute sense). Especially, the price 
elasticities for the unrestricted card are very small. The elasticities are in fact so low 
that it is suspicious. Women react more inelastically to price changes than men. 
Surprising is that the women who currently are fully compensated have a larger 
elasticity (in absolute sense) to total price than the women who pay the entire price 
themselves (as they receive no compensation). This is a peculiar result, as one would 
expect that the larger share a person has to pay, the more price-sensitive she is. 
The elasticities for the restricted card are larger in absolute sense than for the 
unrestricted card. This result is because the choice probabilities for the restricted card 
are much lower than for the unrestricted card, and ceteris paribus the higher the 
probability the smaller the absolute size of a MNL elasticity. This is also visible in the 
MNL elasticity formula (3). See also Figure 1 for the distribution of the choice 
frequencies. 
The responses of the respondent seem very price inelastic. The MNL estimations 
show that there is a substantial difference in the price sensitivity depending on what 
share a respondent pays of the card’s price. 
 
 
6. The nested logit estimation 
 
The nested logit estimation controls for the correlated unobserved utilities of the two 
season card alternatives. The two season card alternatives are put in the “buy a season 
card” nest and the third (no card) alternative sits alone in its degenerate “do not buy a 
card” nest. This nest structure is also depicted in the nest tree of Figure A2 in the 
appendix. Adding control variables in estimation proved more difficult with nested logit 
than with MNL. When the inflexible travel time variable or the journey length dummies 
are added, the estimation does not converge. Journey length in minutes and its squared 
form are added to the estimation, allowing at least some control for non-linear effects. 
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Table 7: The nested logit model. 
 Unrestricted card (1) Restricted card (2) No card (3) 
 Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Attributes 
      
Price * proportion paid (generic) -0.0273*** -9.73 -0.0273*** -9.73   
Price * proportion paid by others 
(generic) -0.0089
***
 -6.59 -0.0089*** -6.59   
Price * proportion paid*gender dummy 
(generic) 0.0137
***
 3.78 0.0137*** 3.78   
Displacement time outbound trip earlier   -0.0089*** -3.82   
Displacement time outbound trip later   -0.0183*** -9.01   
Displacement time return trip earlier   -0.0112*** -5.84   
Displacement time return trip later   -0.0092*** -4.31   
Max 5 days travel   -0.2840*** -2.94   
Control variables 
   
Journey time in minutes   -0.0306*** -5.27 -0.0236*** -3.84 
(Journey time in minutes)^2   0.0002*** 4.82 0.0002*** 3.45 
Car in household   0.3086*** 2.84 0.0066 0.06 
Frequency trip   -0.1114 -1.29 -0.0856 -0.92 
Gender dummy (1=women)   0.0741 0.68 -0.1180 -1.02 
ASC   -0.6697*** -2.94 -1.9280*** -8.97 
       
Nest level scale parameters 
      
Nest Coeff. t-statistic (against H0:    scale parameter =1) 
Buy a season card 0.1710*** 29.06 
Do not buy a season card 1.0000 Fixed normalised parameter 
Respondents  568      Choice cards per respondent  8      log-likelihood  -2799.2      Adjusted Rho2   0.5649 
Note: ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
 
The scale parameters on the alternative level and for the degenerate do not buy a 
season card nest are normalized to one. The scale parameter for the “buy a season card” 
nest is very low with 0.17 and is significantly different from one and zero. This shows 
that the IID assumption of MNL is violated. Following Hensher, Rose and Greene 
(2005), the correlation between the utility functions of two alternatives is given by 
corr(Vj-Vi)=1-(λl)2, where the λl is the nest level scale parameter. The correlation of the 
utility functions of the two season card alternatives is therefore 1-(0.17)2=0.97. This is a 
very high correlation. Furthermore, the log-likelihood of the nested logit estimation is 
also much higher than of the final MNL model. The nested structure is clearly an 
improvement to the MNL estimation. 
All the coefficients of the attributes are of the expected sign, and significant at the one 
percent level. The control variables have a substantial effect in the estimation. The 
utilities of owning a restricted card and the no card alternative again decrease with 
journey length. The longer the most frequent trip takes, the less the decreasing effect of 
an extra minute is. This is shown by the small though significant positive coefficient of 
the squared version (the net effect remains negative though in the sample). The longer 
the journey length of the most frequent trip, the more likely it is that the respondent 
prefers the unrestricted card. This makes sense, since it is more difficult to avoid a 
certain travel window when the trip takes longer. Furthermore, for the longer trips fewer 
alternative modes are available. Thus the longer the most frequent trip the less attractive 
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the no card alternative. The car dummy has a positive effect on the utility of the 
restricted card, though it has no effect on the third no card alternative. 
Persons who receive no cost compensation are again substantially more price 
sensitive. The total price coefficient is calculated by the same equation (10) as with 
MNL and is on average -0.0118. This is more than four times the value from the final 
MNL model, whereas the coefficients of the restriction are almost exactly the same. 
Table 8: WTP’s for the nested logit model. 
Variable Coeff. / average total combined 
marginal utility of price 
 
Both 
genders Men Women 
For the fully 
compensated 
 
For those who 
receive no cost 
compensation 
Displacement time outbound trip 
earlier € 0.76 € 0.68 € 0.92 € 1.01 € 0.39 
Displacement time outbound trip 
later € 1.56 € 1.39 € 1.90 € 2.08 € 0.80 
Displacement time return trip earlier € 0.94 € 0.84 € 1.15 € 1.28 € 0.49 
Displacement time return trip later € 0.79 € 0.70 € 0.95 € 1.05 € 0.40 
Max 5 days travel € 24.22 € 21.56 € 29.38 € 32.36 € 12.37 
 
Table 8 depicts the WTP’s for the nested logit estimation. The same pattern as with 
MNL emerges for the valuations of the displacement time attributes. Respondent are on 
average willing to pay most for reductions in the displacement time later for the 
outbound trip. Women again have on average substantially higher WTP’s. The WTP’s 
are much lower with nested logit than with MNL, because the price coefficients are 
much more negative with nested logit. The coefficients for the restrictions are almost 
exactly the same with nested logit as with MNL. Thus, if the correlation between the 
utilities of two card alternatives is ignored, this results in an overestimation of the 
WTP’s for our data. Note that the coefficients of the displacement time variable are very 
similar between nested logit and MNL. This indicates that the largest problem of the 
correlated unobserved elements was for the price variables. 
Respondents are willing to suffer 32 and 15 minutes of extra displacement time later 
and earlier for the outbound trip for a lifting of the travel frequency restriction. Men are 
willing to accept a price increase of €21.56 and women of €29.38. 
The choice situation specific alternative choice probabilities elasticities of Table 9 are 
calculated with (4), after which they are aggregated by calculating the choice 
probability weighted average. The elasticities are with nested logit considerably higher 
than with MNL. Women show elastic responses to price changes in the restricted card. 
Reassuring is that we no longer see the strange result that women who are fully 
compensated are more sensitive to price changes than women that receive no 
compensation, as was found in the MNL estimation. The result is now that the larger 
share a women pays of the price, the more price sensitive she is. 
The responses to price changes of the unrestricted card are again much more inelastic 
than for the restricted season card. The price elasticities are larger because the relative 
size of the price coefficient with nested logit is bigger in absolute sense than with MNL. 
Again there is a large difference in the elasticities for the fully compensated and not 
compensated, hence the response to price changes are very different for the two groups. 
This shows again that in doing forecasting it is important to control for travel cost 
compensation, as otherwise the predicted changes in the probabilities will be incorrect. 
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Table 9: Aggregate price elasticities for the nested logit estimation.  
Group Unrestricted season card Restricted season card 
 Combined Men Women Combined Men Women 
For the whole group -0.355 -0.428 -0.254 -1.525 -1.724 -1.206 
For the fully compensated -0.215 -0.230 -0.196 -1.118 -1.182 -1.036 
For those who receive no travel cost 
compensation -0.686 -0.853 -0.352 -2.154 -2.439 -1.384 
 
The nested logit section showed that the unobserved utilities of the two season card 
alternatives are correlated. However, the calculation of the choice probabilities by MNL 
uses the assumption that these unobserved elements are uncorrelated. The WTP’s 
calculated from the nested logit output are substantially smaller and the price elasticities 
are higher. 
 
 
7. Mixed logit estimation 
 
Nested logit only relaxes the IID assumption of the MNL to some extent and it can 
not control for unobserved heterogeneity in the marginal utilities. Mixed logit, allows 
for more freedom. It seems likely that the price coefficients differ over the respondents 
for unobserved reasons. Bhat (1998) notes that not controlling for (unobserved) 
response heterogeneity, can lead to biased estimates of the elasticities and WTP’s.  
Furthermore, mixed logit allows us to take into account that the experiment has eight 
choice situations per respondent. MNL and nested logit assume that the unobserved 
elements of an alternative over the choice situations for the same person are 
uncorrelated and therefore that the unobserved elements are unrelated for the same 
person from one choice situation to the next. This seems an implausible assumption. As 
Train (2003) states, ignoring the repeated choices causes the unobserved element to be 
correlated over choice situations, and this violates the IID assumption.  
This misrepresentation of the structure of the unobserved elements (by ignoring the 
repeated choices) can cause the standard errors of the coefficients to be incorrect. For 
instance, because forcing a structure that assumes that the (random element of) a 
marginal utility are different for an individual from one choice situation to the next 
produces extra noise in the estimation.  However, this should not affect the mean 
parameter estimates. In an estimation not tabulated in this paper we re-estimated our 
mixed logit model while ignoring that the data is repeated choice; hence, giving the 
same individual different draws for different choice situations. The resulting 
coefficients were indeed more or less the same. However, the standard errors were 
different and on the whole larger. Furthermore, the log-likelihood for this second mixed 
logit estimation was almost 200 lower than for the panel mixed logit, while having the 
same number of coefficients. The panel version of mixed logit seems therefore more 
efficient, in that the standard errors are smaller.  
 With mixed logit it is possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
marginal utilities (i.e. response heterogeneity). By making the ASC of the no card 
alternative random, it is possible to control for unobserved differences in the utility of 
owning a season card (i.e. preference heterogeneity), as the ASC_3 is defined as the 
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negative of this utility. Train (2003) notes that by giving a constant of one or more 
alternatives a random element it is possible to control for a nest structure. In this case, 
we can thus control for the nest structure of the two card alternatives by giving the ASC 
of the third (no card) alternative a random element.  
In a footnote Revelt and Train (1998) note that there is a difference in what type of 
correlation pattern nested logit and panel mixed logit control for. Nested logit assumes 
that the correlated unobserved elements for a person over the choice situations are 
independent. Conversely, the panel mixed logit assumes that these correlated elements 
(i.e. the random element of ASC_3) are the same in all choice situations of an 
individual. The ASC_3 measures the minus of the utility of owning a card, which 
should at least be very similar, if not precisely the same, over the eight choice situations 
per person. Hence, the panel mixed logit representation of the correlation pattern seems 
the best choice for this experiment. Note that the random ASC causes the model to be 
heteroscedastic in the unobserved effects over the respondents, but not over the choice 
situations faced by an individual. 
The marginal utilities are for lognormal and triangle distributions given by 
 
- lognormal; 
_
exp( ) *  exp( * ) *  exp( ),Tkq k k sd kq k qN v zβ β β= ±  (11) 
- triangle;     
_
* .
T
kq k k sd kq k qT v zβ β β= + +  (12) 
 
Here Nkq is a normally distributed (quasi-)random variable with a zero mean and a 
standard deviation of one. It has the same value for individual q in all choice situations. 
The Tkq is a (quasi-)random variable with a triangle distribution, with -1≤Tkq≤1 and a 
zero mean. The zq contains the interaction variables and vector νk their effects on the 
marginal utility of k. The sign before the exponential in equation (11) is determined by 
the predetermined sign of the marginal utility. If the random parameter of an attribute 
must be negative, the outcome of (11) is multiplied by minus one. For our final mixed 
logit we used 2500 Halton draws and unconditional parameters. We used a panel 
version of mixed logit; hence, the 2500 were the same for individual q over the eight 
choice situations. 
The presentation of the mixed logit needs some explanation. The “Fixed parts of the 
random parameters” section in Table 10 depicts the fixed parts of the marginal utilities. 
The following section shows the coefficients for the effect of the random elements 
(βk_sd). The “Observed heterogeneity in marginal utility of price” gives the coefficients 
(νk) for the interacted variables. The estimation of Table 10 tests whether the coefficient 
of price and the ASC_3 differ for observed and unobserved reasons. 
The random element of the marginal utility of price has a lognormal distribution. 
Before the estimation, the price attribute was multiplied by minus one. The random 
element of ASC_3 has a triangular distribution. Interpreting the coefficients of the 
lognormal distributed random parameters is difficult, as the coefficients are inside an 
exponentional. An easy way to interpret the coefficients of the background variables 
(multiplied by the background variable) for log-normally distributed marginal utilities is 
that they scale the (absolute) size of the marginal utilities. Hence, their effect is not 
subtracted from the marginal utility, as is usually done for the effect of background 
variables with the other types of distribution shapes of the random element. A positive 
(negative) coefficient for the observed heterogeneity means that the larger the 
background variable the larger (smaller) the absolute size of the marginal utility. 
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Table 10: Random effects of price of the season card and owning a season card. 
   
Unrestricted card (1) Restricted card (2) No card (3) 
 Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Fixed parts of the random parameters  
     
Price -6.1077# -38.7 -6.1077# -38.7   
ASC_3     -3.3168*** -6.25 
Parameters of the random elements    
   
Price  (lognormal) 1.1681*** 12.8 1.1681*** 12.8   
ASC_3  (triangular)     9.1772*** 12.2 
Observed heterogeneity 
in marginal utility of price       
Proportion paid*price 0.9648*** 9.95 0.9648*** 9.95   
Gender (female=1) *Price -0.4455*** -4.00 -0.4455*** -4.00   
Car dummy*Price 1.4802*** 16.69 1.4802*** 16.69   
Attributes 
      
Displacement time outbound trip earlier   -0.0087*** 4.12   
Displacement time outbound trip later   -0.0194*** 9.24   
Displacement time return trip earlier   -0.0107*** 5.67   
Displacement time return trip later   -0.0113*** 5.60   
Max 5 days travel   -0.2950*** 3.36   
Control variables 
      
Journey length in minutes   -0.0297*** -6.66 -0.1127*** -10.1 
(Journey length in minutes)^2   0.0002*** 6.26 0.0008*** 8.60 
Car in household   -0.1727* -1.83 -2.9765*** -9.88 
Frequency trip   0.1042 1.10 -0.5923*** -3.97 
Gender dummy (female=1)   -0.1267 -1.59 1.2903*** 4.33 
ASC   -0.3410* -1.90   
Respondents  568     Choice cards per respondent  8     log-likelihood  -2536.1     Adjusted Rho2  0.5132 
Note: ***, ** and *, respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
# As the only reasonable H0 of a zero fixed part of this marginal utility means that this coefficient should 
be -∞ ( as Exp(-∞)=0), there is no (valid) t-statistic (Bhat, 1998). The reported t-statistic is against zero 
and only shows that the standard error is much smaller than the coefficient. 
 
The log-likelihood of the mixed logit is much lower than the one of the nested logit 
and a likelihood ratio test reject the nested logit in favour of the mixed logit at the one 
percent level. To identify observable differences in price sensitivity, the price variable 
is interacted with the proportion paid, gender and car dummies. The coefficients of 
these interactions are all significant at the one percent level. The fact that the coefficient 
of price interacted with proportion paid is positive makes clear that the larger the 
proportion of the price a respondent currently pays, the more price sensitive she is. 
Women are again less price sensitive, as for women the marginal utility is multiplied by 
exp(-0.45). Interesting is that car ownership of the respondent’s household now does 
have a significant effect on the marginal utility of the price attribute. This compares 
with the previous estimations which found no such effect. Other control variables had 
no differentiating effect on the marginal utility of price or the restrictions. 
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The ASC_3 and price variable have highly significant coefficients the random 
elements. This shows that both differ over the respondents for unobserved reasons. The 
ASC_3 is on average very negative. This indicates that on average there is a strong 
preference for owning a season card. The coefficient of the random element of the 
ASC_3 is in absolute terms almost three times the size of the fixed part. This ASC is 
meant to measure the minus of the utility of owning a season card. This shows that the 
spread in this unobserved utility is substantial.  
The coefficients of the restriction attributes are, as expected, negative and highly 
significant. The coefficients of the restrictions are roughly the same as in the MNL en 
nested logit estimation. A noticeable difference is that the ordering of relative sizes is 
slightly different. Now the coefficient for Displacement time return trip later is slightly 
larger than the one of Displacement time return trip earlier, whereas before it was the 
other way around. None of the restriction attributes are found to have random 
components. This mirrors the finding of the MNL estimations, where the coefficients of 
the restrictions did not differ for observed reasons. 
The journey length variable and its squared form have very significant effects on the 
utilities of the restricted card and no card alternatives. The longer the journey length is, 
the lower the utilities of the second and third alternatives. The minimum of the 
quadratic journey length effect function lies for the unrestricted card around 149 
minutes and for no card alternative around 141 minutes. It should be noted that the 
maximum journey length in the sample is 150 minutes and that only two respondents 
had a value of more than 140 minutes. It seems hence seems safe to state that the longer 
the journey length, the more likely one is to choose the unrestricted card and that the 
effect of extra journey length decreases, the longer the trip was to start with. The car 
dummy has negative effects on the utilities of the second and third alternatives. The 
frequency of rail travel and gender variables now have, different from the previous 
estimations, significant effects on the utility of the no card alternative. The more often a 
respondent travels by rail, the less likely she is to stop owning a card. 
Interpreting the coefficients from logit estimation, and especially a mixed logit with 
lognormal coefficients, is difficult. The results are best interpreted by calculating 
elasticities and Willingness-to-Pay. The choice situation specific elasticities are 
determined by (8). This equation has, as was stated before, two parts that are in open-
form integrals (the first for the derivative of the probability to price and the second for 
the choice probability itself) (Train, 2003). Therefore, the elasticities are approximated 
by a second simulation using 100 Halton draws. With the draws, expected values for 
each choice situation are calculated for the derivative and the choice probability, and 
these are used to calculate the simulated choice situation specific elasticities. 
As is visible in (8) the derivative depends on the realisation of the (random elements 
of the) marginal utility of price and the ASC of the no card alternative. For price the 
marginal utility is given by a rewritten version of (11), which is given in (13). Here Npq 
is a quasi-random variable, the βp the fixed part of the marginal utility, βp_sd the 
coefficient of the random element and the ν’s give the coefficients of the interactions.  
 
*exp( * * *  ).
 _
) * exp( ) * (N proportionpaid gender car dummyprice q p pq prop q g q car qp sd Expβ β β ν ν ν+= − +  (13) 
 
Table A.3 in the appendix gives the descriptive statistics for the expected values of 
the marginal utilities, based on the second simulation. The average marginal utility of 
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price from (13) is -0.0167, which is somewhat larger than with nested logit. Conversely, 
the coefficients of the restrictions are of comparable sizes in the two estimations. 
The micro elasticities, as simulated by (8), were aggregated by calculating the choice 
probability average3. Tables 11 and 12 depict the aggregate elasticities for the 
unrestricted and restricted card. The elasticities are differentiated by proportion paid by 
the respondent, car ownership of the households of the respondents and gender. 
Table 11: Aggregate elasticities for the unrestricted season card.  
Table 12: Aggregate elasticities for the restricted season card.  
Group Average A car  in the household No car in the household 
 
 
Both 
genders Men Women 
Both 
genders Men Women 
All respondents -1.624 -1.941 -2.086 -1.651 -0.725 -0.826 -0.541 
For the fully compensated -1.476 -1.775 -1.921 -1.496 -0.529 -0.647 -0.358 
For those who receive no 
travel cost compensation -1.861 -2.187 -2.282 -1.949 -1.033 -1.053 -0.965 
 
For the restricted card alternative, the responses are highly elastic to the price 
attribute. Conversely, the demand for the unrestricted card is on the whole price 
inelastic. The restricted card must offer a large price saving for it to be competitive. 
Car availability has a large effect on the price sensitivities. Respondents with one or 
more cars in the household react elastically to price changes, whereas the respondents 
without a car react very inelastically. This is logical as in the Netherlands for inter-city 
transport the car is the main alternative to the train. The fully compensated are again far 
less price sensitive than the respondents who receive no cost compensation. 
The elasticities are somewhat larger than those of the nested logit model and much 
larger than those of the MNL. This suggests that ignoring the heterogeneity in the price 
sensitivity and the correlation between the unobserved elements causes an 
underestimation of the average price sensitivity. This is a comparable result to the 
findings of Bhat (1998), who found for his data that the elasticities with mixed logit are 
higher than with MNL.  
The elasticities found here are of course not comparable to those found in other 
situations, as currently the restricted season card does not exist. For the purpose of 
comparison we therefore deleted the second restricted card alternative in a second 
calculation of the elasticities, using the coefficients of the same MNL, nested logit and 
                                                 
3
 The second simulation was performed in Gauss 6.0 and the Halton draws were based on the primes 2 
and 3. This simulation by 100 draws was remarkably stable. When we ran the same program using the 
primes 3 & 2, 5 & 7, 5 & 13, 7 & 11 and 11 & 13 the resulting (differentiated) aggregates only differed 
from each other by a few thousands.  
Group Average A car  in the household No car in the household 
  
Both 
genders Men Women 
Both 
genders Men Women 
All respondents -0.431 -0.544 -0.668 -0.377 -0.173 -0.223 -0.108 
For the fully compensated -0.173 -0.437 -0.546 -0.299 -0.113 -0.152 -0.069 
For those who receive no 
travel cost compensation -0.544 -0.713 -0.796 -0.550 -0.335 -0.359 -0.271 
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mixed logit estimations. Following, this we re-calculated the aggregate price elasticities 
for the (unrestricted) season card. The responses in the SP study had a very strong 
nested structure, because the restricted card is so similar in unobserved characteristic to 
the unrestricted card. Consequently, the probability from the deleted alternative is not 
shared proportionally over the two remaining alternatives, but goes predominantly to the 
first season card alternative. Hence, as is also visible in Table 13, the (absolute) price 
elasticities are now much smaller. The aggregate elasticity (in the average column) in 
Table 11 is 7.4 times the size of same elasticity in Table 13. 
 The demand is even almost perfectly inelastic. This result might seem surprising. 
However, the result is rather plausible observing that the owners of the season card 
predominantly are commuters and business travellers. Furthermore, a very large share 
of the respondents is fully compensated and of course travel cost compensation also 
lowers the price sensitivity. The table, hence, shows that the demand for season cards is 
actually very inelastic, even though the alternative choice probability elasticities are 
much larger in absolute sense. Note though that even these elasticities are only 
representative for the current cardholders and not for the whole population of potential 
cardholders. Since, the used experiment only included current cardholders.  
This table also clearly shows that the IID assumption is violated. The MNL elasticities 
are now after the deletion higher than the nested logit elasticities, whereas, before they 
were much smaller. With MNL by assumption the relative size of the probabilities of 
the two remaining alternatives stays the same, as Pcard / Pno card = exp(Vcard – Vno card). 
Consequently, the probability of the deleted restricted card alternative is distributed 
proportionally over the two remaining alternatives. In really the fast majority probability 
goes to the unrestricted season card, because of the strong nested structure. Hence, 
because of the IID assumption, the increase in the probability of the unrestricted card 
following the deletion with MNL is much lower than with nested logit. This in turn 
causes the recalculated price elasticities from MNL to be larger than the recalculated 
nested and mixed logit elasticities. 
Table 13: Aggregated elasticities for the unrestricted card with the restricted card alternative deleted 
 MNL Nested Logit Mixed logit 
All respondents -0.0723 -0.0517 -0.0585 
For the fully compensated -0.0652 -0.0473 -0.0475 
For those who receive no travel cost compensation -0.1124 -0.0620 -0.0817 
 
Table 14 depicts the average WTP’s. The WTP were simulated by the same draws as 
the elasticities4. The average WTP‘s for the five restrictions are calculated by dividing 
the relevant coefficient by the (expected) marginal utility of price for each individual, 
and then calculating the average. The WTP’s for the restrictions have the same pattern 
of relative sizes as with the nested logit and MNL, except that now the WTP’s for the 
Displacement time return trip earlier are slightly smaller than those of the Displacement 
time return trip earlier. To take away the 5 day per week maximum of travel days the 
respondents are on average willing to spend more than 32 euros. This has the same 
value for the average respondent as an increase in the displacement time earlier and later 
for the outbound trip of 34 and 15 minutes. The WTP’s calculated from this mixed logit 
                                                 
4
 Similar to the simulation of the elasticities, the simulated WTP’s were very stable in regard to the choice of primes on which the 
Halton draws are based, with only differences of a few thousands of a Euro of the average values over the different sets of draws. 
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are smaller than those from MNL. They are, however, larger than those of the nested 
logit, even though the average marginal utility of price is higher with mixed logit and 
the coefficients of the restrictions from the two estimations almost exactly the same. 
This is caused by the heterogeneity in the marginal utility from the mixed logit. There 
are some cases with simulated marginal utilities that are very close to zero, and this has 
an increasing effect on the average WTP. 
Table 14: WTP’s for the travel restrictions for the mixed logit estimation.  
Variable Average 
 
Both 
genders Men Women 
For the fully 
compensated 
For those who 
receive no 
compensation 
Displacement time outbound trip earlier € 0.95 € 0.74 € 1.25 € 0.40 € 1.09 
Displacement time outbound trip later  € 2.13 € 1.65 € 2.80 € 0.90 € 2.44 
Displacement time return trip earlier  € 1.17 € 0.91 € 1.54 € 0.49 € 1.34 
Displacement time return trip later  € 1.24 € 0.96 € 1.63 € 0.52 € 1.42 
Max 5 days travel € 32.31 € 25.16 € 42.53 € 13.63 € 37.03 
 
Mixed logit can control for unobserved heterogeneity, whereas nested logit and MNL 
can not allow for this. The marginal utility of the price of the season card differs over 
the respondents for unobserved reasons and the ASC_3 has a random element to control 
for unobserved heterogeneous utility of owning a season card. The price elasticities 
from mixed logit are much larger than from MNL. This seems a plausible finding, as the 
elasticities from MNL were surprisingly small. The elasticities found by mixed logit are 
also larger (in absolute sense) than those from nested logit. This suggests that ignoring 
the response heterogeneity may cause biased estimations of the price elasticities. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This paper studies a Stated Preference experiment conducted among current Dutch 
railways season cardholders. The paper uses multinomial logit (MNL), nested logit and 
mixed logit to analyse the responses of 568 cardholders to eight choice cards. The 
respondents chose between (1) an unrestricted season card, (2) a cheaper season card 
with peak travel and travel frequency restrictions and (3) the no card alternative. 
The analysis showed that the assumptions behind the MNL method are violated by the 
structure of the experiment. The two card alternatives are perceived as very similar by 
the respondents and their unobserved utilities are highly correlated, while the alternative 
no card is rather different. The respondents show heterogeneous responses to price of 
the season card: different persons have very different marginal utilities for price. The 
mixed logit specification appears to provide the most satisfactory results, as it controls 
for the unobserved response heterogeneity, the fact that the SP experiment had repeated 
choices and the correlated unobserved elements. 
There are large differences between the price elasticities of the restricted and 
unrestricted card. The demand for the restricted season card is very price elastic, while 
the (absolute) price elasticity for the unrestricted card is generally low. The elasticities 
for the price obtained with the MNL and nested logit are smaller in absolute sense than 
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those obtained with mixed logit. The estimated Willingness-to-Pay for the reductions in 
the restrictions are much lower MNL than with mixed logit. The price elasticities for 
unrestricted card when we recalculated them, after deleting the restricted card 
alternative, are very close to zero. This suggests that the demand for season cards (in the 
current situation with only one type of season card available) is very price inelastic. 
Our findings on the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on the performance of MNL 
are comparable to those of Bhat (1998; 2000a) and in contradiction to the theoretical 
paper of Horowitz (1980). An interesting question for further research is under what 
circumstances the heterogeneity leads to biased estimates of MNL for the elasticities 
and relative values of the coefficients (i.e. WTP’s). 
The proportion that respondents pay of the price of the season card has, as expected, a 
large influence on their price sensitivities. Respondents who pay nothing or a small 
share themselves of the price have much lower (absolute) price elasticities. This is 
obvious, but important, because a very large share of (Dutch) travellers get their travel 
costs entirely of partly compensated. 
It is important to control for this cause of heterogeneity in the marginal utility of price 
when doing forecasting or calculate elasticities. Without this control the choice 
probabilities might be incorrect (as it is a form of non-IID unobserved elements), and 
thus the elasticities and forecasts will be inaccurate. The best control seems interacting a 
background variable on the travel cost compensation with the price, as the used survey 
enabled us to do. However, if there is no data on the travel cost compensation, it is of 
course also possible to include this heterogeneity in the unobserved heterogeneity of the 
marginal utility with a mixed logit estimation. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A.1: Translated example of a season card SP choice card. 
Note:  The original choice cards were in Dutch, this version was created by the authors. The figure is 
based on Steer Davies Gleave (2006b, pp 7, fig. 3.1). 
Table A.1: Estimation with control for who pays the season card. 
 Unrestricted card (1) Restricted card (2) No card (3) 
 Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
Attributes 
      
Price * proportion paid (generic) -0.0042*** -6.82 -0.0042*** -6.82   
Price * proportion paid by others 
(generic) -0.0018
***
 -3.62 -0.0018*** -3.62   
Displacement time outbound trip earlier   -0.0085*** -3.71   
Displacement time outbound trip later   -0.0187*** -9.31   
Displacement time return trip earlier   -0.0119*** -6.35   
Displacement time return trip later   -0.0097*** -4.60   
Max 5 days travel 
 
  -0.2572*** -2.75   
Control variables 
      
Inflexible travel moment   -0.1323*** -3.94   
Journey time in minutes 
dummies: 15 min or less   0.1271 0.85 -0.7136
***
 -4.44 
 16 to 30 min   -0.1342 -0.82 -0.7435*** -4.19 
 31 to 45 min   -0.3339* -1.91 -0.6394*** -3.46 
 40 to 90 
  -0.1273 -0.77 -0.7721*** -4.09 
 More than  90 
   0.1876*  1.78 -0.0019 -0.02 
Car in household  
   0.0162  0.20 -0.1118 -1.21 
Frequency trip  
   0.1271  0.85 -0.7136*** -4.44 
ASC  
  -0.7564*** -3.71 -1.8620*** -9.32 
Respondents  568     Choice cards per respondent  8     log-likelihood  -2833.2     Adjusted Rho2  0.5721 
Note: ***, **, and *, respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table A.2: Final MNL model without gender effects. 
Note: ***, ** and *, respectively indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
Figure A.2: The nest tree of the alternatives 
   Unrestricted card (1) Restricted card (2) No card (3) 
   Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. Coeff. t-statistic Coeff 
Attributes 
      
price*proportion paid (generic) 
-0.0043*** -7.13 -0.0043*** 7.13   
price*proportion paid by others (generic) 
-0.0017*** -3.60 -0.0017*** 3.60   
Displacement time outbound trip earlier 
  -0.0085*** -3.71   
Displacement time outbound trip later 
  -0.0187*** -9.29   
Displacement time return trip earlier 
  -0.0118*** -6.33   
Displacement time return trip later 
  -0.0098*** -4.63   
Max 5 days travel 
  -0.2573*** -2.75   
Control variables 
      
Inflexible travel moment 
   -0.1335*** -3.98   
15 min or less   Reference group Reference group Journey time in minutes 
dummies: 16 to 30 min    0.1288 0.86 -0.7207 -4.46 
 31 to 45 min   -0.1324 -0.81 -0.7427 -4.16 
 46 to 90 min   -0.3309* -1.89 -0.6577 -3.54 
 More than  90   -0.1254 -0.76 -0.7975 -4.23 
Car in household 
    0.1881* 1.79  0.0079 0.07 
Frequency trip 
    0.0159 0.20 -0.1175 -1.25 
Age dummies 18 or less      0.6071 0.89 
 19 to 29      0.9765 1.61 
 30 to 39      1.0895* 1.81 
 40 tp 49      0.7803 1.29 
 50 to 59      1.1483* 1.91 
 60 and older     Reference group 
ASC 
   -0.7540*** -3.69 -2.8178*** -4.47 
Respondents  568      Choice cards per respondent  8      log-likelihood  -2827.1      Adjusted Rho2  0.5721 
Buy a season card Do not buy a season card 
No season card Restricted season card Unrestricted season card 
Nests: 
Alternatives 
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of the expected mixed logit marginal utilities from Table 10. 
Coefficient Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Total marginal utility of price  -0.0166 0.0173 -0.0487 -0.0021 
ASC_3 of the third alternative -3.3205 0.5950 -5.4091 -1.2363 
ASC_3 plus the effect of the control 
variables -8.5267 1.9642 -12.4807 -2.5245 
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Abstract 
 
The research deals with the use of the stated preference technique (SP) and transport demand modelling 
to analyse travel mode choice behaviour for commuting urban trips in Palermo, Italy. 
The principal aim of the study was the calibration of a demand model to forecast the modal split of the 
urban transport demand, allowing for the possibility of using innovative transport systems like car sharing 
and car pooling. 
In order to estimate the demand model parameters, a specific survey was carried out inside the urban 
area of Palermo. The survey focused on the morning rush hour and involved mainly employees, self-
employed workers and students (about 500 respondents) whose final destination was located within the 
historical centre of the city. The questionnaires contained a stated preference experiment regarding the 
choice among four different transport alternatives: private car, car pooling, car sharing and public 
transport. 
A random utility model was developed by using data resulting from the SP experiment. We found out 
that, for the specific case of Palermo, the multinomial logit proved to be the best urban transport demand 
model, even if the choice set contained three car alternatives. We identified as main attributes affecting 
mode choice behaviour the one-way trip travel time and cost, the parking time, the number of cars 
available to each household member, the alternative specific attributes for the car option and the car 
sharing one. 
The model was applied to analyse the potential demand for car sharing and car pooling in Palermo, 
under a future scenario characterized by several policy actions for limiting private transport use. The 
analysis highlighted that the car club market share could increase up to the 10% level, while car pooling 
could slightly rise. 
 
Keywords: Car sharing; Car pooling; Stated Preference; Random Utility Models; Sustainable transport 
systems. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last decades, the growth of mobility (passenger and freight transport demand) 
has produced a wild development of vehicles (car and trucks) moving inside urban 
                                                 
* Corresponding author: Marco Migliore (migliore@ditra.unipa.it) 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 40 (2008): 33-50 
 34 
Italian areas, with an alarming negative impact on the quality of life for citizens. The 
main effects of such a phenomenon are the following ones: critical travel times for 
urban trips during peak periods; high levels of air pollution and noise; damages to 
monuments and buildings with a cultural value, owing to the polluting traffic emissions. 
In order to face such challenging problems, the Italian Government launched in 1998 
the “Sustainable Mobility in Urban Areas” Decree (or Ronchi Decree) that resumed the 
engagements for the environment protection emerging from the Kyoto International 
Conference held in 1997. The strategies in favour of a sustainable urban transport 
system, which are contained in the Ronchi Decree, are listed below: 
- the introduction of the mobility manager role for enterprises and institutions with 
many employees (more than 300 in the first case and more than 800 in the second 
one); the task of a mobility manager consists in planning commuting trips, so as to 
minimize the use of car; 
- in relation to all the other enterprises and institutions, fostering the use of innovative 
transport modes, like car pooling and car sharing; 
- favouring the diffusion of low polluting emission vehicles. 
This paper considers car pooling and car sharing. Car pooling and car sharing (or car 
club) are demand optimization strategies that are widespread in Northern Europe. The 
former guarantees the reduction in vehicles moving on the urban road network by the 
formation of pools of colleagues using the same car for their journey-to-work trips. The 
application of such a solution is a typical task of a mobility manager, who can put 
workers, who need to get to the same destination within the same time-window, in 
contact with each other (Ferguson, 1997; Giuliano et al., 1990; Teal, 1987). To gain this 
outcome, the technical board of mobility managers can use a software able to manage 
databases containing information about employees (personal data, trip origin and 
destination, journey date and time, constraints and preferences) and create “ideal crews” 
based on spatial and temporal proximity conditions. 
Car sharing is a service that permits one to book a car for a short-term use (one hour 
or less), to take possession of it at a terminal close to one’s house, to return it at a 
terminal close to one’s destination, paying hourly and kilometric fees, so as to reduce 
the need for a personal vehicle (Bonsall et al., 1981; Enoch, 2002; Litman, 2000; 
Prettenthaler and Steininger, 1999; Shaheen et al., 2004; Shaheen et al., 2005). The 
consequent main benefits are the following ones: 
- reducing cars moving on the urban road network: a car sharing vehicle can replace 
several personal cars; 
- customers pay per use, sharing the following vehicle costs: lease, maintenance, repair, 
taxes and insurance; 
- reducing emissions by supplying a fleet of clean fuel vehicles; 
- reducing the need of space for parking. 
Only in the 1990s, interest in car sharing as an alternative mobility solution grew 
remarkably throughout Europe, North America and Asia. In Europe, the first 
organizations were created in Switzerland and in Germany: Mobility CarSharing 
Switzerland, StattAuto (Berlin), Stadtmobil (Bremen). Mobility CarSharing Switzerland 
(40 % of the European market at present) took place in 1987 with only 2 cars and 30 
users; in 2001 it managed a fleet of 1700 cars located in 700 different places for 44000 
users throughout Switzerland. In Germany different car sharing societies exist today: 
StattAuto operating in 200 cities for 8000 users with 300 cars located in parking areas 
for 2-10 vehicles each, Stadtmobil in Bremen with a fleet of 300 cars for 8000 users, 
Cambio with 300 cars in 5 main cities and 7000 users. Today in Germany more than 60 
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organizations supply car sharing services with a global fleet of 2000 cars for 50000 
customers; moreover, they tend to cooperate with local public transport companies to 
implement fare integration systems. 
The principal aim of the study is the calibration and use of a random utility model to 
forecast the modal split of the urban transport demand in Palermo, allowing for the 
possibility of using innovative transport systems, such as, car sharing and car pooling. 
In particular, the research focuses on the role that can be played by car sharing and car 
pooling in Palermo in response to strategies for discouraging car use and favouring 
public transport. 
This research rests on the scientific literature about travel choice behaviour modelling, 
with particular reference to random utility models and stated preference methods (Ben-
Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Daly and Rohr, 1998; Louviere et al., 2000; Ortùzar and 
Willumsen, 1994; Permain et al., 1991). In particular, it is based on urban transport 
demand modelling background. Some relevant papers from previous research are 
described below. 
O’Fallon et al. (2004) investigated the impact on mode switching of a wide range of 
policy tools (both measures discouraging car use and measures improving public 
transport services) through a stated preference experiment conducted in the three largest 
New Zealand urban areas. The observations deriving from the SP survey were 
employed to develop mode choice logit models. The policy actions increasing the cost 
of using a personal car proved to influence commuter’s mode preferences much more 
than the others. In the authors’ opinion, such a result should not induce policy makers to 
ignore the need to improve public transport services, since it is not acceptable to 
discourage car use without guaranteeing a convenient alternative mode of travel. 
Furthermore, the study revealed several constraints that make many car users “captive”, 
like the need to transport children and the need to use the car for work-related trips. 
Hunt and McMillan (1997) performed a stated preference experiment in Calgary to 
examine factors affecting the use of car pooling to work in the central business district. 
The observations thus obtained were used to estimate parameters of logit choice models. 
An interesting finding regards the time spent picking up other carpool participants that 
was valued at a premium rate of $4.00 (Canadian) per hour (about 45 %) more than the 
automobile ride time for the direct trip. Moreover, the study revealed that each 
additional non-household member, who does not imply further benefit, does tend to 
reduce in a nonlinear manner the effect of parking costs for the respondent. 
Washbrook et al. (2006) investigated commuter mode choice behaviour in response to 
road pricing and parking charges. They involved 548 commuters from a Greater 
Vancouver suburb, who at present drive alone to work, in a discrete choice experiment 
in which respondents could choose among driving alone, car pooling and taking a 
hypothetical express bus service. The resulting observations were employed to develop 
logit models that were applied to predict commuter response to various pricing 
strategies and single occupant vehicle travel time increases. Model estimation results 
suggested that increases in drive alone costs lead to greater reductions in single 
occupant vehicle demand than improvements in the times and costs of alternative modes 
(like carpooling). 
In the research presented here, adopting discrete choice modelling techniques, we 
aimed at highlighting the role that could be played, in a great town like Palermo, by 
innovative transport systems such as car pooling and car sharing in supporting a 
transport policy for a sustainable urban mobility. 
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The rest of the paper describes the study area (Section 2), the sample used for the SP 
survey (Sections 3 and 6), the questionnaire employed for the interviews (Section 4), the 
SP experiment design (Section 5), the mode choice model estimation results (Section 7), 
the application of the mode choice model (Section 8), some conclusive remarks (Section 
9). 
 
 
2. Study Area 
 
The study area is Palermo city that plays a leading role in Sicily: with a population of 
about 700000 inhabitants, its territory holds all the regional level administrative offices. 
Palermo is characterized by a “weak” public transport system. In particular, the urban 
rail network is not wide enough and its service capacity is limited by the single-track 
constraint. Moreover, in spite of covering the whole urban area, the road public 
transport suffers from the interference with the car traffic, with a negative impact on 
frequency and comfort, which can be ascribed to the insufficient development of the bus 
way network (Migliore and Catalano, 2007). 
Other problems consist in the remarkable lack of suitable parking areas for private 
vehicles, especially within the centre, and the need of new parking facilities to favour 
intermodalism. 
 
 
3. Features of the sample 
 
The research focuses on the centre of Palermo (see Figure 1) where many important 
work sites are placed: regional and municipal level administrative units, the town hall, 
the head offices of the main banks, some departments of the University, the most 
important commercial area of Palermo. 
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Figure 1: Study area. 
 
So, we conducted a Stated Preference survey involving a random sample of 
employees, university students and self-employed workers daily moving towards the 
city centre. Table 1 and Figure 2 show the composition of the sample together with its 
size. 
Table 1: The sample of commuters moving towards the city centre compared to the corresponding 
universe. 
Category Universe of 
Palermo 
Percentage in 
relation to the 
whole 
population 
Universe of 
Palermo city 
centre 
Respondents Percentage of 
respondents in 
relation to the city 
centre universe 
Employed 135803 19.40 % 12901 235 1.82 % 
Self-employed 12268 1.75 % 3249 218 6.70 % 
Student 11992 1.71 % 480 42 8.75 % 
      
Total 160063 22.86 % 16630 495  
Source: ISTAT (National Institute of Statistics) Census 2001 
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Figure 2: Composition of the sample. 
 
 
4. Questionnaire structure 
 
As stated before, this research aims at constructing a modelling tool to forecast 
choices between traditional modes of transport and innovative ones and consequently to 
identify the optimal strategy for developing car sharing and car pooling in Palermo. To 
calibrate such a demand model, a SP survey was carried out by a questionnaire 
consisting of three parts. The first section (Revealed Preference phase) deals with the 
following socioeconomic characteristics of the decision makers’ households: 
composition, sex and age of members, number of available cars and mopeds, income, 
number of members daily travelling to work or to study; moreover, we submitted 
questions concerning only the single respondent on the following aspects: mode usually 
used, time spent, origin and distance covered for a journey-to-work (or study) trip. 
The second section describes the car sharing option and asks the respondent to 
express his opinion about this alternative transport system compared with the traditional 
private car. 
The third part contains the SP exercises submitted to the sample. They consist in 
choice games requiring the decision-maker to opt for one of four alternatives: private 
car, car pooling, car sharing, public transport. 
The attributes selected to characterize the previously listed options are the following 
ones: the transport hourly cost (€/h), for car sharing; the transport kilometric cost 
(€/km), for private car, car pooling and car sharing; the transport cost per one-way trip 
(€/trip), for public transport; the parking cost per one-way trip (€/trip), for car, car 
pooling and car sharing; the time spent to move from the origin zone to the destination 
one (min.), for all the alternatives1; the parking time (min.), for car, car pooling and car 
                                                 
1
 For public transport, this time attribute includes the waiting time spent at the bus stop. 
48%
44%
8%
Employed Self-employed Student
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sharing; the access time (min.) for all the options, that is the time spent for moving from 
one’s house to the starting point of the trip (parking lot, car sharing centre, bus stop). 
The attributes vary according to a pre-specified set of levels in a way that is illustrated 
in Section 5. 
 
 
5. Definition of attributes’ levels 
 
The levels of the above mentioned attributes or explanatory variables (see Table 3) 
were determined taking into account the need to limit the number of choice exercises for 
the respondent and the need to construct a database suitable for analysing the role that 
can be played by car sharing in Palermo, under a future scenario characterized by a 
better public transport level of service. Consequently, the car sharing option has the 
larger number of attributes at two levels. The following considerations apply: 
- The car kilometric cost was set at the present value for each respondent. Under the 
random utility model calibration stage, this parameter was specified for every decision 
maker based on the yearly run covered by car, taking into account the following cost 
items referring to the car ownership case2: yearly equivalent value of the purchase 
cost, insurance, taxes, maintenance and fuel. The output of this estimation process 
consists in three cost parameters based on three different scenarios about the distance 
covered per annum (see Table 2). 
- The car pooling kilometric cost was set at the present value for each respondent, 
considering an occupancy factor of two passengers per vehicle. 
- The transport cost for car sharing consists of two components: the hourly cost and 
the kilometric one, each characterized by two levels: 1.00 € and 1.50 €, in the former 
case; 0.20 € and 0.30 €, in the latter one. 
- The public transport cost per one-way trip has one level (1.00 €) that was computed 
on the basis of the season ticket price for a commuter using the bus service in 
Palermo: the monthly ticket price / 48 trips per month. 
- The car parking cost has one level (1 €) based on the monthly parking pass price for 
the city centre of Palermo: the monthly parking pass price / 48 trips per month. The 
car pooling parking cost was calculated dividing the car parking cost by the 
occupancy factor of two passengers per vehicle. In the case of car sharing, parking 
inside the study area was considered free, to allow a municipal policy action in favour 
of sustainable urban mobility systems. 
- The time spent to move from the origin zone to the destination one, for car, car 
pooling and car sharing, was set at the present value for each respondent; under the 
model estimation phase, it was determined for the O/D pair declared by each 
respondent through a deterministic user equilibrium assignment (Cascetta, 2001; 
Ortuzar and Willumsen, 1994) of the origin-destination matrix representing the 
private transport demand of Palermo during the peak period of a working day (2003) 
to the corresponding graph. 
- The time spent to move from the origin zone to the destination one for public 
transport3 has two levels. In particular, one level is the 50% of the other (that is the 
present value for each respondent); under the model estimation process, it was 
                                                 
2
 The decision of introducing a full monetary cost for car can be explained considering that a commuter 
using car sharing services does not need to own a personal vehicle. 
3
 That is the sum of the in-vehicle time and the waiting time spent at the bus stop. 
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quantified for the O/D pair declared by each respondent through a hyperpath 
assignment of the origin-destination matrix representing the public transport demand 
of Palermo during the peak hour of a working day (2003) to the corresponding graph. 
- The parking time presents two levels in the car sharing case (5 min. and 10 min.) 
and in the car pooling one (0 min. and 5 min.), while the car alternative is 
characterized by one parking time level (7 min.). 
- As for the access time, one level was introduced for car (3 min.), car pooling (3 
min.) and public transport (7 min.); while, for car sharing, two levels were identified 
(5 min. and 10 min.). 
The choice scenarios that can be constructed by combining the shown levels with 
each other are 64: a choice set that can’t be proposed to a decision maker; so, the full 
choice set was divided into 8 blocks of 8 choice games, to be presented to 8 different 
groups of respondents, through one of the most used experimental design techniques, 
that is the block design. This method is performed in the following way: a block 
variable (corresponding to an interaction4 between two or more attributes) is selected 
and the scenarios are divided into as many clusters as the levels of the block variable; 
for example, if an interaction between any two attributes were used as block variable, 
this one would present a level referring to the concordance case (low/high level for both 
attributes) and another one relative to the discordance case (low level for an attribute 
and high level for the other one). 
 
Table 2: The small-sized car kilometric cost under different scenarios on the distance covered per annum. 
COSTS 1
st
 Scenario 
5000 km/annum 
2nd Scenario 
7500 km/annum 
3rd Scenario 
10000 km/annum 
Equivalent value* of car cost per annum (€) 1371.11 1371.11 1371.11 
Surplus value (€) 128.53 128.53 128.53 
Insurance per annum (€) 1100.00 1100.00 1100.00 
Taxes per annum (€) 144.87 144.87 144.87 
Park cost per annum (€) 400.00 400.00 400.00 
Fixed cost per annum (€) 3144.50 3144.50 3144.50 
    
Fuel cost per annum (€) 472.00 708.00 944.00 
Maintenance per annum (€) 245.11 380.69 429.68 
Variable cost per annum (€) 717.11 1088.69 1373.68 
    
Total cost per annum (€) 3861.62 4233.19 4518.18 
Cost per kilometre (€) 0.77 0.56 0.45 
Source: ISTAT (National Institute of Statistics) Census 2001. 
*Assuming a life-cycle of ten years. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 An interaction can be defined as the effect of two or more factors which, when acting together, produce 
an influence different from the sum of their individual impacts (Cascetta, 2001). 
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Table 3: Levels of the attributes. 
Options Levels of the attributes 
 
Transport 
cost per 
hour (€) 
Transport 
cost per 
km (€) 
Transport 
cost per 
trip (€) 
Parking 
cost per 
trip (€) 
O/D time 
(min.) c 
Parking 
time 
(min.) 
Access 
time 
(min.) 
Car - a PV b - 1.00 PV 7 3 
Car Pooling - PV - 0.50 PV 0 5 3 
Car Sharing 1.00 1.50 0.20 0.30 - 0.00 PV 5 10 5 10 
Public Transport - - 1.00 - PV PV/2 - 7 
Note: a -: no level, b PV: present value; it varies across the respondents, c time spent to move from the 
origin zone to destination. 
 
 
6. Analysis of the SP survey output 
 
This section presents statistical data deriving from the SP survey, which involved 
about 500 workers and students daily travelling towards Palermo city centre. In 
particular, the data concern the characteristics of the respondents and their households 
(see Figure 3), especially in terms of travel behaviour. 
Most respondents belong to households owning at least two cars (see Figure 4). These 
households could give up owning a vehicle and use the car sharing service: in fact most 
respondents (about the 83% of the sample) cover by car less than 10000 kilometres per 
annum (see Figure 5), which makes the car sharing option potentially competitive with 
the private car one. 
Furthermore, the data reveal a high percentage of respondents that daily drive at least 
7 km to reach their destination (see Figure 6), thus coming from suburban origins served 
by a public transport supply with a low level of service. 
A final consideration regards the transport mode used by respondents for their 
journey-to-work (or study) trips (see Figure 7): in this case, it is interesting to observe 
the percentages of the car pooling5 and public transport options indicating an urban 
mobility system which has to improve so much from the environmental impact point of 
view. 
 
                                                 
5
 Car pooling refers to the following choice possibilities: car as driver with passengers and car as 
passenger. 
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Figure 3: Composition of households. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Number of cars and mopeds available to the households. 
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Figure 5: Kilometres covered by car per annum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Length of the typical commuting one-way trip. 
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Figure 7: Transport modes used for the typical commuting one-way trip. 
 
 
7. Mode choice model estimation 
 
As stated before, to simulate transport mode choice behaviour for commuting trips 
within the urban area of Palermo, a multinomial logit model was employed. To estimate 
the model parameters, we adopted the Nlogit 4.0 software processing 3080 choice 
observations (several respondents didn’t complete the SP experiment). The following 
formulations refer to the one-way trip systematic utility functions stemming from the 
iterative model specification-estimation process. 
 
CARTCTV CARPARKINGTTRAVELCTRAVELTCAR PARKINGTRAVELTRAVEL ⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅= ββββ  
 
PARKINGTTRAVELCTRAVELTCARPOOLING TCTV PARKINGTRAVELTRAVEL ⋅+⋅+⋅= βββ  
 
CSNCARSTCTV CSNCARSPARKINGTTRAVELCTRAVELTCARSHARING PARKINGTRAVELTRAVEL ⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅= βββββ
 
PTCTV PTTRAVELCTRAVELTSPORTPUBLICTRAN TRAVELTRAVEL ⋅+⋅+⋅= βββ  
 
Where: 
Vj: systematic part of the utility function assigned to alternative j; 
TTRAVEL: one-way trip travel time (min.); 
CTRAVEL: one-way trip travel cost (€); 
TPARKING: parking time (min.); 
CAR (1/0), CS (1/0), PT (1/0): alternative specific constants; 
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NCARS: for a single family, it measures the number of cars available to each individual 
daily moving for working or studying; 
PTCSCARNCARSTCT PARKINGTRAVELTRAVEL βββββββ ,,,,,, : coefficients. 
For private car, car pooling and car sharing, the one-way trip travel time attribute is 
the sum of the time spent for moving from the origin zone to destination and the access 
time; for public transport, travel time consists of the following elements: the in-vehicle 
time, the waiting time at the bus stop and the access time. For the access time, other 
specifications were tested as a distinct variable rather than a part of the trip travel time 
attribute, finding out worse estimation results. 
As regards the one-way trip travel cost variable, in the car and car pooling case, it 
consists of the following components: a cost attribute obtained multiplying the 
kilometric cost by the distance (from the RP survey) and the parking cost. The 
specification introducing the parking cost as a distinct variable gave worse estimation 
results. In the car sharing case, the trip travel cost is based on the kilometric and hourly 
costs: (the kilometric cost x the distance) + the hourly cost. For public transport, the 
one-way trip travel cost is calculated on the basis of the season ticket price for a bus 
user in Palermo. 
Table 4 shows the coefficients of the attributes that proved to be statistically 
significant, the model goodness-of-fit measures and the output of the t-test on individual 
parameters. 
Table 4: Estimation results for the multinomial logit model. 
Attribute Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[|Z|>z] 
TTRAVEL (min.) -0.02605340 0.27924585E-02 -9.330 0.0000 
CTRAVEL (€) -0.28923442 0.27332091E-01 -10.582 0.0000 
TPARKING (min.) -0.10766113 0.13312674E-01 -8.087 0.0000 
NCARS -2.60542611 0.21059922 -12.371 0.0000 
CAR (1/0) 1.14893210 0.98749327E-01 11.635 0.0000 
CS (1/0) 1.48328631 0.16045208 9.244 0.0000 
Summary statistics 
Number of choice observations = 3080 
Log likelihood function = - 3892.192 
ρ
2
 (constants only) = 0.04 
Value of time (Ttravel/Ctravel): 5.40 €/h 
 
As the reader can observe in Table 4, the selected explanatory variables are highly 
significant and have the proper signs; furthermore, the resulting trade-off between travel 
time and travel cost is consistent with the findings of previous studies on transport mode 
choice behaviour in Italy (see for example Cherchi, 2003). 
Besides the multinomial logit, we also tested other model structures by using the 
Nlogit 4.0 software; in detail, some nested logit functional forms were examined. 
Among these, only one form resulted good enough as regards the t-test on coefficient 
estimates and the informal tests on coefficient signs and trade offs (like the rate of 
substitution between travel time and travel cost). This model is the one assuming a 
correlation between the two innovative transport systems, car pooling and car sharing. 
Figure 8 and Table 5 illustrates, respectively, the decision-making process and the 
estimation output under the aforesaid nested logit model. 
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oθ : parameter determining the variance of the first decision-making step error term. 
θ : parameter determining the variance of the second choice level error term. 
 
Figure 8: The decision-making process under the nested logit model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Estimation results for the nested logit model. 
Attribute Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[|Z|>z] 
TTRAVEL (min.) -0.00453299 0.00245883 -1.844 0.0652 
CTRAVEL (€) -0.08562979 0.02325707 -3.682 0.0002 
TPARKING (min.) -0.03196440 0.01516793 -2.107 0.0351 
NCARS -2.82168303 0.41167262 -6.854 0.0000 
CAR (1/0) 0.60815977 0.12725500 4.779 0.0000 
CS (1/0) 1.31656840 0.19183171 6.863 0.0000 
PT (1/0) 0.33456320 0.10599345 3.156 0.0016 
Inclusive value car 1.00000000 (fixed parameter) 
Inclusive value other car 
options 1.12921693 0.18949129 5.959 0.0000 
Inclusive value Public 
Transport 1.00000000 (fixed parameter) 
Summary statistics 
Number of choice observations = 3080 
Log likelihood function = -3918.695 
ρ
2
 (constants only) = 0.03 
Value of time (Ttravel/Ctravel): 3.22 €/h 
Other car options 
Car pooling Car sharing 
O
 
θ  
Public Transport Car 
oθ  
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The following observations on the nested logit model emerge from the analysis of 
Table 5: 
- all the coefficient estimates have the expected signs; 
- unlike the multinomial logit case, the public transport specific constant significantly 
differs from 0; 
- in comparison with the multinomial logit case, the log likelihood function value and 
the rho-squared index worsen; in addition, the statistical significance level of 
individual coefficients decreases, especially for the trip travel time attribute that can 
be considered different from 0 only at the 10% significance level; 
- the inclusive value parameter for the “other car options” composite alternative is not 
significantly different from 1 (t-ratio with respect to 1 = 0,682), so multinomial logit 
appears an appropriate choice, since the hypothesis of correlation is rejected by the 
data. 
 
 
8. The application of the mode choice model 
 
The potential demand for car sharing and car pooling was estimated applying the 
calibrated multinomial logit model to a future scenario characterized by the following 
transport policy actions: a rise in parking fees and the implementation of closed-to-
traffic zones for high emission vehicles, with reference to Palermo city centre; the 
development of the public transport system, by reducing the in-vehicle time and the 
waiting one (due to a new light rail line and new three tram lines); the diffusion of 
reserved parking areas for car sharing and car pooling users. For a typical outskirts-city 
centre trip, Table 6 highlights the modal split under the present conditions of the urban 
mobility system in Palermo; while Figure 9 shows the variation in the modal split 
depending on some future pricing strategies fostering the car sharing competitiveness by 
the car sharing kilometric fare. 
As the reader can notice in Figure 9, the car sharing market share grows from the 
present scenario level that is close to 0 to a value of about 10%, in the case of the lowest 
kilometric cost; furthermore, car pooling users increase slightly, with respect to the 
present situation. The low market share of car sharing can be explained considering it as 
a mode of transport particularly addressed to commuters moving from those suburban 
zones characterized by a weak travel demand, that consequently are not adequately 
served by the public transport system. 
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Figure 9: The variation in the modal split depending on the car sharing kilometric fare. 
Table 6: The modal split under the present scenario. 
Kilometric fare (€/Km) Choice probability (%) 
 Car Car pooling Car sharing Public Transport 
0,20 68,02 21,06 0,02 10,90 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
The paper illustrates the development of a urban transport demand model to forecast 
commuter choice behaviour among car, public transport and innovative modes like car 
sharing and car pooling. In particular a multinomial logit model was calibrated by a SP 
survey involving workers and students (about 500 respondents) daily travelling towards 
the city centre of Palermo (Italy). Other functional forms were tested (some nested logit 
structures), but the hypothesis of correlation was rejected by the data. The model was 
applied to analyse the role of car pooling and car sharing in Palermo, under a future 
scenario in favour of a low environmental impact transport system (park pricing 
0
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strategies, closed-to-traffic zones discounted or preferential parking for rideshare 
vehicles, improvement of the public transport service). As a result, car sharing, with its 
10% market share, revealed its vocation for serving “weak” travel demand areas. 
A future step of the research consists in employing the described random utility model 
to determine the optimal pricing strategy for car sharing service and to optimize location 
and size of parking areas for car club customers and car pooling users. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper estimates the real estate benefits due to accessibility gains brought by a light rail 
infrastructure (the T2 tramway, in the Hauts-de-Seine). According to Urban Economics, the accessibility 
improvements resulting from a transport project will influence the residential location choices of 
households, and eventually the land rents at equilibrium will include the valuation of accessibility gains 
made by these households.  
Apart from accessibility, housing choice also depends on other characteristics: internal characteristics 
and external (environmental) characteristics. To take into account all these determinants, we have 
estimated a hedonic price function of residential properties econometrically. 
The data used are sales of residential dwellings in the Hauts-de-Seine department, population census 
and other sources, from 1993 to 2004, to take into account anticipation and learning effects. 
The hedonic price function obtained allows us to measure implicit or “hedonic” prices of dwellings 
with a given group of characteristics, and isolates the pure effect of each characteristic on the price of a 
dwelling.  
The results show that the T2 tramway accessibility improvements are capitalized into the housing 
prices. To measure this capitalization into real estate, we calculate the prices of dwellings with and 
without these accessibility gains. For the whole department, we estimate a capitalization around 3%. 
 
Keywords: Accessibility; Hedonic function; Real estate values; Transport infrastructure. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the role of transport infrastructures in the 
formation of residential property values in urban areas. It focuses on the impact of 
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accessibility gains on equilibrium prices1, because we want to measure the added value 
of accessibility gains produced by a new transport infrastructure on residential property 
values. We have taken the case of the T2 tramway, opened in the Hauts-de-Seine 
department (France) in September 1997. This line was initially a railway2, closed in 
1993. Its layout cuts through wealthy neighbourhoods along the river Seine. It connects 
two major centres (La Défense in the North, and Issy-les-Moulineaux in the South). 
There was no significant additional urban quality improvement associated with its 
conversion, but this infrastructure noticeably improved accessibility in the department.  
So we measure the effects of the tramway only by accessibility gains. 
First, theoretical bases in urban economics and hedonic modelling to assess real estate 
benefits will be reminded. Then a description of the data used for this empirical work 
will be given. Then the construction of the accessibility indicators which capture the 
effect of the infrastructure will be presented and their values before and after the 
infrastructure improvement will be shown. Similarly, the changes in the explained 
variable housing prices will be put on maps. Finally, the results of the model will be 
displayed and discussed. 
 
 
2. Theoretical bases 
 
Our theoretical bases are urban economics and hedonic price theory. 
Urban economics explains the functioning of a city by the behaviour of households 
relative to their choice of residential location. In the basic model (Alonso, 1964), the 
city is monocentric, all the jobs are located in the business centre, and the choice of a 
residential location by an economic agent results from a trade-off between expenditure 
for land area and transport costs to move to the centre, under budget constraints. This 
model was largely extended3: other variables may influence the choice of a location 
(amenities, neighbourhood externalities …), and the cities may be polycentric (so we 
use the concept of accessibility instead of transport costs to the centre).  
According to urban economics, accessibility improvements resulting from a transport 
project will influence the residential location choices of households. Hence the demand 
for land occupation will be affected and land rents at equilibrium will include the 
valuation of accessibility gains made by these households. In this case we observe a 
“capitalization phenomenon”. 
Accessibility is not the only factor for the selection of a home: it is a heterogeneous 
good, with internal characteristics (surface area, equipment, type of dwelling …) and 
external characteristics (environment quality, school proximity ...). 
To study the formation of housing prices, we will use hedonic price analysis to take 
all the characteristics into account. According to Sheppard (1999), this theory was 
initiated by Court (1939) and Griliches (1961), and popularized by Lancaster (1966) and 
Rosen (1974). It supposes that there are “implicit” competitive markets for each 
characteristic of heterogeneous goods, and the price of a characteristic is determined by 
the comparison of supply with demand for this characteristic in its implicit market. 
Therefore, the housing price is a function of “implicit” prices of the goods which 
characterize it.  
                                                 
1
 But not on the effects on supply and demand taken separately. 
2
 Thus the space for the tracks already existed. 
3
 See for example Fujita (1989), Papageorgiou (1990) or Henderson (1985).  
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Rosen recommends selecting the best specification of the hedonic function in an 
empirical way. Amongst the most common functional forms are the linear model and 
the logarithmic model (see for instance Follain and Jimenez (1985)). Cavailhès (2005) 
questions the constancy of the hedonic prices of residence characteristics, according to 
quantities, obtained with a linear model, “in particular because of the fixed costs of 
production (costs of construction) and of transaction, and because of indivisibilities for 
the consumer”. On the contrary, the logarithmic form implies hedonic prices depending 
on quantities. We can also use the Box-Cox specification, generally considered as a 
more flexible functional form, adapted to estimate hedonic models, but its estimate is 
more complex than that of the models presented previously. In its simplest form (Box 
and Cox, 1964), we transform the dependent variable y in the following way: λ
λ 1−y
. So 
the Box-Cox transformation allows us to estimate several types of models, while 
varying λ from 0 to 1. The parameter λ is chosen by the maximum likelihood method, 
and the form will be linear when λ=1, and logarithmic when λ=0. 
Therefore, the hedonic estimate will enable us to have a function that will be used to 
calculate the price of the heterogeneous good, when modifying the quantities of the 
various characteristics which define it. Thus, if accessibility plays a role in the 
formation of residential property values in our study zone, we will be able to measure 
the effects on dwelling prices of the accessibility gains induced by the installation of the 
T2 tramway. To do this, we compare the dwelling prices observed with the tramway 
with the prices which we would have observed without the tramway, and these effects 
will be isolated from the influence of other factors4. 
 
 
3. The study perimeter and the data used 
 
The perimeter of the study was defined as being the whole of the department of the 
Hauts-de-Seine, in the west of Paris (see Figure 1).  
 
                                                 
4
 We only use the first step of the hedonic method of Rosen (1974), because we only measure the impact 
of better accessibility on equilibrium prices. We don’t explain how these effects come about, so we don’t 
use the second step of this method to identify demand effects and supply effects (moreover, we don’t 
have the necessary data to do this). For instance, Marchand and Skhiri (1995) and Kazmierczak-Cousin 
(1999) use the second step of this method.  
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Figure 1: The line of the T2 tramway in the Hauts-de-Seine department.  
Data Source: RATP 
 
We chose a wide temporal dimension, from 1993 to 2004, in order to take into 
account the phenomena of anticipation of economic agents and learning effects. 
The data used for the hedonic regression are sales of residential dwellings in the 
Hauts-de-Seine department, which include the prices and some internal characteristics 
of the dwellings (“CD-BIEN” data, provided by the DREIF).  
We restricted ourselves to transactions relating to apartments, which account for 90% 
of the residences in the department, given the small number of transactions relating to 
single family houses and the low quality of the empirical results obtained with the latter. 
Here we consider a polycentric urban area, which is representative of our study zone. 
The households move towards all the centres, and a location is characterized by the 
whole of the potential destinations, and more precisely by the generalized total cost of 
transportation towards all these destinations. Therefore we built accessibility indicators, 
using matrices of generalized public transport time, from station to station, for the years 
1996, 1997 and 20015, provided by RATP6. We deduced generalized public transport 
                                                 
5
 We do not have the direct monetary costs, but in an urban area they are negligible compared to non-
monetary costs; moreover, fares are rather flat and the season ticket holding rate is high. 
6
 Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (this is a public transportation company). 
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time from IRIS to IRIS7, directly used in calculations of accessibilities. We have also 
built these indicators with road transport times given by the DREIF8. 
To these data we have added neighbourhood characteristics from the Population 
Census and other sources that contain external characteristics, located at the 
geographical level of the IRIS2000. So, some characteristics relating to dwelling 
comfort are only available at the neighbourhood level, and not at the transaction level: 
this should restrict the accuracy of housing price estimation, insofar as comfort plays a 
role in their formation, but this is presumably unrelated to the influence of accessibility 
on housing prices, which is our concern, and should not bias the estimation of real estate 
benefits derived from accessibility gains. 
We also used the “SIRENE” data of INSEE9, acquired by INRETS10 and which 
contains information on employment and firms.  
 
 
4. Construction of accessibility indicators 
 
It is essential to build reliable indicators of accessibility, since they will enable us to 
make conclusions about the connection between modifications of these following T2, 
and the evolution of real estate prices. These indicators were calculated on the 
geographical level of the IRIS2000, and represent accessibility to all the IRIS of the 
Hauts-de-Seine. 
We chose potential accessibility indicators for population, jobs and establishments. 
These indicators are based on spatial interaction models (see for example Schürmann et 
al. (1997) or Geurs and van Eck (2001)). 
The formula is: ∑=
k
ikki timefOA )(  where  
- i represents the IRIS taken into account, and k the other IRISs in the department 
- timeik is the generalized transport time between the centre of IRIS i and the centre of 
IRIS k, expressed in minutes 
- Ok represents the volume of population, jobs or establishments in the IRIS of the 
destination k 
- f(timeik) denotes the dissuasion function, decreasing in time, which we shall assume 
to follow a reciprocal form f(timeik)=1/timeikβ or a negative exponential form  
f(timeik)=e(-βtimeik)11, β being a sensitivity parameter to transport time, between 0 and 1, 
and reducing the effect of travel time increase or decrease. 
In order to choose the functional form and the β parameter12, we have introduced the 
various accessibilities in a simple hedonic price model13, and we kept the form and the β 
parameter giving the best explanatory capacity. 
                                                 
7
 The IRIS or IRIS2000 is an administrative segmentation in zones of 2000 inhabitants. 
8
 Direction Régionale de l’Equipement en Ile-de-France  
9
 Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques 
10
 Institut National de Recherche sur les Transports et leur Sécurité 
11
 There are the two functional forms most usually used in studies (the inverse form gives Stewart-
Warntz’s measure (1958) and the exponential form gives Hansen’s measure (1959) (Pooler (1995)).  
12
 Normally the sensibility parameter is estimated empirically using a spatial interaction model, such as 
for example in Calzada and Le Blanc (2005). In this case, we must know the emissions and receptions 
(this is not our case).  
13The simple model refers here to the fact that we only include the housing characteristics and the 
accessibility level of the zone in which it is located. 
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For accessibility by public transport, it is the negative exponential function with a low 
value for β, i.e. 0.01, whatever the opportunities: so in collective transportation, people 
are not very sensitive to a small variation in time. This value is close to that chosen by 
Spiekermann and Wegener (2007), 0.005, for accessibility by public transport. 
Accessibility by road is not significant in the hedonic price model. 
 
 
5. Description of study zone accessibility  
 
The accessibility to jobs chart (Figure 2) shows the absolute levels of accessibility to 
jobs by public transport, in the “Hauts-de-Seine” department, before the opening of the 
T2 tramway (in 1996)14.  
The most accessible zones are located in the north around La Défense (Neuilly, 
Levallois, Asnières, Bois-Colombes, La Garenne-Colombes) and around Issy-les-
Moulineaux (Boulogne, Vanves, and in the south of Issy, up to Châtenay-Malabry), as 
well as in the north of the department, where the number of jobs is quite high. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Accessibility to jobs, in 1996. 
Data Sources: RATP and SIRENE 
                                                 
14
 Accessibilities to other opportunities are strongly correlated with accessibility to jobs, and the 
cartographic representations are very similar. 
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Figure 3 represents the accessibility gains due to the T2 tramway. These gains are 
supposed to be equal to accessibility gains between 1996 and 1997. Indeed, there were 
no important modifications of the public transport grid system between these two years, 
apart from the T2 tramway operation15. 
The most significant gains are located along the tramway line. There is a diffusion 
from Issy-les-Moulineaux to the south-east until Bagneux, to the south-west (Sèvres and 
Chaville), as well as to the north/north-west. 
Thus the T2 tramway facilitated access to areas which were not very accessible. 
 
 
Figure 3: Gains of accessibility to jobs, by public transport, between 1996 and 1997.  
Data Sources: RATP and SIRENE 
 
 
6. Transactions in the Hauts-de-Seine department 
 
Figure 4 shows the number of transactions relative to multi family residences in the 
department per year. This number increases from 1993 to 1999, with a decrease in 2000, 
and then another increase to 2004.  
                                                 
15
 That is why we observe small losses of accessibilities, considered as equal to 1 in the econometric 
regressions. 
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Figure 4: Number of transactions of collective residences, per year, over the period 1993-2004. 
Data Source: CD-BIEN 
 
Figure 5 represents the number of transactions between 1993 and 2004, and the 
average price per square meter. The transactions are especially numerous along the 
Paris border and in the north east of the department. Prices are especially high in the 
centre of the department. 
 
 
Figure 5: Number of transactions of collective residences and average price per square meter, over the 
period 1993-2004 
Data Source: CD-BIEN 
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Finally the “average price chart” shows the trend of the average price per square 
meter between 1993 and 2004 (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Evolution of the average price per square meter between 1993 and 2004. 
Data Source: CD-BIEN 
 
At first sight, it seems that there is no impact due to the T2 tramway, but we will see 
later that the results of the econometric analysis are different. 
 
 
7. Results 
 
We have econometrically estimated a hedonic price function for the collective 
residences, taking into account all the determinants of housing choice. The data used are 
sales of apartments in the Hauts-de-Seine department, which contain prices and internal 
characteristics of the housing, as well as the population census and other sources for the 
external features. 
The chosen variables have to respect the parsimony principle, in order to avoid 
problems of multi-colinearity, but they have to be sufficiently numerous in order to 
avoid estimate biases that would occur if important variables were omitted. Cheshire 
and Sheppard (1995), for instance, insist on the importance of neighbourhood amenities 
variables. 
In the first round, we limited ourselves to transactions carried out in 1996 and 1997, 
in order to measure the immediate effects of accessibility gains due to the T2 tramway 
on transaction values in 1997. Indeed, if the land and property markets worked 
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perfectly, there would be an immediate price adjustment. But the highlighted profits 
were negligible. 
We then carried out the analysis over a longer period, from 1993 to 2004, in order to 
identify possible anticipation or persistence impacts, like McDonald and Osuji (1995),  
and Deymier (2005). Indeed, the buyers could have anticipated the implementation of 
the T2 tramway and incorporated the value of accessibility gains into prices before 
1997. Reciprocally, the value of the accessibility gains may have impacted prices only 
after 1997, once the tramway was in place. 
We tested a Box-Cox specification for the dependent variable in the hedonic 
regression for the apartments. We obtained a λ equal to 0.099. This parameter being 
close to zero, we chose the dependent variable in the logarithm form, so that the 
interpretation of the coefficients would be easier. We chose the best possible 
specifications for the explanatory variables: they are sometimes expressed in level or in 
logarithm, are introduced in polynomial form or are transformed into qualitative 
variables. 
The variables chosen to explain the logarithm of the price of collective housing are: 
- for the intrinsic features of the housing: building age, surface area and the surface area 
per room;  
- transaction year, in order to take into account the evolution of the housing market; 
- the neighbourhood characteristics of the IRIS: share of housing by comfort level, 
share of households by size and by socio-professional category of the head of the 
household, the smallest distance to a shopping centre; 
- the taxation level of the municipality, considered in three different ways: 
 in model 1: we elaborate a synthetic qualitative variable with 5 modalities, mixing 
tax rates on dwellings and on the (built up) land value; 
 in model 2: we introduce the logarithm of the tax rate on the built up land value; 
 in model 3: we introduce municipality dummy variables; in this case, the local 
taxation variables cannot be retained, because there is a perfect correlation 
between the two kinds of variables; introducing these dummies also has some 
effect on the coefficients of neighbourhood characteristics, as these are linked to 
the municipality (though defined for a smaller area). 
- accessibility to jobs16, introduced 
 in levels for the year of transaction considered 17  
 in variation (profit between 1996 and 1997), crossed with transaction year, in 
order to measure the capitalisation of this gain per transaction year. 
In model 3, the accessibility to jobs in level cannot be retained, because there is a 
strong correlation with the municipality dummies. Indeed, if the accessibility variance is 
split into two components, between municipalities and within municipalities, the former 
component represents 88% of the total variance of the accessibility. 
The three models are presented in Table 1. They have been estimated using the 
Ordinary Least Squares method18, from 91,354 observations.  
                                                 
16
 We have tested the three potential accessibilities by public transport, but the most significant is the 
accessibility to jobs; this result is in accordance with the urban economic theory.  
17
 For the variable on accessibility by public transport to jobs, we only have the values of 1996, 1997 and 
2001. So we consider that the level of accessibility between 1993 and 1995 equals that of 1996, and that 
the level between 2002 and 2004 equals that of 2001, and we interpolate between 1998 and 2000. 
18
 The Hausman test permitted us to detect the presence of endogeneity in the surface area of housing. 
The best instruments for this variable are the composition of the household or the age of the purchaser. 
But we don’t have these variables. The only variable that we have is the socio-professional category of 
the purchaser. But this instrument is not satisfying: the R-square of the regression of the housing surface 
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We have detected the presence of heteroscedasticity using the Gleisjer test, which we 
could not treat. So we use the White estimators (Greene (2003)) in order to estimate the 
variance and the t-statistics. 
Note that the variables relating to the housing neighbourhood play a small role as 
compared with the internal housing variables: the model with only the internal housing 
characteristics explains 72% of the dependent variable inertia, and the model with the 
internal housing characteristics and the transaction year explains 79%. 
The parameters obtained for the internal and external variables are not surprising; they 
confirm the results already obtained in the empirical literature19. 
The price increases with the age of the building, the total surface area and the surface 
area per room (evidence of higher quality buildings). The price varies with the year of 
transaction; we notice a decrease between 1996 and 1999. 
The neighbourhood variables are significant too: prices are higher in IRISs where the 
share of one or two person households is significant, and prices are higher in IRISs 
where there is a significant share of households of a high social category. The price 
increases with the distance to a shopping centre (which are located in undesirable areas), 
and decreases with the level of municipality tax (consistently). 
The current accessibility variable for the transaction year has a significant and 
positive impact on housing prices. 
Concerning the effect of the accessibility gains, brought by the tramway between 
1996 and 1997 on apartment prices, the results are quite surprising: the modalities of the 
gain variable, crossed with the transaction years 1993 and 1994, are not significant. In 
1995, the effect is even negative. There is therefore no anticipation effect before 1996. 
Some explanations of this can be put forward. Work before the opening of the line may 
have generated additional congestion, making road accessibility worse along the 
corridor. Moreover, the former rail service had been transferred to buses that were 
caught up in the traffic, leading to a reduced public transport accessibility, even 
compared with the data used for the model estimation (since these data only considered 
theoretical bus scheduling). And overall, in 1995, there was a major public transport 
strike that particularly made accessibility worse as compared with the theoretical data 
used for modelling. 
On the contrary, for transaction years from 1996, there is a positive impact of 
accessibility gains on prices, which continues until 2003 (the modality corresponding to 
the year 2004 is no longer significant). 
There is therefore a progressive price adjustment over the years after 1996, and more 
particularly over the 4 years following the implementation of the T2 (the highest 
coefficients are over the period 1998-2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
on the instruments is 3%; and the R-square of the hedonic regression with instrumental variables falls 
from 86% to 37% for model 1, for example. 
19
 See for instance Cavailhès (2005), Gravel et al. (2002), Özdilek et al. (2002), Cornuel et al. (2003). 
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Table 1: Hedonic regressions on sales of apartments between 1993 and 2004. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES 
Coeff. t-stat.   
(White) 
Rate of 
induced 
variation 
Coeff. t-stat.   
(White) 
Rate of 
induced 
variation 
Coeff. t-stat.   
(White) 
Rate of 
induced 
variation 
Constant 6.8544 48.67  7.4929 56.53  7.9897 162.71  
INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS          
before 1914 -0.4151 -99.02 -33.97% -0.4163 -99.26 -34.05% -0.4339 -107.83 -35.20% 
1914 - 1947 -0.4494 -141.37 -36.20% -0.4496 -141.53 -36.21% -0.4326 -141.45 -35.12% 
1948 - 1969 -0.4064 -152.27 -33.39% -0.4063 -152.47 -33.39% -0.4020 -157.24 -33.10% 
1970 - 1980 -0.3285 -119.92 -28.00% -0.3302 -120.81 -28.12% -0.3144 -119.79 -26.98% 
1981 - 1991 -0.2327 -69.24 -20.76% -0.2343 -69.35 -20.89% -0.2212 -69.41 -19.84% 
Construction year 
(dummy) 
after 1992 (reference) - - - - - - - - - 
Logarithm of the surface area 1.0813 537.03  1.0810 537.84  1.0795 561.67  
Logarithm of the surface area per room 0.0353 6.67  0.0305 5.79  0.0292 5.67  
YEAR OF TRANSACTION          
1993 -0.3987 -33.03 -32.88% -0.4215 -35.11 -34.39% -0.4012 -35.03 -33.05% 
1994 -0.4098 -38.37 -33.62% -0.4283 -40.18 -34.84% -0.4186 -42.06 -34.20% 
1995 -0.4608 -41.49 -36.93% -0.4763 -43.05 -37.89% -0.4713 -45.45 -37.58% 
1996 -0.5381 -52.59 -41.61% -0.5377 -52.30 -41.59% -0.5571 -56.47 -42.71% 
1997 -0.5673 -71.12 -43.29% -0.5713 -71.64 -43.52% -0.5856 -78.37 -44.32% 
1998 -0.5731 -79.91 -43.62% -0.5807 -80.57 -44.05% -0.5875 -86.25 -44.43% 
1999 -0.5197 -72.92 -40.53% -0.5269 -73.38 -40.95% -0.5309 -79.10 -41.19% 
2000 -0.4529 -61.14 -36.42% -0.4611 -61.82 -36.94% -0.4527 -65.61 -36.41% 
2001 -0.3934 -54.84 -32.52% -0.3991 -55.35 -32.91% -0.3858 -58.18 -32.01% 
2002 -0.2917 -42.69 -25.30% -0.2951 -43.08 -25.55% -0.2779 -44.04 -24.26% 
2003 -0.1581 -23.90 -14.62% -0.1590 -23.97 -14.70% -0.1481 -24.19 -13.77% 
Transaction year 
(dummy) 
2004 (reference) - - - - - - - - - 
EXTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS          
Share of residences 
with individual central 
heating 
0.4500 10.12  0.3282 7.32  0.5124 10.63  
Share of residences 
with collective central 
heating 
0.4130 9.93  0.2858 6.79  0.4025 8.97  
Distribution of 
residences in the 
IRIS according to 
type of heating 
Share of residences 
without central 
heating (reference) 
- - - - - - - - - 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES 
Coeff. t-stat.   
(White) 
Rate of 
induced 
variation 
Coeff. t-stat.   
(White) 
Rate of 
induced 
variation 
Coeff. t-stat.   
(White) 
Rate of 
induced 
variation 
Share of households 
of one person 
(reference) 
- - - - - - - - - 
Share of households 
of two persons -0.4355 -9.72  -0.3890 -8.69  0.1607 3.48  
Share of households 
of three or four 
persons 
-0.0075 -25.34  -0.0069 -23.52  -0.0075 -24.63  
Distribution of 
households in the IRIS 
according to size 
Share of households 
of more than four 
persons 
-1.3837 -23.59  -1.3234 -22.63  -0.3608 -6.01  
Share of households 
where the PR20 is a 
farmer 
-3.7054 -3.62  -3.1506 -3.03  2.6712 2.69  
Share of households 
where the PR is 
independent 
1.2958 35.93  1.1557 31.76  0.5411 13.84  
Share of households 
where the PR is an 
executive (reference) 
- - - - - - - - - 
Share of households 
where the PR is in an 
intermediate 
profession 
-1.0604 -42.49  -1.0527 -42.35  -0.3133 -11.97  
Share of households 
where the PR is an 
employee 
-0.1732 -8.12  -0.1754 -8.29  -0.2253 -11.14  
Share of households 
where the PR is a 
worker 
-1.5499 -75.35  -1.5417 -75.14  -0.7793 -37.35  
Share of households 
where the PR is a 
pensioner 
-0.3047 -12.26  -0.3057 -12.39  -0.0595 -2.39  
Distribution of 
households in the IRIS 
according to the social 
and economic 
category of the person 
of reference 
Share of households 
where the PR is 
without occupation 
1.0128 18.55  0.8833 16.12  0.0610 1.10  
very low 0.0247 7.31 2.50% - - - - - - 
low 0.0281 10.38 2.85% - - - - - - 
medium (reference) - - - - - - - - - 
high -0.0319 -9.21 -3.14% - - - - - - 
Municipality tax level 
(model 1 only) 
very high -0.0525 -17.39 -5.11% - - - - - - 
Logarithm of the tax rate on the built up land 
value (model 2 only) - - - -0.1223 -33.23  - - - 
Municipality dummies (model 3 only) - - - - - -    
less than 1 km 
(reference) - - - - - - - - - 
between 1 km and 
1,5 km 0.0210 9.51 2.12% 0.0123 5.68 1.24% 0.0301 12.87 3.06% 
Nearest distance 
from a shopping 
centre 
more than 1,5 km 0.0837 20.72 8.73% 0.0579 14.67 5.96% 0.0309 6.71 3.14% 
Logarithm of accessibility to jobs for year of 
transaction 0.1076 10.50  0.0502 5.22  - - - 
1993 -0.0005 -0.27  0.0008 0.45  0.0004 0.26  
1994 -0.0017 -1.12  -0.0005 -0.32  -0.0008 -0.52  
Logarithm of 
accessibility gains to 
jobs between 1996 
and 1997, crossed 
with the year of 
transaction 
1995 -0.0061 -3.68  -0.0049 -2.90  -0.0021 -1.36  
 
                                                 
20
 Person of reference of the household 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES 
Coeff. t-stat.   
(White) 
Rate of 
induced 
variation 
Coeff. t-stat.   
(White) 
Rate of 
induced 
variation 
Coeff. t-stat.   
(White) 
Rate of 
induced 
variation 
1996 0.0024 1.69  0.0016 1.11  0.0045 3.22  
1997 0.0029 2.73  0.0025 2.30  0.0054 5.11  
1998 0.0061 6.67  0.0059 6.39  0.0063 6.87  
1999 0.0045 5.13  0.0040 4.53  0.0048 5.55  
2000 0.0061 6.46  0.0058 6.10  0.0053 5.72  
2001 0.0065 7.28  0.0068 7.60  0.0058 6.58  
2002 0.0043 5.13  0.0044 5.19  0.0027 3.28  
2003 0.0025 3.15  0.0024 2.98  0.0016 1.97  
Logarithm of accessibility 
gains to jobs between 1996 
and 1997, crossed with the 
year of transaction 
2004 0.0002 0.32  0.0000 -0.06  0.0001 0.11  
R² 0.8626 0.8630 0.8803 
F 9969 10642 7221 
observations number 91354 91354 91354 
 
Once a hedonic price function is obtained, the added value due to the T2 tramway is 
calculated by taking into account housing prices with and without accessibility gains. 
The sum of observed differences measures the capitalization on housing prices for the 
whole of the department from 1996 to 2003. This amount cannot be diffused because it 
is not yet validated by RATP21, but the added value could be approximately less than 
5%. 
The capitalization is not equally spread over the whole of the Hauts-de-Seine 
department (see Figures 7 and 8). 
The highest capitalization is in the central zone of the department crossed by the T2, 
and the zone which extends towards the south west, where the accessibility gains 
between 1996 and 1997 were the highest. In volume, it is lower at the end points of the 
T2, but expressed as a percentage, capitalization is also high at the extreme south of the 
T2, around Issy-les-Moulineaux. 
                                                 
21
 We have a clause of confidentiality with RATP for this study. 
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Figure 7: Volume of capitalization of accessibility gains per district on the sales of residential dwellings 
in the Hauts-de-Seine department, between 1996 and 2003. 
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Figure 8: Percentage of capitalization of accessibility gains per district on the sales of residential 
dwellings in the Hauts-de-Seine department, between 1996 and 2003. 
 
The implementation of the T2 had a positive and significant impact on the evolution 
of housing prices, through the accessibility gains to jobs, due to the infrastructure.  
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This research shows that hedonic models can yield significant accurate quantitative 
measurements of real estate benefits, provided by the accessibility gains of a new 
transport infrastructure. The main merit of the hedonic models is that they can separate 
the accessibility impacts from the many other variables, with a role in forging real estate 
prices. Their main drawback is that they are data intensive, they need a large amount of 
input that may be expensive to acquire, or that may not exist at the appropriate level of 
disaggregation: in that case, proxies must be found to take into account some relevant 
factors. Colinearity between some variables must also be checked.  
This research also raises other questions that should be answered in future work. One 
of them is assessing the anticipation-delay feature of the impact: we have not detected 
any anticipation effect: is that true for all kinds of transport projects? On the contrary, 
our estimation shows that the consolidation of dwelling values took a few years after the 
infrastructure operation to be established. Methods for accurately estimating the total 
added value over this period should be refined. Other issues are related to the link 
between the real estate impacts of a new infrastructure and the type of context: are these 
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impacts dependent on the level of urbanisation, proximity to the city centre or CBD, the 
maturity of the public transport network in the city and so on? This promises fascinating 
but challenging studies for the future. 
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Abstract 
 
It is commonly accepted that there is a two-way relationship between land use and transport in urban 
areas. Land use affects transport, conditioning travel demand. Conversely, transport affects land use, 
conditioning spatial distribution of activities and land market. 
The problem of simulating mutual interactions between land use and transport has been tackled by so-
called Land Use Transport Interaction (LUTI) models. Different modelling approaches are present in 
literature, which are generally grouped into three main categories: spatial micro-economic, spatial 
interaction and spatial accounting models. 
The paper presents a spatial accounting LUTI model, which relies on Multi-Regional-Input-Output 
(MRIO) framework. The model has two main interacting components: an activity model and a transport 
model, which allow to endogenously estimate activities generation and location, land prices, travel 
demand and transport accessibility. 
The proposed LUTI model has been specified and applied in an urban area, more particularly to the 
town of Reggio Calabria (Italy). The objective of the application is the estimation of long-term impacts on 
land use and passenger travel demand patterns when interventions on transport facilities and services are 
planned at a strategic scale. The results confirm that MRIO framework offers the potentialities to bring 
activity location, land use in line within travel demand modelling. 
 
Keywords: Land use transport interaction; Activity location; Travel demand. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In urban areas land use affects transport, conditioning travel demand. Conversely, 
transport affects land use, conditioning spatial distribution of activities and land market. 
The two-way relationship between land use and transport may be simulated by so-
called Land Use Transport Interaction (LUTI) models. Literature is very rich and 
involves urban economics and urban transportation planning. LUTI models are 
generally grouped into three main categories: spatial micro-economic, spatial interaction 
and spatial accounting models. 
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Spatial micro-economic models treat space as a continuous variable, making it 
impossible to represent geography in all its variety. Modelling more than one market 
place or centre of employment is very complex, even if much effort has been, and is 
still, made in this direction. Furthermore, it is impossible to capture individual 
behaviour of consumers and producers. Spatial interaction models provide an aggregate 
perspective, since both space and activities are grouped into discrete categories. They 
are loosely structured from a theoretical point of view: the entropy-maximising method 
makes no assumptions about the behaviour of consumers and producers involved and no 
market equilibrium process is guaranteed.  
The development of spatial accounting models pivots on the potential provided by the 
Multi-Regional-Input-Output (MRIO) framework, which considers the dimension of 
production in relation to the spatial structure. This potential has been translated into 
concrete application by the introduction of discrete choice modelling. The MRIO 
framework offers a set of relationships able to bring activity location, land use in line 
within travel demand modelling. 
The paper presents an urban Land Use Transport Interaction (LUTI) model, belonging 
to the spatial accounting category. The model has two main components: a transport 
model and an activity model. The former solves the internal circular dependence among 
transport demand, link flows and link costs. The latter solves the internal circular 
dependence among activity demand, activity flows and land prices. Moreover, the two 
modelling components are mutually interacting: the transport model provides transport 
accessibilities to location model; the activity model provides activity flows to travel 
demand model. 
The proposed urban LUTI models has been specified and applied to the town of 
Reggio Calabria (Italy), with the objective to simulate long-term impacts on land use 
and passenger travel demand patterns when interventions on transport facilities and 
services are planned at a strategic scale. The planned intervention concerns a high-
frequency transit system, called Sustainable Mobility System (SMS), operating in the 
central district of the town. 
Simulation results are related to activities location, land prices, travel demand and 
transport accessibility before and after the introduction of SMS. Regarding effects on 
location patterns, SMS increases transport accessibility. This makes the zones served by 
SMS more attractive to locate activities, leading to higher land prices. The process ends 
attracting activities with lower sensitivity to land prices in central district, pushing 
activities with higher sensitivity to land prices towards suburbs. Regarding effects on 
travel demand patterns, the increasing level of service due to SMS makes transit more 
attractive by transport users, causing a sensible shift from private to transit modes. 
The rest of the paper is articulated in five sections. Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review on LUTI modelling. Section 3 describes the general framework of the proposed 
LUTI model. In the fourth section, each modelling component is specified. Section 5 
illustrates the model application and presents some results concerning activities 
location, land prices, travel demand and transport accessibility. In the last section final 
remarks are reported. 
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2. Literature review 
 
In literature LUTI models are generally grouped into three categories according to the 
background theory from which they could be derived: spatial micro-economic, spatial 
interaction and spatial accounting models. 
Spatial micro-economic models focus their analysis on consumers (households and 
firms) and producers (landowners and employers). Their behaviour is driven by market 
mechanisms, in which consumers maximise their utilities subject to budget constrains 
and producers maximise their profits, generating an equilibrium pattern of land rent. 
The pioneering work of Von Thünen (1826) explained the effect of transport costs on 
activity locations and land prices. Wingo (1961) and Alonso (1964) adapted Von 
Thünen monocentric market proposition for the urban case by adding consumers budget 
constraints. Further developments were present in Muth (1968) and Mills (1969) 
models. After the proposition of random utility theory (Domencich and McFadden, 
1975), Anas and Duann (1984) proposed an integrated model able to bring into 
agreement land rent with residential location and travel demand modelling. Recently, 
computable general equilibrium models able to clear land, labour and good markets and 
to simulate travel demand were presented (Anas and Kim, 1997, Anas and Liu, 2007). 
The large number of papers on these models may be included in the broad discipline 
called urban economics. 
Spatial interaction models provide an aggregate perspective, since both space and 
activities are grouped into discrete categories. Lowry (1964) proposed a gravity-based 
urban land use model, which allows estimating the distribution of population, 
employment and land use. A general theoretical framework for gravity models is the 
entropy-maximizing method introduced by Wilson (1967, 1970a). Lowry model was 
further developed by Putman (1973, 1983).  
Spatial accounting models rely on Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) framework. 
MRIO was originally developed to represent national economies, subdivided into 
sectors and zones (regions). At national scale, the attention is focused on production 
location and on travel (freight and passenger) demand estimation, neglecting land use 
aspects. The basic concept was in Keynes theory (Keynes, 1936), who introduced the 
principle of effective demand, whereby production is determined by consumption. In 
the sphere of Keynes theory, Leontief (1941) firstly proposed an IO model to simulate 
inter-dependencies between economic sectors through fixed technical coefficients. 
Further theoretical developments from the original IO framework, able to reproduce the 
spatial representation of the economy, were later proposed (Isard, 1951; Chenery, 1953; 
Moses, 1955). They introduced trade coefficients to calculate exogenously interregional 
trade patterns and locate production across zones, although they did not specify any 
model to estimate them. Several MRIO models were proposed, which incorporates a 
location model into the IO framework in order to obtain an endogenous estimation of 
trade coefficients. At a first stage, trade coefficients were estimated through entropic-
gravitational location models (Leontief and Strout, 1963; Wilson, 1970b). But, after the 
proposition of random utility theory (Domencich and McFadden, 1975), they were 
estimated through discrete location models (de la Barra, 1989; Echenique and Hunt, 
1993; Cascetta et al., 1996). Several papers were presented in which the economy and 
freight travel demand at a national scale are simulated (Cascetta et al., 1996; Russo, 
2001; Marzano and Papola, 2004; Kochelman et al., 2005). 
At urban scale, several LUTI models, which integrate the IO framework and random 
utility theory, were proposed in literature (de la Barra, 1989; Echenique and Hunt, 1993; 
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Simmonds and Still, 1998). The models simulate transport and activity systems by 
means of market mechanisms, where demand and supply interact, providing 
simultaneously prices and quantities. In the transport model, users behaviour is 
simulated through demand models which estimate emission, mode, path choices. These 
choices are driven by utilities, which include transport costs provided by a congested 
network model. Demand-supply interaction is simulated through an assignment model, 
which estimates transport costs (prices) and flows (quantities) on network. If the 
available supply of transport facilities and services is limited, congestion costs arise 
bringing the transport system to an equilibrium condition. In the activity model, 
household and firms behaviour is simulated, through an activity generation model 
which estimates demand (consumption) levels of activities (population, employment, 
land) and an activity location model which simulates where activities supply 
(production) are located across zones. Location choices are driven by utilities, 
composed by supply prices plus transport costs. Subsequently demand-supply 
interaction, supply prices and production quantities are estimated in each zone. Due to 
supply constrains (ex. restrictions in available land), a rent could be generated bringing 
the activity system to an equilibrium condition. A detailed state-of-the-art on MRIO 
framework is presented in Russo and Musolino (2007). 
 
 
3. LUTI model formalization 
 
In this paper a LUTI model, which belongs to the category of spatial accounting 
models, is proposed. The model has two interacting components: the transport model 
and the activity model. 
 
3.1. Transport model 
 
The transport model is composed by: 
- a demand model, elastic to costs on the emission and mode dimensions, with a 
stochastic path choice model 
 
h = P (∆T c (f)) d (F, V) (1) 
 
with 
h, path flows vector;  
P, probability path choice functions matrix;  
∆, link-path incidence matrix;  
c, link cost functions vector;  
f, link flows vector;  
d, demand functions vector;  
F, activity flows vector;  
V=V(g), transport utilities vector; 
 
- a congested network model 
 
g = ∆T c (f) (2.a) 
f = ∆ h (2.b) 
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with 
g, path costs vector; 
 
- an assignment model 
 
f* = ∆ P (∆T c (f*)) d (F, V) (3) 
f* ∈ Sf 
 
with 
f*, link flows vector at equilibrium;  
Sf, set of feasible link flows; 
 
3.2. Activity model 
 
The activity model is composed by: 
- an activity generation model with technical coefficients depending on prices 
 
Y = A(p) Y + Ye (4) 
 
with 
Y, activity demand vector;  
A(p), technical coefficients functions matrix;  
p=p(F), sector prices vector, which depends on activity flows vector, F, through the 
production vector, X; 
Ye, exogenous activity demand vector; 
 
- an activity location model for estimation of trade coefficient matrix, T, which depends 
on prices and transport utilities 
 
T = T (p, V) (5) 
 
with 
T, trade coefficient functions matrix; 
 
- an activity generation-location interaction model: 
 
F* = T (p(F*), V) A(p(F*)) Dg (Y) + T (p(F*), V) Dg (Ye) (6) 
 
with  
F*, activity flow vector at equilibrium; 
Dg (Y), matrix obtained by arranging the elements of vector Y along the main 
diagonal. 
 
Finally, production vector, X, is obtained from:  
 
X = 1T F (7) 
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3.3. Model features 
 
The general framework, depicted in Figure 1, shows each modelling component and 
mutual interactions of the proposed LUTI model. The transport model solves the 
internal circular dependence among transport demand (vector d), link flows (vector f) 
and link costs (vector c), which is represented in the assignment model (eq. 3). 
According to the transport model, path costs depend on link flows due to congestion 
(eq. 2.a). The activity model solves the internal circular dependence among activity 
demand (vector Y), activity flows (vector F) and prices (vector p), which is represented 
in the activity generation-location interaction model (eq. 6). According to the activity 
model, prices depend on activity flows due to limited production capacities.  
Moreover, the transport model and the activity model are mutually interacting: the 
transport model provides transport utilities (vector V) to the location model (eq. 5); the 
activity model provides activity flows (vector F) to travel demand model. 
The introduction of exogenous physical or regulatory constraints gives rise to rents, 
which reflect the congestion in the transport and activity systems and provide the 
mechanisms to bring the demand in line with the available supply (market clearing). 
 
 
4. LUTI model components specification 
This section presents the specification of the modelling components of the general 
model depicted in Figure 1. 
 
4.1. Activity model specification 
 
The activity model simulates the processes of generation and location of endogenous 
activity and land sectors, driven by exogenous ones. It derives from the MRIO 
framework and it is specified by combining equations (4), (5), (6) and (7): 
 
Xim  =Σj Σn ti/jm ajmn Xjn + Σj ti/jm Yjm,e           ∀ m, i (8) 
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Figure 1. LUTI model components and connections. 
 
where 
i (j), origin (destination) zone; 
m (n), production (consumption) activity sector; 
Xim, production of m in i; 
Xjn, intermediate demand of n in j; 
Yjm,e, exogenous demand of m in j; 
ajmn, technical coefficient, defined as input m necessary for one unit of output n in j; 
ti/jm, trade coefficient, defined as the percentage (probability) of production of m 
located in i and consumed in j. 
In the current specification, inter-activity technical coefficients are fixed. The only 
price-elastic technical coefficient is the one connected with land sector. The equation 
that describes land consumption in zone j by activity sector n is (de la Barra, 1989; 
Modelistica, 2000): 
 
ajLAND,n = amin,jLAND,n + (amax,jLAND,n – amin,jLAND,n) exp (-δn pj LAND) (9) 
 
where 
amin,jLAND,n, amax,jLAND,n, minimum and maximum values of land consumption by sector 
n in zone j; 
pjLAND, average price of land in j; 
δn, elasticity of sector n to land price. 
Trade coefficients are estimated through an activity location model: 
 
ti/jm = exp (Vi/jm) / Σi’∈N exp (Vi’/jm) (10) 
 
where 
N, number of zones of the study area; 
Vi/jm, utility of locating production of m in i to satisfy consumption in j: 
 
Vi/jm = λm piLAND + Vijm (11) 
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with 
piLAND, average price of land in i;  
Vijm, transport utility of m from i to j; 
λm, weight of land price against transport utility for m. 
As eq. (11) shows, utility of locating production activity in each zone comes from a 
trade-off between transport utility and land price. Due to restrictions in available land in 
each zone, a rent could be generated. This has effects on land consumption by each 
activity sector (eq. 9) and on activity location patterns, provided by trade coefficients 
(eq. 10). The model provides land prices and activity location in each zone as a result of 
an equilibrium condition of land market.  
 
4.2. Transport model specification 
 
The transport model comprises travel demand models, supply models and demand-
supply interaction models. 
 
4.2.1. Travel demand models 
 
Travel demand is estimated through a three-step system of demand models that 
simulate path, mode and emission choices. The distribution model is not present, since 
the spatial distribution of demand is derived from inter-zone activity flows supplied by 
the activity model (8). 
The stochastic (logit) path choice model provides the percentage (probability) of trips, 
undertaken by users of category s, choosing path k between OD pair ij with mode q, 
p[k/ijsq]: 
 
p[k/ijsq] = exp (Vsk/ijq/θ) / Σk’∈Kijq  exp (Vsk’/ijq/θ) (12) 
 
where 
Vsk/ijq=-βsgk, utility of path k for users of category s; 
gk=Σl δlkcl(fl), average generalized flow-dependent cost of path k (eq. 2.a); 
βs, weight connected to path cost for users of category s; 
Kijq, path choice set connecting OD pair ij with mode q; 
θ, logit dispersion parameter. 
The stochastic (logit) mode choice model simulates the percentage (probability) of 
trips, undertaken by users of category s, choosing mode q between OD pair ij, p[q/ijs]: 
 
p[q/ijs] = exp (Vsq/ij/θ) / Σq’ exp (Vsq’/ij/θ) (13) 
 
where 
Vsq/ij=θlnΣk’∈Kijqexp(Vsk’/ijq/θ), utility of users of category s associated to mode q for 
OD pair ij; 
θ, logit dispersion parameter. 
The emission model (Modelistica, 2000) provides the demand flow of category s for 
OD pair ij, dsij: 
 
dsij = Fsij (bsmin + (bsmax – bsmin) exp (Vsij)) (14) 
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where 
Fsij is the activity flow related to category s for OD pair ij; 
Vsij=θlnΣq’exp(Vsq’/ij), transport utility for category s for OD pair ij; 
bsmin, bsmax, are minimum and maximum emission rates for category s. 
 
4.2.2. Supply models 
 
The supply model for private mode is a congested network model, consisting of a 
synchronic graph and flow-dependent link cost functions. Transit services are 
represented through a line-based supply model, where the graph is made up by a service 
sub-graph and an access-egress sub-graph, with no flow-dependent link cost functions 
(non-congested network).  
 
4.2.3. Assignment models 
 
The private assignment model is a Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE) assignment 
model (eq. 3). The transit assignment model is a Stochastic Network Loading (SNL) 
model (Cascetta, 2006). 
 
4.3. Activity-transport interface model specification 
 
The transport and activity models operate at two different reference periods: the 
transport model operates during the morning peak period of a working day, while the 
activity model is related to a one-month period. So, it is necessary to scale in times and 
volumes the input/output variables through an activity-transport interface model. 
The activity-transport interface model (Modelistica, 2000) provides activity flow Fsij 
related to OD couple ij and category s: 
 
Fsij = Σm (Xijm (vfs,m pcs,m / tfs,m) + Xjim (vfs,m cps,m / tfs,m)) (15) 
 
where 
Xijm, production of m located in i and consumed in j; 
Xjim, production of m located in j and consumed in i; 
vfs,m, volume factor for activity flow m related to category s; 
tfs,m, time factor for activity flow m related to category s; 
pcs,m, proportion of activity flow m related to category s that travels from production 
to consumption; 
cps,m, proportion of activity flow m related to category s that travels from 
consumption to production. 
 
 
5. Urban application 
 
The LUTI model formalized and specified above is applied to the town of Reggio 
Calabria (Italy) to forecast long-term changes in land use and travel demand patterns 
induced by a transit system called Sustainable Mobility System (SMS) (LAST, 2004). 
The emphasis is put on population and employment location choices (vector X in Figure 
1), passenger modal trip patterns (vector d in Figure 1), transport utility (vector V in 
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Figure 1). In the subsections below the study area, transport scenarios and simulation 
results are described. 
 
5.1. Study area: current situation and transport scenarios 
 
The study area includes the municipality of Reggio Calabria, which has about 180 000 
inhabitants and an extension of 236,02 Km2. It consists of a central district with 
residential and retail activities, educational and public services clustered into three poles 
(university, regional government and health, municipal government); and of three 
suburban districts (northern, southern, hill) with manufacturing activities and scattered 
residences.  
The study area is divided into 35 zones with homogeneous socio-economic 
characteristics. The central district is divided into 24 zones, the northern district into 6, 
the southern district into 2 and the hill district into 3 zones. Figure 2 shows the study 
area, the districts and zones delimitation, the area where SMS will operate (SMS area). 
The activity system inside the study area is segmented into 8 sectors to match 
available census residential and employment location data (ISTAT, 2001): 
manufacturing, service and office, retail, school education, university education, low-
income population, high-income population, available floorspace.  
Inter-dependencies between the activity sectors are simulated through technical 
coefficients defined in a simplified Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). Coefficients 
connected to employment in each sectors are fixed, while those connected to floorspace 
consumption per sector are price elastic, according to eq. (9). The general structure of 
the SAM is reported in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 2: The study area: districts, zones and SMS area delimitations. 
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Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)     
   Consumption sector    
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7    
MANUF 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    
SERV 2 0 0 0 0 0 f f    
RETAIL 3 0 0 0 0 0 f f    
SCH EDU 4 0 0 0 0 0 f f    
UNI EDU 5 0 0 0 0 0 f f    
LI POP 6 f f f f f 0 0    
HI POP 7 f f f f f 0 0    
Pr
o
du
ct
io
n
 
se
ct
o
r 
LAND 8 e e e f f e e    
            
Correspondence matrices           
  Activity sector  Transport mode 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Private Transit 
LI work 1      X   X X 
HI work 2       X  X X 
Service 3  X       X X 
Purchase 4   X      X X 
SCH student 5    X     X X 
Ca
te
go
ry
 
UNI student 6     X    X X 
 
f=fixed; e=price elastic; MANUF, manufacturing; SERV, service and office; RETAIL, retail; 
SCH EDU, school  education; UNI EDU, university education; LI POP, low-income population; 
HI POP, high-income population; LAND, available floorspace. 
Figure 3: Social Accounting Matrix (SAM); sector activity vs. category and category vs. transport mode 
correspondence matrices. 
 
Travel demand, segmented into 6 categories (low-income work, high-income work, 
services, purchase, school, university), is associated to activity sectors which generate 
activity flows, according to category vs. activity sector correspondence matrix in Figure 
3. 
The current transit system comprises urban and regional bus services; regional rail 
services, connected with bus services through the bus terminus beside the main railway 
station in the central district; and inter-regional maritime services. The transit system 
has no direct connections among the three poles or between the latter and the railway 
stations, harbour and bus terminal. Trips are mainly undertaken by private mode (car), 
while transit services have a negligible role.  
SMS is a high-frequency transit system travelling in a reserved right-of-way, with 
stops every 400-500 metres. Vehicle guidance is fully automated and the control system 
is centralized. Figure 4 shows the SMS area inside the central district: pole locations 
and a schematic representation of bus, railway and SMS itineraries are depicted. 
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Figure 4: SMS area inside central district: poles location, bus, railway and SMS itineraries. 
 
Figure 5 shows the transport graph for private mode inside the study area and the 
SMS service sub-graph (in the upper-right box) inside the central district. 
Two transport scenarios are considered and compared. DN (Do-Nothing) is a scenario 
with the current transit system operating in the study area, SMS is a scenario including 
the Sustainable Mobility System. No exogenous changes in the activity system are 
considered. 
 
5.2. Simulation results 
 
Simulation results concern activities location, floorspace prices, travel demand and 
accessibility for the DN and SMS scenarios. Simulations are performed with the support 
of TRANUS (de la Barra, 1989; Modelistica, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 5: Private transport graph inside study area and SMS service sub-graph inside central district. 
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5.2.1. Model calibration and validation 
 
Before presenting simulation results, some comments concerning model calibration 
and validation are reported.  
In the activity model, activity sectors segmentation (Figure 3) was performed in order 
to ensure consistency with available data at urban scale. Fixed technical coefficients 
were derived from available census data related to the town of Reggio Calabria 
provided by Italian National Statistics Institute (ISTAT, 2001) and municipal 
authorities, while parameters of model (9) were estimated through an aggregate 
calibration from observed data concerning average unit of land consumption per sector 
and land prices in each zone. 
Validation has been performed concerning floorspace price per zone, which is 
estimated as the result of an interaction between a floorspace consumption (eq. 9), 
generated by each sector which production is located to each zone through the location 
model, and a floorspace supply present in each zone. Figure 6 shows a comparison 
between observed and estimated prices in DN scenario for each zone. Observed values 
are provided by Real Estate Observatory of the municipality of Reggio Calabria 
(www.agenziadelterritorio.it). 
In the transport model, parameters of link cost functions are derived from the 
literature, considering urban roads with similar characteristics. Four link categories have 
been identified, for each of one specific values of free speed and capacity are 
determined. An extensive sensitivity analysis is performed on parameters of models 
(12) and (13), according to observed aggregate available data. 
Validation has been performed comparing observed and simulated vehicular link 
flows on some selected urban links (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Observed and estimated floorspace prices and link flows. 
 
5.2.2. Activities location and floorspace prices 
 
Central district presents in DN scenario the higher concentration of both population 
and employment (Table 1). In SMS scenario, central district attracts high-income 
population from suburbs (+9,8%), expelling small percentages of low-income 
population (-1,7%), service (-0,5%) and retail (-4,5%) employment towards suburbs. 
The above location pattern is amplified inside SMS area. Average floorspace prices 
(Table 2) rise in central district (+1,1%), because of its increasing attractiveness caused 
by the extension of transit services to places where they were not previously available, 
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and reduce in suburbs (-3,6%). More sensible increments are forecasted in all zones 
served directly by SMS (+3,2%). 
Table 1: Location of population and employment. 
 Sector DN [individuals] SMS [%] 
 Service employment 20716 -0,5 
Central district Retail employment 6685 -4,5 
 LI population 77684 -1,7 
 HI population 33320 +9,8 
 Service employment 1212 +5,6 
Suburbs Retail employment 973 +9,1 
 LI population 21977 +2,8 
 HI population 9427 -12,3 
 Service employment 11845 -1,3 
SMS area Retail employment 3290 -8,1 
 LI population 32482 -3,2 
  HI population 13932 +20,1 
Table 2: Average floorspace  prices. 
 
DN [Euro/m2] SMS [%] 
Study area 1291 0,0 
Central district 1406 +1,1 
Suburbs 1041 -3,6 
SMS area 1544 +3,2 
 
The explanation of the forecasted location pattern is that the central district becomes 
more attractive in SMS scenario because of increasing accessibility and this ends with 
higher land prices. The result is that central district attracts high-income population, 
which is the sector with the lowest sensitivity to land prices (λ in eq. 11), pushing low-
income population and employment with higher sensitivity to land prices towards 
suburbs. 
 
5.2.3. Travel demand 
 
Table 3 shows forecasted travel demand share with private and transit modes inside 
the study area, central district and SMS area for DN and SMS scenarios. 
Inside the study area, travel demand with transit modes increases in SMS scenario 
(+20,6%), while travel demand with private modes presents a slight reduction (-5,1%). 
Inside central district and SMS area, transit modes capacity to attract users is amplified 
than study area (+40,3% inside central district and +201,6% inside SMS area). 
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Table 3: Transport demand. Comparison among scenarios. 
 Demand DN [users] SMS [%] 
Private 66921 - 5,1 Study area 
Transit 10868 +20,6 
Private 41703 - 3,8 Central district 
Transit 5618 +40,3 
Private 8268 -25,2 SMS area 
Transit 1118 +201,6 
 
A relevant component of mobility involves the three poles present in the central 
district (Table 4). They can be reached directly by bus and SMS services, so rail service 
is not represented. The trend described for the study area is confirmed in the case of the 
single poles. The above results are mainly caused by the direct connection, determined 
by the introduction of SMS, among the three poles and between them and suburbs, 
served by railway. 
Table 4: Trips towards poles. 
Pole Service DN [users] SMS [%] 
Car 1726 -5,2 
Bus 51 -23,5 University 
SMS ---- 304 
Car 5594 -11,2 
Bus 664 -56,9 
Regional 
government 
and health SMS ---- 886 
Car 3108 -6,4 
Bus 162 -82,1 Municipal government 
SMS ---- 309 
 
5.2.4. Transport accessibility 
 
A transport accessibility indicator has been formalized in order to estimate relative 
values of active and passive accessibilities for each category s: 
 
Acca,si = (Va,sMAX(i∈K) – Va,si) / Va,sMAX(i∈K)          Acca,si ∈[0, 1] (16) 
 
Accp,sj = (Vp,sMAX(j∈K) – Vp,sj) / Vp,sMAX(i∈K)          Accp,sj ∈[0, 1] (17) 
 
where 
Va,si=θlnΣj exp(Vsij), active accessibility for category s in zone i to reach opportunities 
distributed in the study area; 
Vp,sj=θln Σi exp(Vsij), passive accessibility for category s distributed in the study area 
to reach opportunities that are in zone j; 
Va(p),sMAX(i∈K), maximum value of active (passive) accessibility among all the zones of 
the study area for category s; 
K, set of zones of the study area. 
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Values of (active and passive) transport accessibility indicator related to zones of 
SMS area for users belonging to high-income work category are presented in Figure 7. 
Passive accessibility values are always lower than active accessibility ones both in DN 
and SMS scenarios, due to the fact that the simulation of transport system is related to 
the morning peak hours when trips are performed mainly inside the central district and 
from suburbs to central district for home-to-work purposes. Moreover, passive 
accessibility values in DN scenario ranges from 0,00 in the zones close to the university 
pole (this means that these zones present the lowest values of passive accessibility 
related to the study area) to 0,56 in the zone where the municipal government pole is 
present. In SMS scenario both values of active and passive accessibility increase in all 
zones respect to DN scenario, and the increment is more sensible in zones with the 
lowest values in DN scenario. 
 
 
6. Conclusions - Final remarks 
 
The paper presents a spatial accounting LUTI model, which relies on Multi-Regional-
Input-Output framework. The model has two main interacting components: a transport 
model and an activity model. The former provides transport accessibilities to location 
model; the latter provides activity flows to travel demand model. Exogenous physical or 
regulatory constraints give rise to rents, which reflect the congestion in the transport and 
activity systems and provide the mechanisms to bring the demand in line with the 
available supply.  
The model has been specified and applied to the town of Reggio Calabria (Italy), to 
forecast long-term impacts in land use and travel demand patterns due to interventions 
in the transport supply system at strategic scale. Severe challenges concerned data 
unavailability at urban scale that did not allow high segmentation of activity system, 
calibration of some model parameters, general validation of the whole model. 
Simulation results are related to activities location, land prices, travel demand and 
transport accessibility before and after the introduction of SMS. Regarding effects on 
location patterns, the introduction of SMS into zones scarcely served by transit services 
increases transport accessibility. This makes these zones more attractive to locate 
activities, leading to higher land prices. The process ends attracting sectors with lower 
sensitivity to land prices in central district, pushing sectors with higher sensitivity to 
land prices towards suburbs. Regarding effects in travel demand patterns, SMS ensures 
a direct connection among the three poles and between them and suburbs. The 
increasing level of service makes transit more attractive by transport users, causing a 
sensible shift from private to transit modes. 
The main conclusion of the work is that the proposed urban LUTI model is able to 
describe the two-way relationship between land use and transport, confirming that the 
MRIO framework offers the potentialities to bring activity location, land use in line 
within travel demand modelling. 
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Figure. 7: Values of active and passive transport accessibility indicator for DN and SMS scenarios inside 
SMS area (high-income work). 
 
Future work will concern model calibration, land use and transport policies impacts 
assessment through sustainability indicators, model development. Next step will regard 
the execution of a direct survey in order to identify attributes and calibrate parameters of 
the location model. A set of sustainable indicators will be defined and measured and 
policies will be assessed and compared in terms of social, economic and environmental 
impacts. Further developments will regard the activity model in order to overcome 
current theoretical limitations due to the presence of technical coefficients which are not 
consistent with utility and profit maximization. 
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Abstract 
 
We set out to investigate whether transportation improvements can trigger welfare economic impacts in 
a peripheral region. The paper addresses this issue through the development of a general equilibrium 
labor market model with a transportation component. The model is implemented to a set of 101 core and 
peripheral cities in Israel. Numeric simulations are carried out to test the research hypotheses regarding 
positive relationship between improved accessibility and enhanced economic welfare. Economic welfare 
is measured in terms of efficiency and equity impacts. The results of the simulations show that 
transportation improvements in the form of auto travel time reductions may lead to substantial welfare 
benefits in the peripheral region considered in terms of increased output, productivity and wages. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in the mechanisms linking a barrier-
free geography and economic efficiency and equity. A common claim put forward by 
many urban economists, transportation planners and regional scientists is that 
transportation improvements extend the borders of labor markets, thus contributing to 
enhanced welfare by widening the scope of opportunities for consumers and producers 
alike.  
Transportation investments have been identified in the literature as one of the main 
contributors to regional development and to the enhancement of economic growth. 
Although the strength and causation of the transport-growth relationship is a highly 
controversial issue in regional science, there is a general consensus amongst researchers 
that underserved regions with development potential are likely to benefit from such 
improvements (Frederiksen, 1981; Deno, 1988; Martin, 1998; McCann and Shefer, 
2004).  
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The motivation for this research stems from the need to provide theoretical and 
empirical underpinning for the short-term effects of transportation improvements on the 
generation of equity and efficiency (welfare) benefits in a peripheral region. Over the 
past decades, existing modelling frameworks dealing with the urban and regional arena 
(e.g. land-use transportation models, micro-simulation models) have focused primarily 
on the long-term implications of transportation improvements (e.g. effects on land use, 
jobs, population, and land market). Short-term implications such as the impact of 
enhanced accessibility on wage convergence between core and peripheral regions have 
not been adequately addressed.  
The terms “equity” and “efficiency” have multiple meanings and can be attributed to 
a variety of issues dealing with fairness and justice. In the transportation context, equity 
is usually used to describe the accessibility of individuals to jobs, opportunities and 
services. In this work, equity is used to describe the effect of decreasing spatial friction 
on the enhancement of wage rate. Economic efficiency is defined as achieving higher 
levels of productivity and output per worker. 
The study region encompasses 101 core and peripheral cities in Israel. We take a 
particular interest in the welfare-economic impacts of transportation improvements on 
several small impoverished peripheral cities located in the southern part of the country.  
The methodological framework chosen to investigate these impacts is a welfare 
economic model built from three sub-models – a commuting model, a production model 
and a general equilibrium model. Model 1 (equity) is designed to represent the 
commuting scene and to show how reduction in travel time encourages commuting and 
thus contributes to wage increase in peripheral cities. Model 2 (efficiency) is designed 
to reproduce the mutually-re-enforcing impact on productivity that is induced by 
diminishing travel time. Model 3 combines Models 1 and 2 and reproduces both 
impacts.  
The balance of the rest of the paper is made up of additional eight sections: Section 2 
examines previous work. Each of the following three sections 3, 4, and 5 is dedicated to 
one of the three models. Section 6 describes the study region. The data for the models 
and their application to the study region is presented in Section 7. Section 8 reports the 
findings of the numerical simulations dealing with the impacts of improved accessibility 
on economic indicators. Section 9 concludes the paper with discussion of the research 
findings. 
 
 
2. Previous research 
 
Transportation improvements are often called upon as a means to revive a region’s 
economic competitiveness, particularly that of a depressed region. This stems from the 
desire to remove spatial impediments such as poor accessibility which constrain the 
market and slow-down economic development.  
It is widely believed that regions that are most likely to benefit from transportation 
improvements, in terms of increased economic efficiency and equity, are those which 
are found in a transitional stage of development. Due to investment in transportation 
infrastructure capital, these regions are likely to experience greater growth in wages and 
jobs, and show faster convergence than regions which are found in a more advanced 
stage of development (Thill et al., 2001) 
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Transportation improvements can contribute to the enhancement of economic 
efficiency in under-served peripheral regions by integrating distant markets and cities 
(Fox and Porca, 2001). Diminishing spatial friction between neighboring cities 
intensifies the economic interaction between them, thus enabling them to enhance each 
other’s productivity (see Dekle and Eaton 1999; Banister and Berechman, 2001).  This 
in turn allows the generation of positive spatial externalities – agglomeration effects 
become region-wide.  
Transportation improvements may also have a profound impact on the reduction of 
spatial disparities and the promotion of economic equity. The enhanced accessibility 
created by transportation improvements extends the borders of the labor market, 
allowing people who live in underserved peripheral regions to work closer to the core 
and enjoy the higher wages offered there (Garrison and Souleyrette, 1996; Blum et al., 
1997; Button, 1998). Thus, reduced commuting time may lead to a process of socio-
economic convergence, where wage levels in the core and in peripheral cities move 
closer to each other. 
A wide range of models and techniques are used for evaluating the impacts of 
transportation improvements on economic growth. Two of the most commonly used 
methods include the production function approach (see Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1990; 
Eberts, 1990; Tatom, 1991) and general equilibrium models with transportation as a 
component (Dekle and Eaton, 1999; Banister and Berechman, 2001). 
 
2.1 Efficiency related studies 
 
One of the most cited studies on the impact of public infrastructure on economic 
efficiency is Aschauer's (1989) seminal work on the contribution of public infrastructure 
(mostly highways) to productivity growth in the United States. His findings suggest that 
a 1% increase in the public capital stock could raise total factor productivity by 0.39%. 
Aschauer's work has produced a voluminous research activity, both at the national and 
regional levels. Munnell (1990) employed aggregate time series data with a constant 
returns production function. She reports figures close to Aschauer's estimations, with 
elasticities of output with respect to changes in infrastructure near 0.34. Fritsch and 
Prud'homme (1995) using cross-sectional data (1973-1989 period) from 20 different 
regions in France showed that the impact of road infrastructure on the productivity of 
both labor and capital seems quite strong, with elasticities also in the 0.08-0.12 range. A 
few studies however found the relationship between public infrastructure and 
productivity to be relatively small – at the 0.03-0.08 elasticity range (see Eberts, 1990; 
Duffy-Deno and Eberts, 1991; RESI Study, 1998) or insignificant (see Tatom, 1991). 
Banister and Berechman (2001) present a spatial production economy model with 
transportation infrastructure effects. Their model tackles the question of whether 
transportation improvements between two production units (firms, cities, etc.) can 
contribute to enhancement of their productivity. The model assumes that productivity at 
location 1 is positively affected by the level of output in location 2 (and vice versa), and 
that this influence weakens with distance. By applying numerical simulations to their 
model, Banister and Berechman reach the conclusion that transportation helps, but not 
overwhelmingly. 
Another multi-location model with transportation as a component is Dekle and 
Eaton’s (1999) prefectural production and land rents model. Their model uses wage and 
land rent data from 46 Japanese prefectures to estimate the magnitude and the 
geographical range in which agglomeration effects diminish with distance in the 
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financial services and manufacturing industries. The authors find that the extent of 
agglomeration economies in both industries is significant, but that their effect decays 
much faster with distance in the financial services sector than in the manufacturing 
sector. 
 
2.2 Equity related studies 
 
Additional strand of literature examines the effects of transportation investments on 
equity and income inequality. Ferreira (1995) presents a model of public-private capital 
complementarity in which expanding public investment reduces inequality. His model 
shows that infrastructure helps poorer individuals and underdeveloped areas to get 
connected to core economic activities, thus allowing them to access additional 
productive opportunities (Estache, 2003). Another study conducted by Estache and Fay 
(1995) found that enhanced access to roads is a key determinant of income convergence 
for the poorest regions in Argentina and Brazil (Calderón and Servén, 2004). 
Deno (1988) found that highway capital has its greatest effect on manufacturing 
output in distressed cities. An earlier and similar research conducted in Mexico by 
Looney and Frederiksen (1981) shows that road transportation is effective in 
intermediate regions but not in underdeveloped regions. These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis suggested by Hansen (1965) that the best candidates for highway 
development investment are regions in an “intermediate” stage of development. 
In the next three sections, we develop a framework that constitutes the focus of the 
paper: a general equilibrium multi-city model that focuses on labor-force, commuting, 
productivity and agglomeration effects. 
 
 
3. Model one: workforce, labor supply and demand, and employment 
 
Consider a simulation region with n cities i=1, 2,…,n, specifying for each city i a 
location within geographic space. Each city is endowed with workforce Fi, physical 
capital Ki, and a Cobb-Douglas production function with two inputs: human and 
physical capital, with α as the share of employment. An origin-destination travel time 
matrix summarizes the geography and transportation system of the region. Symbols 
used include: city i, employment Ei, wages wi, rates of return on capital ρi and the 
amount of inter-town commuting, Fij. 
 
3.1 Commuting and labor supply 
 
We assume in this short-run model that capital is immobile while labor is quasi 
mobile. During the short run workforce does not respond to structural shocks by inter-
city migration, but it can choose to offer its services either in its residence city or at any 
other reachable city. We also assume that workers decide to commute based on two 
major considerations and several secondary factors ζij. The major two considerations 
are: (1) a comparison of wages between residence city and candidate work city; (2) 
travel time between residence city and the candidate work city. The choice mechanism 
is stochastic: for equidistant cities, a higher wage improvement (over what the residence 
city offers) will lead to a higher probability of choice. For cities offering an equal wage 
hike, a shorter travel-duration will dominate choice. However, the choice mechanism 
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should suppress travel to a city offering less than the residence-city. The discrete choice 
function is presented in Equation 1: 
 
1 2
1 2
1
( , )
j
ij k ij
i
i j n
k
ik k ik
ik
w
Exp t
w
w T
w
Exp t
w
β β β ζ
β β β ζ
=
  
− +  
  
Ω =
  
− +  
  
∑
∑ ∑
 (1) 
 
Commuting probability Ωij is applied to workforce Fi to compute the number of 
workers in city i who offer their labor services in city j. Summing up over all i’s yields 
the work supply in city j: 
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3.2 Production and labor demand 
 
Since capital is assumed to be immobile, rates of return ρi must be endogenous. This 
leads to the following optimum conditions: 
 
i i iw E Yα=
 (3) 
(1 )i i iK Yρ α= −
 (4) 
 
where Yi represents the value of the local product. Equations 3 and 4 yield the demand 
function for labor, i.e., the optimum number of employees sought by producers at city i: 
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3.3 Equilibrium 
 
To close the model, each labor supply is set to equal labor demand and the solution 
vectors of wages and capital costs are sought: 
 
i jE E=
⌢ ⌣
 (6) 
 
The labor demand and supply equations thus obtained form a logically consistent and 
complete representation of the simulation region's labor market. Furthermore, they 
satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium, namely: 
(1) they are continuous in prices w and ρ; (2) they are homogeneous of degree zero in 
prices; and (3) they satisfy Walras' Law. 
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4. Model two: agglomeration spillovers in production 
 
Model 2 builds an additional layer onto model 1. The labor supply sub-model loses 
the commuting section, and local employment equals local workforce. The production 
environment changes in the following way: Productivity at each city i may be enhanced 
by the proximity of economic activity at other cities j, provided that the cities are not 
too far away in terms of travel time. The specific model is a generalization of a similar 
model by Banister and Berechman (2001) whose model is shown in Equation 7. 
Banister’s and Berechman’s model is a system of 2 Cobb Douglas production units 1 
and 2, at a distance of d12 from each other. Productivities A1 and A2 are the following 
functions of product levels Y2 and Y1: 
 
1 2
1 1 2(1 )tA A e Yλγ −= +ɶ  and 1 22 2 1(1 )tA A e Yλγ −= +ɶ  (7) 
 
where Ã is the agglomeration-impacted productivity and A is the stand-alone 
productivity. This is clearly a case leading to mutually dependent product levels. We 
develop a multi-city version as follows: 
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It increases the number of cities from two spatial units to n units and it includes the 
impact of local characteristics variables Z. The local product is: 
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Expression 9 is a system of linear equations equivalent to the following matrix 
equation: 
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For a small enough γ, Equation 10 has a strictly positive solution set where each Y is a 
linear combination of all other Y's and is strictly greater than the stand alone Y. The size 
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of λ is of course crucial since it governs the attenuation of mutual productivity re-
enforcement over space.  
 
 
5. Model three: agglomeration and commuting 
 
This section combines sub-models 1 and 2 in order to obtain a multi-city general 
equilibrium solvable model. This model, when perturbed to reflect a transport system 
upgrading, is expected to show improvement in efficiency (higher product and 
productivity) as well as equity (higher wage levels in spatially disadvantaged regions). 
Combining models 1 and 2 is achieved by adding matrix Equation 10 to Equations 1 
through Equation 5 and by substituting the labor supply Ei values of Equation 2 for the 
labor demand Ei within the matrix equation. Solving this matrix equation is equivalent 
to matching supply and demand, as was done previously in Equation 2. An equilibrium 
solution is guaranteed to exist because the three necessary and sufficient conditions 
described in model one still hold. The application of the combined model to a real 
system of cities, characterized by a core-periphery structure, is presented in the next 
sections. 
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Figure 1: Study Area. 
Kiryat 
Shmone 
Nes-Ziyyona 
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6. Study area 
 
The study area (Figure 1) encompasses 101 cities in Israel with population above 
2000 residents. We are particularly interested in two regions: the Core region of central 
Israel (Tel – Aviv metropolitan Area) and the Near Negev (Greater Beer-Sheva Region) 
– a peripheral region located at the southern part of the country. These two regions are 
known for their acute socio-economic contrast. The Core region which includes Tel-
Aviv and its surrounding satellites (e.g. Ramat-Gan, Giv'atayim, Herzeliyya) is socio-
economically successful and draws the best businesses and the most skilled workforce. 
It suffers from typical "rich-man's problems" plaguing central areas – traffic congestion, 
demographic problems and environmental pressures (Gat, 2004). The southern 
periphery is comprised of one central city (Beer-Sheva), several Jewish small cities (e.g. 
Sederot, Netivot, Ofaqim, Arad), and Bedouin-Arab villages. It continuously suffers 
from severe “poor man’s problems" - chronic unemployment, low quality education and 
low skilled workers. The southern cities are poorly connected to each other and to the 
Core region. The low socioeconomic background of the southern cities has contributed 
to their transformation into conspicuous pockets of deprivation and poverty (Yiftachel, 
2000). Due to their low residential and employment densities, these cities lack the scale 
economies necessary for creating producer and consumer amenities. 
Statistical data show considerable differences between these small peripheral cities 
and core region cities in almost all socio-economic parameters. These disparities are 
best reflected by wage and socio-economic level variations. Table 1 shows acute 
differences (1000-1500 NIS) in the average proposed wages between the Beer-Sheva 
metropolis cities and Tel-Aviv. Sharp disparities can be also observed in the socio-
economic cluster rankings of these two regions. This index, supplied by the Israel 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) is based on demographic, economic and standard of 
living variables such as dependency rate, years of schooling, occupation, 
unemployment, motorization rate, average income per capita etc. The cluster ranking 
index ranges from 1 to 10, where a measure of 1 denotes very low socio-economic level 
and a measure of 10 indicates a very high socio-economic level. As can be observed 
from the table, all southern cities with the exception of Arad are characterized by 
medium to very low socio-economic level, as opposed to most core cities which are 
characterized by high to very high socio-economic level. 
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Table 1: Socio-economic level and size of selected cities. 
Location City Average Wage in 
1995 NIS 
(1US$=3.5 NIS) 
Socio Economic 
Cluster Ranking 
(1-10 Scale) 
Population 1995 
(in Thousands) 
Tel Aviv - Yafo 4850 8 348.3 
Rishon LeZiyyon 5195 8 163.3 
Ramat Gan 5140 9 128.0 
Herzeliyya 5950 9 82.8 
Giv'atayim 5220 9 48.9 
Core 
Nes Ziyyona 5090 7 21.8 
Be'er Sheva 3825 5 149.4 
Qiryat Gat 3625 3 43.8 
Ofaqim 3230 2 20.6 
Arad 3775 6 20.3 
Sederot 3205 3 16.6 
Southern periphery 
Netivot 3350 3 14.4 
Source: Israel Census, 1995 
 
Table 2 presents a travel time matrix that shows auto trip lengths (in minutes) at AM 
peak hours between selected cities in the Beer-Sheva Metropolitan area and Tel-Aviv. 
As can be observed from the table, trip lengths between Beer-Sheva and its surrounding 
satellite cities range between 27-44 minutes, whereas trips lengths between the various 
Beer-Sheva Metropolis cities and Tel-Aviv (including other core cities) are in the 65-
111 minute range. The city of Beer-Sheva, and the cities of Netivot, Ofaqim and 
Sederot would clearly be within a commuting range to the core if improvements will be 
made in the transportation network. The census data shows that less than 2% of 
residents living in the peripheral cities commute to the core cities. 
Table 2: AM peak hours auto travel time (in minutes) matrix (2003) for selected cities. 
Origin 
            Dest. 
Arad Beer-Sheva Netivot Ofaqim Sederot Tel-Aviv 
Arad - 44 64 64 65 111 
Beer-Sheva 44 - 31 27 39 90 
Netivot 67 31 - 18 13 71 
Ofaqim 66 28 19 - 27 86 
Sederot 69 39 13 27 - 65 
Tel-Aviv 110 88 67 81 61 - 
 
 
7. Model application 
 
In this section, we present the application of the models to real world data. A brief 
description of the data is provided in Section 7.1. Parameters values are reported in 
Section 7.2. The simulation results are presented in Section 8. 
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7.1 Data 
 
The commuting and agglomeration spillovers in production sub-models were 
estimated with data extracted from two main data sources. Socio-economic and labor-
force data for the 101 city system were collected from the 20% sample of the 1995 
Israel Census of Population and Housing. This detailed disaggregated database supplies 
information on the social and demographic characteristics of the population. The data 
used from this source include geographic and employment variables.  
Travel time data were extracted from a national travel time matrix prepared for the 
Israel Ministry of Transport (A.B. Plan, 2004). This matrix was obtained from a traffic 
assignment model outputs for AM peak hour demand matrices for the year 2003. 
Representative travel times between the 101 cities were calculated by extracting the 
centroid of each city polygon and computing the respective times between two 
centroids. For the purposes of this paper, it is safe to assume that the travel time data 
represent the magnitude of the spatial friction between the cities. 
Additional data pertaining to the proportions of labor, physical capital and annual net 
return per capital used in the agglomeration spillovers in production, were extracted 
from two secondary data sources. The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
publishes every year the annual net return per capital unit (interest rate ρ). A division of 
this input by 12 yields the average monthly interest rate. In 1995 the annual interest rate 
was 10.2%, or 0.85% in monthly terms. The values of the labor and physical capital 
coefficients (α,1- α) were obtained from CBS publications and from an empirical 
production function study conducted by the Bank of Israel and the International 
Monetary Fund (Scacciavillani and Swagel, 1999). Both sources have estimated that in 
1995, the share of labor equaled approximately 2/3 and the share of physical capital 
equaled 1/3.  
 
7.2 Parameter Values 
 
The parameter values used in the simulations presented in the next section are based 
on the estimation results of two studies. The coefficient values for the first sub-model 
(commuting) were obtained from Leck et al. (2007), and the parameters for the second 
sub-model (agglomeration spillovers in production) were extracted from Leck (2008). 
The estimation results of the commuting (discrete choice) model reported in Leck et 
al. (2007) include three parameters - wage ratio (β1=0.00198), auto travel time 
differences (β2=-0.10341), and employment differences (β3=0.00316). The latter 
coefficient is a local variable representing the size or economic robustness of the city.  
The estimation of the commuting model yielded the expected signs, where offered wage 
ratio larger than 1 and a large job supply contribute to utility of selecting a particular 
work city, and long travel time is a disutility in the selection process. All of the 
estimated coefficients were significant at the 0.001 level. 
The estimation of the agglomeration spillovers in production model (Leck, 2008) was 
conducted in two stages. In the first stage, the element e-λtij (see Equation 8) was 
regressed against the dependent variable (log local productivity Ãi) and the coefficient 
denoting the weight of travel impedance λ was estimated. The estimation of travel 
impedance coefficient was carried out by an iterative process which involved the search 
for the λ value that maximizes the percentage of variance explained by the log-linear 
model. The maximum R2 was attained in the log-linear model, when λ was set to equal 
0.78. 
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In the second estimation stage, the remaining parameters were estimated by the least 
squares method. These parameters include stand alone (base) productivity A (A=285),  
a parameter labeled as “sum access” reflecting the economic impact of all other cities j 
on the product of a specific city i (γ=6.63E-11), and three additional parameters 
representing the local characteristics of a city i: average years of schooling (θ1=0.021), 
a dummy variable for location in the southern district (θ2=-0.069), and  the number of 
trains departing from a particular city (θ3=0.001). The “sum access” coefficient 
parameter is positive, indicating that the higher the sum access, the higher the 
productivity level of a particular city. 
The estimation results also highlight the importance of high quality human capital in 
contributing to higher productivity. This finding is consistent with the results of many 
econometric studies which probed the relationship between human capital enhancement 
and productivity growth (see Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Gemmell, 
1995; Ranis et al., 2000, and others). The coefficient indicating the number of trains 
departing from a particular city to other cities is also positive, signifying the important 
role of high-quality rail service in impacting productivity. It is important to indicate 
however that this particular variable is a function of the centrality or economic 
importance of the city, and big cities are better served than small ones. The coefficient 
sign of the dummy variable indicating location in the southern district is negative. This 
estimation result is not surprising given the low socio-economic conditions existing in 
the peripheral cities which subsequently lead to poor economic performance and lower 
productivity rates. All of the estimated coefficients were significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
8. Policy simulations 
 
The empirical tool chosen to address the research question regarding the impact of 
decreasing spatial friction on the enhancement of economic equity and efficiency is a 
set of policy simulations based on the results of the general equilibrium model. Two 
types of simulation scenarios were carried out and are described in the following 
paragraph: 
 
- Base scenario: reflects initial equilibrium or current conditions (prior to any changes 
in the transportation system or local city variables). 
- Highway improvement scenario: estimates the impact of auto travel time reduction. In 
this scenario, auto travel times between cities are multiplied by 0.8 to reflect a “flat” 
20% improvement in travel time throughout the 101 city system.  
 
8.1 Equity impacts 
 
Figure 2 presents the impact of transport improvements on absolute wage growth in 
core and peripheral cities. The simulation results show that the core cities are expected 
to only slightly benefit from auto travel time improvements. As can be seen from the 
figure, the average wage in Tel-Aviv is projected to increase by 0.7% compared to the 
base scenario. Higher wage increases are projected in Nes-Ziyyona (2.5%) and 
Givatayim (1.8%). The relatively high wage increase in Givatayim (Tel Aviv suburb) is 
mainly due to the high socio-economic profile of the commuters in this city.  These 
commuters, who are highly skilled and educated, earn particularly high salaries outside 
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their own locality. When an improvement is being made in the highway system, the 
share of workers residing in Givatayim and working in other cities increases. This 
sequentially leads to an increase in the average wage. A possible explanation for the 
stronger showings of Nes-Ziyyona may be related to its relatively small population and 
location in the outer metropolitan ring, making her more sensitive to transport 
improvements. 
 
Figure 2: Wage growth in the auto travel time improvement scenario compared to base scenario. 
 
According to theory, wages should slightly decrease in the Core due to higher supply 
of labor. So, why is this not the case?  The reason for this stems from the impact of 
decreasing spatial friction on the ability of neighboring cities to enhance their output 
and productivity level (see first summation in the right hand side of Equation 8). This 
impact is much stronger in the core cities due to strong agglomeration effects stemming 
from the proximity of the core cities to one another and because of their large output 
level. Due to the fact that in the general equilibrium model wage level wi is dependent 
on local product Yi [wi=(α Yi)/Ei], when the local product in the core cities increases, so 
does the wage level. 
Improvements in the highway system are expected to generate slightly higher equity 
benefits in the peripheral cities. Average wages are expected to rise by 4.4% in Sederot, 
2.2% in Netivot and 1.6% in Arad. The higher wage increase in Sederot is explained by 
the fact that this town is the closest amongst the peripheral cities to the Core region, so 
even a relatively small reduction in auto travel time significantly increases the utility of 
Sederot residents’ to work in the core cities. Beer-Sheva, the largest city in the southern 
periphery is much less sensitive to auto travel time changes than the smaller cities and is 
virtually unaffected by transportation improvements. 
 
8.2 Efficiency impacts 
 
The efficiency related simulations cover two economic indicators - output per worker 
and productivity. Figure 3 presents the output per worker in 1995 NIS in the base and 
auto travel time improvement scenarios. As can be seen from the figure, the core cities 
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are expected to moderately benefit from highway improvements. Output per worker is 
projected to rise in Nes-Ziyyona by 2%, and in the other core cities by approximately 
1%.  Although these benefits do not seem to be large in relative terms, they are quite 
substantial in absolute terms (total output). 
 
Figure 3: Output per worker (1995 NIS) prior and following transportation improvement.   
 
In the southern periphery, the impact of transportation improvements on output 
enhancement is predicted to be much higher. Output per worker is projected to be 
boosted by 5% in Sederot, 4% in Qiryat Gat, 3.5% in Netivot and by 2.5% in Ashdod. 
The explanation for the especially large increase in output per worker in the peripheral 
cities is primarily due to the significant decrease in employment (out-commuting).  
Figure 4 presents the percentage growth in agglomeration-impacted productivity 
compared to the base scenario in core and peripheral cities. As can be seen from the 
figure, the agglomeration-impacted productivity is expected to rise in all core cities by 
no more than 0.3%-0.8% as a result of highway improvements. The city of Nes-Ziyyona 
is the only city that is expected to enjoy higher productivity growth (1.5%).  
Productivity enhancement in the peripheral cities is projected to be substantially 
higher than in the Core. The agglomeration-impacted productivity is projected to be 
enhanced in Sederot by more than 3% and in Qiryat Gat by approximately 2.5%. 
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Figure 4: Productivity growth compared to base scenario.  
 
A clear dichotomous trend regarding the source of welfare enhancements can be 
observed from the analysis of the simulation results. While welfare improvements 
(growth in wages, productivity and output per worker) in the peripheral cities are 
primarily due to enhanced commuting benefits and decreased labor supply, the source 
of these improvements in the core cities largely derives from the fruits of 
agglomeration. Agglomeration effects are much more substantial in the Core due to the 
large size of cities and the short distances between them. As spatial friction between the 
core cities diminishes as a result of transportation improvements, these agglomeration 
effects become even stronger giving rise to productivity enhancements. Higher 
productivity level in a particular city contributes to increased output and consequently 
to higher wages. 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, the effects of transport improvements on economic welfare have been 
demonstrated by the employment of several numerical simulations. The outcomes of the 
simulations illustrate the existence of a significant relationship between reduced spatial 
friction and enhanced economic welfare. The magnitude of the welfare impacts in 
relative terms was found to be quite small in the core cities, and moderate in the 
peripheral cities. Cities located in the outer Tel-Aviv metropolitan ring were found to be 
more sensitive to accessibility improvements than other cities located in the inner ring 
or in the core. 
The agents impacting welfare enhancement in the core and peripheral cities are not 
identical. Welfare enhancement in the peripheral cities is mostly due to changes in the 
work destination of commuters. Workers in the peripheral cities change their workplace 
choice in favor of the core cities that offer higher wages and other amenities. In contrast 
to the peripheral cities, welfare enhancement in the core is mainly due to mutual 
productivity effects of neighboring cities. The large size of the core cities, combined 
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with decreasing spatial friction due to transport improvements enables them to further 
reinforce their own productivity level. 
The research has focused on the short-termed equity and efficiency benefits of 
transportation improvements. Prospective research should be aimed at investigating the 
long termed welfare economic impacts by including additional urban sub-systems in the 
integrated model, especially land market and land use. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on urban road pricing as a demand management policy that is often regarded as 
radical and generally unacceptable. Road pricing often gets delayed or abandoned due to low 
acceptability. This may be due to the fact that complex interactions and drivers of change affect road 
transport management and require cooperation within implementation networks. The implementation 
network is a group of people (referred to as partners and actors) who co-ordinate the introduction of 
policy tools. The drivers of change include any internal or external influences that have an effect on the 
time, place, or ‘shape’ of the policy measures being introduced. 
Demand management measures that focus on 'sustainable transport' usually address a limited set of 
objectives and are often implemented alone i.e. are not necessarily combined with other policy measures. 
When combined with other measures, it is not always clear whether the multiple interactions between 
policy tools and implementation networks have been sufficiently considered. Examples of ongoing 
implementation of policy package in the UK are the support of road pricing initiatives combined with 
public transport improvements by the Transport Innovation Fund. 
The objectives of the paper are twofold. First, we present a review of the UK urban road pricing 
situation. Second, we contrast the emerging issues against six key implementation factors. The analysis of 
three existing UK road pricing examples - London, Edinburgh and Durham – shows the importance of 
combining policy tools. Furthermore, through the above examples and theoretical arguments, we 
emphasise the additional need of creating and maintaining strong networks when implementing policy 
packages. 
 
Keywords: Urban Road Pricing; National Road Pricing; Transport Innovation Fund; Transport Policy; 
Policy Packages. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction - A need for change 
 
It has been said often, but apparently not often enough, that “in transport things 
cannot go on as they have before” (Glaister, 2001; Docherty and Shaw, 2003). A move 
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from the ‘predict and provide’ transport policy to a demand-management, multi-modal, 
environmentally and socially sustainable approach was never expected to be easy. Many 
people don’t like the idea of having to change. But with environmental pressures 
building and economic impacts of congestion worsening the society in general might be 
forced to change. 
Transport is already a large component of our economy and society - this can be seen 
in the relationship of transport with GDP. In the UK context this has been illustrated 
recently in the Eddington report (Eddington, 2006). Combined developments in 
technology and the world economy have accelerated change to almost unpredictable 
levels. The change affects many areas and transport is not an exception. With new 
vehicle technologies, radical policies and the persistent growth in private and 
commercial vehicles, a new changing transport landscape is emerging. The UK, 
together with most European countries, is transport intensive and dependent, and the 
trends are for further growth. The current UK government has made many steps in 
“rejecting the myth of the great car economy” (Docherty and Shaw, 2003) but the 
performance of their policies has been ambiguous. Car use continues to grow, car-
reducing policies such as road pricing as well as alternative travel modes are not 
promoted adequately, and large-scale road building projects are slowly appearing again. 
This is not a viable model for the 21st century. 
The car has evolved from an expensive luxury for a few to become an important tool 
for the everyday lives and employment of the majority of people, a status symbol and a 
hobby. Increased use of private vehicles has not only brought benefits. For many years 
congestion was little more than a localised problem. Today it has become endemic, not 
just for major cities but even in many rural regions. Associated with traffic congestion, 
are the related problems of air pollution, emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases, 
together with more subtle lifestyle effects, such as contributing to less healthy lifestyles 
and transport poverty (Ieromonachou et al., 2006b). Some academics have reported 
thoroughly the unsustainability of current transport practices (Banister, 2004; 
Whitelegg, 1993). 
The topic of merging policy measures into policy packages has been previously 
addressed (May et al., 2005; Verhoef et al., 2008). Conclusions from many studies 
(CORDIS, 1999; DfT, 2004a; Feitelson et al., 2001; Wall et al., 2008) have supported 
the idea of implementing policy packages. Cases where this was seen as necessary 
include projects that generated tradeoffs by attempting to reduce externalities of other 
transport systems. For example, a set of restraint measures in a city centre could result 
in higher concentration of traffic in surrounding roads. A set of policies that includes 
different measures could have one measure addressing the negative impacts of another 
measure. For example, improvement in public transport systems in a city centre could 
help reduce the impact that access control or pricing policies would have on car drivers. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential in successfully introducing 
sustainable development with the combination of policies into packages (policies 
reinforcing one another) and network dynamics (interactions, motivation, and learning). 
Whether it is termed as policy packages or integrated strategies, this study does not 
make a distinction. May et al. (2005) strategically exemplified integration in five 
different ways. The examples presented here are categorised as integration between 
policy instruments involving infrastructure provision, management, information, and 
pricing. To illustrate this, UK road pricing cases are reviewed including London, 
Durham and Edinburgh. A recent action by the UK government was the creation of the 
Transport Innovation Fund (DfT, 2004b; 2005) to support experiments with a package 
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of policies including road pricing. Apart from examples on the implementation of 
schemes in the UK, the Transport Innovation Fund (TIF) - as an approach for 
combining policies into packages - is discussed. 
The paper will now summarise recent transport policy in the UK (Section 2) followed 
by a detailed description of the three road pricing cases (Section 3). Section 4 considers 
the Transport Innovation Funding and how it relates to policy packages. Section 5 
examines the key issues observed within each implementation factor. Sections 6 and 7 
summarise key learning outcomes and potential ways forward for future applications. 
 
 
2. Recent UK Transport Policy 
 
To understand the reasons responsible for the introduction of road pricing schemes in 
Britain and the subsequent ‘stalemate’ that has been reached, a brief overview of recent 
transport policy issues is necessary. 
The current Government, after the success in the 1997 general election, published the 
consultation document ‘Developing an Integrated Transport Policy’ that had little 
impact as it basically reiterated the goals set by the previous administration. This was 
followed by the 1998 White Paper (DETR, 1998a) which was the first transport White 
Paper in 20 years. This document “influenced policy and research and geared them 
towards the idea of an integrated transport system” (Hine and Preston, 2003). Policy 
moved towards reducing car use and increasing alternatives, including public transport, 
cycling and walking. 
New powers were proposed for local authorities to improve public transport services 
and encourage more sustainable modes of travel. The Greater London Authority Act 
and Transport Act (TSO, 1999; 2000) enacted the White Paper proposals, including 
provision for road user charging (RUC) and work-place parking levy (WPPL) schemes 
to be introduced by local authorities. Road user charging could have a role to play in 
reducing overall demand and the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(RCEP) concluded since 1994 (and also in 1997) that RUC could help reduce the 
dominance of motor traffic if local authorities were given powers to introduce RUC in 
their own areas. 
A fundamental shift in transport policy was pledged in the pre-election campaign of 
1997. But the problem is that the UK government backed out too easily from its original 
promises, as many academics agree (Docherty, 2003; Goodwin, 2003; Potter, 2001), 
and that it has fallen well short of the integrated transport aspirations expressed in the 
1998 White Paper even by the time the 10 year Plan was issued in 2000. Soon after the 
publication of the Transport Act 2000, fuel protests in September caused the removal of 
the fuel duty escalator, an important part of UK transport policy until then. “All attempts 
to rebalance the cost of car use and public transport - a policy of successive 
Conservative and Labour governments for ten years - ceased from that point on” 
(Potter, 2004). The first instalment of ‘Transport 2010: The 10-Year Plan for 
Transport’, started the shift of the policy back to road construction, with around £60 
billion allocated to roads over 10 years. The ‘second’ 10-Year Plan came in 2002 when 
the government published a progress report on the 10 Year Transport Plan. In this report 
it was admitted that congestion-cutting targets set out in the first plan were not going to 
be reached. Unforeseen economic growth and an unwillingness of local governments to 
implement congestion charging schemes were blamed for the failure to stay on target. 
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The 2004 White Paper on Transport, ‘The Future of Transport: A Network for 2030’, 
appeared as supporting a national road pricing scheme but did not set any firm time 
limits or reassurances about the technological feasibility of such a scheme. A national 
scheme was ‘reassuringly’ set aside for the next 15 years, therefore removing it from a 
current political focus. However, at the same time as the White Paper was being 
published, another document emerged which constituted a comprehensive study on road 
pricing and how it could help make better use of the road capacity. The Road Pricing 
Feasibility Study (DfT, 2004a) explained the reason for the time scale of the national 
road pricing scheme as being the need to develop the appropriate technology which was 
not expected to be available until at least 2014. Moreover, in its chapter six the report 
suggested that undertaking forms of road pricing on a more limited scale would improve 
knowledge on the effects and benefits of pricing. Support for these local schemes could 
come from the Transport Innovation Fund (TIF) which was outlined in the (TIF) report 
(DfT, 2005). The TIF offered support for packages which combine demand 
management (including radical schemes like road pricing) with measures to promote 
modal shift and better bus services - the initial TIF funds would be made available from 
2008/9. 
 
 
3. Road Pricing in the UK 
 
Road pricing was recognised some time ago (see for example Ison, 2004) as a way for 
taxing the external costs of transportation – congestion, accident risks, noise and 
emissions of pollutants (Maddison et al., 1996). With the exception of the Singapore 
scheme (1975), it was not until two decades later that politicians started to recognise 
road pricing as a potential funding source and travel demand management measure. 
Examples include the Norwegian urban toll schemes of the mid-eighties and early 
nineties, the Italian city centre pricing trials that evolved from zone access control and 
the two road user charging schemes that came into operation in Britain. 
Road user charging had been proposed in the UK several times since the Smeed 
report (delivered in 1964), but there were no serious attempts to practically introduce 
the policy, with the exception of a trial in the city of Cambridge in the early 1990s. For 
a number of reasons, most notably the lack of political support and not least because of 
the proposed “congestion” technology, the Cambridge scheme failed to progress beyond 
the field trial (Ison, 2004). Legislation for road pricing measures in the UK has been 
encouraged in recent years through the Transport White paper ‘A New Deal for 
Transport: Better for Everyone’ (DETR, 1998a) and the following daughter document – 
‘Breaking the Logjam’ (DETR, 1998b). The 2000 Transport Act (TSO, 2000) contains 
powers for English and Welsh local authorities to introduce ‘road user charging’ 
schemes provided they form part of an integrated transport plan. The legislation 
allowing for the implementation of congestion charging in Central London was made 
available earlier under the Greater London Authority Act (TSO, 1999). In Scotland, the 
Integrated Transport Bill (TSO Ltd, 2000) included proposals for congestion charging. 
The Scottish Transport Act was approved in 2001 (TSO Ltd, 2001). 
There are a variety of urban road pricing methods and sometimes a confusing variety 
of names are given to the schemes. It is therefore useful first to define the types of road 
pricing presented in this paper. These terms are defined within the UK examples 
provided below. 
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3.1. Area Charging: London 
 
Area charging applies to vehicles for accessing and travelling within a specified area 
by providing a license (paper permit) or charging (cameras, smart cards) to enter a 
certain defined area. It does not restrict how many journeys a license holder can make 
within the area and could be more refined as a congestion tackling tool. The London 
Congestion Charging scheme (2003) operates as area charging. Trondheim, a 
Norwegian scheme which ceased operation at the end of 2005, started off as a cordon 
charging system. Seven years later, in 1998, it advanced to a pseudo-area-based 
charging by dividing the initial area into several zones and introducing a charge for trips 
within zones (Ieromonachou et al., 2006a). 
 
3.2. London 
 
Central London has had a long running and serious traffic congestion problem. Over 
the years, a number of measures had been implemented to tackle the problem but none 
managed to do so effectively. The Congestion Charge scheme was introduced in 
February 2003, following an intense planning and advertising campaign led by Mayor 
Ken Livingstone. A fee of £5 GBP (€7.3)1 was initially charged to motorists entering 
and travelling within a central zone of a 5km radius between the hours of 7 a.m. and 
6.30 p.m. on weekdays (TfL, 2003). The £5 charge was expected to deter 10-15% of 
vehicles entering the zone and reduce journey times by 25% but in practice reduced cars 
by around 20% and congestion by 30% compared with the last few weeks before 
charging. This better than expected impact upon traffic reduced the revenue generated 
from an expected £130m (€190m) to around £90m (€131m). 
The initial charged area represented only 1.3% of the total Greater London area but 
around 200,000 vehicles were driving into the charging zone every day. From these, the 
charge applied to about 110,000. Exemptions included: 100% reduction to taxis, 
emergency vehicles, disabled badge holders as well as other groups and 90% reduction 
to residents of the zone (TfL, 2004). A network of video cameras in positions 
throughout the charging zone enforces the scheme. There are also a number of mobile 
units with cameras that patrol within the zone. Payment can be made to any of the 9,500 
UK-wide Pay Points, at various petrol stations and shops throughout the UK. Payments 
can also be made by phone, SMS text, or the internet. 
The traffic impact outside the congestion charging zone has, contrary to expectations, 
been minimal. To accommodate modal transfer, 300 additional buses, offering 11,000 
places were added to the already extensive bus network of London increasing bus usage 
by more than 7%. Making radical improvements in bus services was one of the Mayor’s 
ten priorities for transport in London (TfL, 2004). Plans for extension of the charging 
zone westwards were approved by the Mayor of London in 2005 (TfL, 2005) and 
became operational in February 2007. A year after, criticisms regarding high processing 
costs, ambiguity over the use of the improvements budget and increasing congestion 
were raised (Swinford, 2007). These comments add to pressure against acceptability 
that could affect future schemes in the UK. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Exchange rate at time of writing £1 GBP ≈ €1.46 Euro. The charge was increased to £8 (€11.7) in July 
2005. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 40 (2008): 106-123 
 111 
3.3. Cordon Charging: Durham and Edinburgh 
 
Cordon charging involves charging drivers crossing a designated boundary for a 
specific area – usually the city’s central business district (CBD). Drivers pay a charge 
dependent on how many times the boundary is crossed. The fee can be levied using 
manual methods – either by manned toll booths or coin operated machines, as well as 
electronic tags – relatively simple read/write tags or smart card technology. 
With one point controlling access to the Peninsula, the Durham scheme operates as a 
cordon scheme. Had it been implemented, the Edinburgh scheme would have operated a 
dual cordon scheme. Successful examples of cordon charging (toll rings) are found 
mainly in Norway where the policy has developed into a niche after most major cities 
adopted the measure (Ieromonachou et al., 2006a). 
 
3.4. Durham 
 
Durham is in the North East of England and there the council had being trying to 
restrict city centre traffic to the ‘Peninsula’ area since 1949. This area is a designated 
UNESCO World Heritage Site because of its religious and architectural significance 
and protecting it from traffic pollution is important.  
For its size, the area had particularly acute traffic problems with Saddler Street, a 
single track road, the Peninsula’s only access thoroughfare. Of the 3000 vehicles that 
entered the area each day prior to the scheme being adopted, 50% used the road as a 
‘mobile parking’ area thus contributing to congestion. Congestion was high because of 
the sheer number of vehicles and pedestrians concentrated in a small street – around 
13,000 pedestrians accessed the area each weekday and 17,000 on Saturdays (DCC, 
2000). The situation in the area was untenable, threatening the viability of local 
businesses and damaging the appeal of the Durham Peninsula as a World Heritage Site. 
Various measures had been proposed and tried over some 20 years, but failed to solve 
the problem. The agreed aim for the Peninsula was to significantly reduce the pedestrian 
and vehicular conflict by removing a substantial proportion of the existing traffic 
through a road user charge. A key part of introducing the congestion charge was the 
provision of alternative means of access to the Peninsula, and discussions with public 
transport users resulted in the launch of a new minibus service, the ‘Cathedral Bus’, that 
began operating some two months before the congestion charge was introduced (DCC, 
2002). 
The Durham Road Access Charge Scheme began operating in October 2002, the first 
to take advantage of road user charging powers granted in the Transport Act 2000 
(TSO, 2000). Motorists pay a £2 (€2.95) charge to exit the area on Monday to Saturday 
between 10am and 4pm (DCC, 2003). An exit charge was preferred as it allows free 
flow of vehicles into the area, preventing traffic queues back to a nearby major road. It 
was estimated before the implementation that there would be a 50% reduction in vehicle 
access to the area. For the remaining traffic, a very generous 70% would have permits 
and 30% would be liable to pay. The first evaluation of the scheme (DCC, 2003) 
showed the reduction of vehicles to be around 85% so the permit allocation, despite the 
fact that it seemed generous, has not affected the scheme’s traffic reduction impact. 
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3.5. Edinburgh 
 
The Scottish capital city, like Durham, is a World Heritage site, a major financial and 
commercial centre and a major generator of economic activity for the region as well as 
the country. Growth in car ownership and use has caused traffic levels in certain roads 
to increase by up to 60% in the last 20 years, which in turn has caused congestion, 
parking problems and air pollution (Edinburgh Council, 2003). Edinburgh Council, 
proposed to introduce a congestion charging scheme to directly reduce the number of 
vehicles using Edinburgh’s road network whilst at the same time raising revenue for 
public transport improvements. Without the charging scheme, transport models (MVA, 
2000a; 2000b) predicted traffic level increases of around 30% by 2021, as well as 
increased time lost due to congestion. 
If implemented, the proposed scheme would have charges levied at roads crossing 
two cordon lines: an inner cordon defined by the boundaries of the centre of Edinburgh 
and an outer cordon inside the city bypass. A daily, one-off charge would be collected 
from vehicles travelling inbound across the cordons and only during the charging 
period. The two cordons would operate from Monday to Friday with slightly different 
schedules, with the inner one from 7 am until 6.30 pm, while the outer cordon would 
operate in peak times between 7 am until 10 am and between 4 pm until 6.30 pm. The 
scheme would operate with cameras so that no toll barriers or charge points would add 
to delays. If successful, the Council was committed to spending all net revenue raised 
by the charging scheme on transport projects and services, in addition to the existing 
public sources of transport funding. Prior to any charging scheme being introduced, 
there would be a £100 million up-front investment to improve the city and regional 
public transport network. Over £100 million was already estimated as public sector 
funding for projects within Edinburgh and southeast Scotland (tie, 2003). 
The Council had claimed throughout its campaign that their first priority was to make 
the scheme fair and socially inclusive. In February 2005, Edinburgh residents were 
asked to vote for or against the Council’s transport proposals which included plans for 
the congestion charge and a package of planned transport improvements funded from 
the charging revenue. From a turnout of around 62 per cent, 75 per cent (133,678 
voters) were against the proposals for the charging scheme. Voters explained that the 
Council failed to convince them that the proposals for the charge were sufficiently 
equitable and that the scheme would have hurt the local economy as well as pushing 
traffic into the residential areas of the city (BBC, 2005). A range of issues was 
responsible for the way Edinburgh’s residents voted in the referendum, but most 
importantly people’s perceptions on issues of fairness and taxation (Saunders, 2005). 
Derek Turner, one of the designers of the successful London charging scheme, pointed 
out that Edinburgh should have avoided the referendum and brought as an example the 
Stockholm compromise where the local authority agreed for the public to vote on a 
charging scheme after it operates for a year. 
 
 
4. Support to local authorities for implementing policy packages – the Transport 
Innovation Fund 
 
The 2004 transport White Paper (DfT, 2004a) announced the intention of creating a 
Transport Innovation Fund as support to local authorities interested in using demand 
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management to reduce traffic congestion. The White Paper explained the role of 
policies in managing demand but warned that, on their own, such policies will not be 
sufficient to prevent congestion spreading for longer periods of the day and for more 
road users. Congestion problems need integrated solutions from the local authorities and 
the TIF will help putting in place policy packages that combine effective radical 
schemes with measures that promote modal shift and better public transport. 
Guidance for the TIF was outlined in another report from the Department for 
Transport in 2005. The fund is looking in particular to support: 
- Smarter, innovative local transport packages that combine demand management 
measures such as road pricing with modal shift measures such as better bus services; 
- Innovative mechanisms to raise new funds; 
- Schemes that will be beneficial to the national productivity. 
The Fund was established to tackle the twin objectives of reducing congestion and 
improving productivity. In effect, the fund is particularly looking to fund schemes that 
can pilot approaches to road pricing elsewhere as well as provide benefits locally 
Proposals for TIF funding are divided into “congestion schemes”, for which bids are 
invited from local authorities, and “productivity schemes”, which are determined by the 
DfT after consultation with the Regional Development Agencies. Congestion TIF 
schemes are expected to consist of demand-management measures such as road-pricing, 
accompanied by complementary public transport improvements. Productivity TIF 
schemes will be regional, inter-regional, inter-urban and, exceptionally, local packages 
which have the potential to make productivity gains at the national level. Examples 
might include improved surface access at a port or airport, or improved inter-urban 
connections which create significant reduction in business costs. 
Local authorities applied to the Department for Transport and asked for support in 
developing their proposals to enable them to come forward with business cases in 2007. 
The Department for Transport has supported those authorities that came forward with 
detailed innovative schemes to address specific local congestion problems. Successful 
bids for two rounds of pump-priming funds for congestion schemes were announced by 
the Department in November 2005 and 2006. On November 2006 £7.5 million (€11 
million) of pump-priming funds were awarded to support the development of seven 
local TIF packages that combine demand management, including road pricing, with 
better public transport. Ten packages (see Table 1) were supported in total under the 
TIF programme. 
Table 1: The ten TIF winners of both rounds. 
 Total Funding 
Large Conurbations 
G. Manchester £3,200,000 
Tyne & Wear £1,700,000 
W. Midlands £3,200,000 
Cities and Towns 
Cambridge £1,440,000 
Durham £350,000 
Norwich £250,000 
Reading £680,000 
Shrewsbury £857,800 
Mixed Areas 
W of England £1,495,000 
E. Midlands £1,800,000 
Note: Adapted from Crawford, 2007 
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Examples of cities that have been successful in TIF funding include among others 
Durham and Cambridge which are better known as areas of historical interest as well as 
their association with road pricing. Both cities are based on an ancient/historic layout 
which makes it difficult in many cases to add capacity to the network in certain areas 
and with a high percentage of those employed in the city centres coming in as morning 
traffic from outside. Each place is planning a different trial to conduct based on local 
and regional characteristics and requirements. Cambridge, for example, is only engaged 
with modelling studies with high level stakeholders, whilst Durham – which already has 
a RUC scheme in place – is considering expanding the access control area. 
The UK government promised up to £200 million per year from TIF will be made 
available for such packages. The Fund is forecast to grow from £290 million in 2008–09 
to £2.5 billion in 2014–15. It is expected that small schemes could be up and running by 
2010-11 and larger local schemes within two years of that. Any subsequent proposals 
on a national road pricing scheme will require new primary legislation. It will help local 
authorities to develop well designed schemes which are, where appropriate, consistent 
with each other and any future local or the proposed national scheme. 
 
 
5. Key implementation factors 
 
Road pricing is a complex market based instrument and its implementation does not 
depend on a single issue. This section details a number of critical factors relating to the 
implementation of road pricing. The factors cannot be considered complete as each 
scheme can bring in its own complexity, but they represent areas of concern identified 
in previous research in three European countries (Ieromonachou, 2005). Other studies 
have identified similar issues concerning the implementation of road pricing based on 
scenarios (Glaister and Graham, 2005) and game theory (Levinson, 2005) or 
implementation steps (Ison and Rye, 2005). Some relate to the factors presented in this 
paper, but do not concentrate on a network based analysis. Below, a brief analysis 
explains each of the six factors and how they function within the implementation 
network. 
These six factors are referred to as: the partner-actor network, the project champion, 
the expectations and motivations (of the groups within the implementation network), the 
protection measures, network learning, and user learning/acceptance. Each of these is 
explained in more detail below. 
 
5.1. Partner-Actor Networks 
 
Around any policy measure are networks of affected groups – businesses, interest 
groups, neighbouring local authorities and local residents. These seek to influence or be 
part of the policy development process. The active involvement of such groups in policy 
development and implementation is seen as essential (Gillingwater and Ison, 2003). 
Glaister et al. (1998, p10) emphasised that: “…anyone with an interest in transport 
policy who wants to exercise an effective influence in that process needs to understand 
who the actors are, how they relate to one another, what powers they exercise and what 
constraints they face”. 
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In this paper, a categorisation of such ‘stakeholders’2 has been adopted, developed in 
earlier work by the author and based on innovation management studies (Hoogma et al., 
2002; Geels, 2002; Rothwell, 1992; Schot and Rip, 1996). A distinction has been made 
between two groups: (a) the partners, those actively involved in the planning, 
implementation and operation of a scheme, and (b) the actors, users and other groups 
that were affected by the measure and may have been indirectly involved in the 
decision-making process. In almost all cases, the leading Partner (or project manager) 
has been the Local Authorities, represented either by a strong champion or group. The 
first stage of the analysis is to identify the Partner-Actor network for developing and 
implementing a policy initiative. The partner-actor network then constitutes the 
implementation network for that specific initiative.  The implantation network was 
apparent in all the investigated cases, but the level of involvement of  partners and 
actors differed in each project. All cases required a wide partner network to implement 
their respective schemes and this involved a complex project planning system. Even in 
the case of London where the key partner appears to be TfL headed by the Mayor, there 
were a large number of groups working for this and they were all grouped under the 
aegis of TfL3. The importance of particular relationships in each Partner-Actor network 
varied with the institutional context in which they were placed. It cannot be generically 
said that a certain set of links were more important than others. An important aspect of 
the analysis is that this context (regional context) is mapped and from this an 
understanding of key relationships emerges. 
The UK schemes started with no user familiarity with road user charges and also 
sought to cut traffic flows. This combination required a wider partner/actor network and 
thus the project planning system and network had to be largely created anew. Durham 
did try initially to introduce Access Control using a very restricted partner network but 
that failed. Later, Durham identified and empowered a wide range of community 
stakeholders, developing relationships with them and drawing them in to become 
partners to the scheme. The way in which the County Council also promoted actors in 
the scheme into partners was probably one of the most interesting and important factors. 
The scheme therefore was protected by a network of partners and actors that wanted a 
solution of the problem that existed in the area. As it would be expected, the London 
Congestion Charging scheme required a great number of stakeholders to be involved in 
its planning, implementation and management operations. It appears that not many 
seemed involved due to the fact that the Mayor and Transport for London (TfL) 
combined the majority of the most essential partners that invested in the scheme. 
London had all vital partners grouped under the aegis of one ‘lead player’, TfL although 
the London Boroughs remained independent and some have been the focus of 
opposition. Despite a niche being created in urban road pricing policies by the London 
and Durham schemes, the Edinburgh project failed to get past the design stage. The 
majority of the voters in Edinburgh failed to accept the importance of the policy in 
reducing the use of private vehicles in the city and the potential benefits it would have 
brought to their overall mobility. The politicians were not close enough to the 
population to understand their needs. 
 
                                                 
2
 The term ‘stakeholder’ is used here to mean any affected group. More restricted meanings are 
sometimes used (e.g. by TfL to mean only “corporate” interested bodies.) 
3
 Boroughs are not part of TfL but are highway authorities for much of the London road network; 
furthermore, the Underground remained under Government control until the PPP was finalised. 
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5.2. Project champion 
 
Where projects involve complex systems of partners and actors, the management 
process needs a mechanism to provide focus and drive. This is particularly so for 
innovative projects involving the creation of new networks. This role is one that can be 
filled by project champions - charismatic individuals that spearhead projects. Support of 
politicians is vital to the introduction of any road-pricing scheme whether a charismatic 
project champion exists or not. The project champion emerges as a critical part of the 
process of getting the charging system into place. The champion leads and many times 
influences decisions made by the entire implementation network.  
All schemes examined had some type of champion figure or change agent but this 
varied, with the role being an individual (London) or community group (Durham). In 
some places (such as London) the champions held special places (such as a government 
office) and their personal motivation could have linked to motives beyond the scope of 
transport policy. By contrast, in Edinburgh “no independent champion of the scheme, 
political or not political, emerged to build support” (Saunders, 2005). 
 
5.3. Expectations – Motivations 
 
It is interesting to note how the expectations of different partners and actors gradually 
become aligned. Normally for this to happen, a shift in expectations would have 
occurred. The next stage in the analysis is to explore the motivations and the extent to 
which the different expectations of partners and actors come together. Many of the 
parties taking part bring their own notions, values and beliefs with them, which may be 
summarised as their motivations. When examined, motivations help explain why each 
group became involved in a road pricing scheme in the first place and the amount of 
commitment they have towards it. Sometimes motivations are very obvious and in some 
cases they develop or evolve during the various scheme phases. Motivations are 
intrinsically linked to the expected outcome of the scheme. These expectations of 
partners and actors are useful to analyse for many reasons. A real danger sign is where a 
scheme involves partner and actors who have very different expectations and conflicting 
motivations. 
It is of note that behind the transport reasons for the road pricing schemes referred to 
in this paper there were deeper motivations than simply transport policy. For example, 
protection of historical buildings was of great importance in Durham and Edinburgh. In 
London the main motivation was the economic cost of congestion and the direct 
transport benefits. Tapping into the core motivation of key actor groups is therefore 
important. In Durham, groups that would otherwise be seen as actors in the scheme 
were brought into the network as partners. Once integrated into the network, they were 
able to voice their concerns and thus working towards materialising their expectations. 
 
5.4. Protection measures 
 
These are complementary actions benefiting users to support road pricing policies. 
Previous work (Ieromonachou, 2005) has categorised protection measures into two 
forms: (a) Enhancement Protection, which are actions that enhance the effect of road 
pricing (like the provision of extra public transport capacity to facilitate modal shift 
from car, subsidies to reduce public transport ticket prices, reallocating road space for 
pedestrians and bicycles etc.); (b) Compensation Protection, where there are full or part 
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exemptions from charges for certain groups of users, for social or transport policy 
reasons. Typically the latter include buses, taxis, disabled drivers and local residents. 
Both types of protection measures are particularly needed for innovative or unfamiliar 
policy measures and are closely related to the level of acceptance achieved (considered 
below). Enhancement Protection measures featured strongly in the London and Durham 
schemes. These were therefore an inherent part of both schemes. A major part of 
enhancement protection in London was enhancing public transport services and the 
London experience shows how much can be accomplished in a relatively short amount 
of time and with relatively low capital (e.g. providing an extra 300 buses). Durham also 
introduced the Cathedral bus service to provide alternative access to the charging area. 
 
5.5. Network Learning 
 
Successful development of a specific policy niche depends on the local level of 
innovation processes and stakeholders’ behaviour. If the innovations (in this case road 
pricing policies) are successful, then the niche they create will become known and may 
be adopted more widely. Niche development can be evaluated by the level of learning 
and the level of institutional embedding. Hoogma et al. (2002, p.28) appreciate the 
learning that occurs through a range of processes of articulating “relevant technology, 
market and other properties” but enhance this notion by suggesting that a second-order 
learning is required for niche development to result in a regime shift. This form of 
learning will involve a co-evolutionary learning (Wynne, 1995) that will draw in the 
partners and actors involved in the scheme but also third parties like governments that 
can help in the institutional and societal embedding. Learning processes need to extend 
beyond the immediate local network of stakeholders. This is where the wider issue 
arises of what contributes to acceptance of a policy measure. 
Each of the cities referred to in the paper used incremental processes but in different 
ways. All the successful schemes have used an incremental approach with flexibility to 
experiment and adapt. As the process unfolds, many of the barriers would be (or in 
effect be seen) as less dramatic, particularly by actors. Radical policies require a 
relatively un-complicated start and a pre-defined ‘test’ phase that would allow for 
problems like political and public acceptability to gradually normalise. Even London, a 
case praised for its “courage and rapid execution” (Grush, 2005), used incremental 
processes. This refers firstly to the initial choice of ANPR (automated number plate 
recognition) as enforcement technology which was expensive but it constituted tested 
technology that could easily and quickly be put in place in time for the proposed start 
date. After the scheme was established, experiments started with GPS (global 
positioning system). An incremental evolution in the technology path could easily 
follow a successful scheme. Secondly, a relatively small area was chosen for the initial 
charging zone for reasons of cost and technical feasibility. An incremental approach has 
emerged with the expansions of the zone in 2007 – which builds on existing experience 
and network learning. 
An important part of learning by the network of partners and actors involves 
understanding user needs and attitudes towards a policy measure such as road pricing. 
Understanding user attitudes and needs for a number of policy measures (that could 
include road pricing and other measures) will support the design of protection measures. 
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5.6. User Learning/Acceptance 
 
A number of studies took place in order to establish the social aspects and 
acceptability of transport pricing policies in the UK (Jones, 1998; Preston et al., 2000; 
Rajé, 2003). In the UK, Ison (2000) found that approximately 80% of surveyed people 
viewed urban road pricing as being publicly unacceptable. This point was supported by 
findings from an RAC study (2002) that 83% of motorists would find it very difficult to 
adjust to a lifestyle without the car. The same report argues that most would find road 
tolls acceptable if there were equivalent reductions in fuel duty or as part of a package 
for better roads, public transport and traffic management. The TransPrice project (1999) 
concluded that the lack of political willingness to implement charging measures stems 
from the electorate’s perceived low acceptability for such measures. Other studies 
showed the acceptability of road pricing depends upon perceived benefits and the 
justification given for the development of such a programme in the selected area (Jones, 
1998; Schade and Schlag 2003). This links in to the motivation/expectation and 
protection measures. It is clearly important to take into consideration both in the design 
and implementation of the scheme the views that arise within the general public. 
Acceptability needs to be considered seriously by implementers and government 
officials. The public still has little knowledge of the possibilities of pricing policies as 
solutions to traffic congestion over other policies. 
Incremental approaches permit learning and enhance understanding and acceptance. 
In the UK there was little experience of road charges or even city centre access control 
zones, which meant that the London and Durham schemes involved something entirely 
new. In all cases, acceptance of road pricing required a widespread acceptance that it 
was needed to address an accepted problem. In London and Durham it was congestion; 
it is essential that the charging scheme is seen as a solution to an accepted problem. In 
Edinburgh, people that voted against the proposed scheme considered that congestion 
was not a big problem. 
There are many difficulties when introducing a radical transport scheme like road user 
charging. There are always a number of technical difficulties but however complex such 
issues may be, they rarely compare with the social barriers linked with such a process 
(Langmyhr, 1997). Dealing with all the diverse opinions of the different stakeholders, 
users or affected groups and most importantly finding the way to win the support of the 
majority of the public can be made easier if the project is explained and the benefits of 
such a venture are clearly identified. Improvements to transport (private and public) 
prior to the charging would benefit the image of the scheme as performing well. 
In practice, many politicians see the London experience as exceptional and identify 
more closely with the politically damaging outcomes in Edinburgh. The issue of user 
learning and acceptance, and the need for implementation processes that facilitate this, 
is therefore as important as ever. The success of both the London scheme and Ken 
Livingstone’s re-election revived the Government’s interest in road pricing. This led to 
the rapid development of proposals for a national congestion charging scheme, preceded 
by local trials financed under the Transport Innovation Fund (TIF). 
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6. Moving towards change 
 
One of the main conclusions of this paper is that solutions to problems caused by 
transportation systems are very much contextual issues. Most places in the UK and 
especially rural areas do not experience London’s levels of traffic. Findings from the 
cases show that recognition of the problem is vital as well as incremental 
implementation. Avoiding this incremental implementation and jumping straight to a 
national scheme in 10 to 15 years does not register as good practice.  
Implementation requires work from system builders and project champions. The 
overall process involves the change of users’ attitudes and institutional structures and 
requires, apart from time, planning. The research conducted, which this paper forms a 
part, showed that users’ response to proposed measures plays an important role in the 
final outcome of the project. In many cases, management (partners) were the main 
driving force for introducing a measure but users and other groups (actors) had an active 
role in the shaping of a measure. However, despite the efforts of local authorities and 
their networks, it remains crucial for the central government to remain active on the 
measure. Glaister et al. (1998) judge that: “Transport policy is not a technical issue 
which can be debated and decided between experts. It has been and remains a political 
decision”. 
The announcement in June 2005 for a National Road Pricing Scheme combined with 
the 2004 White Paper on transport (DfT, 2004b), marks a shift in the approach to local 
road pricing measures. The previous policy was to provide enabling powers for local 
authorities to introduce RUC (DETR 1998a, 1998b). The new policy is for a radical, 
nationwide scheme. There is a danger that this will not permit a gradual adaptation, 
learning and user understanding that this paper has shown to be so crucial for the 
successful implementation of local schemes. The paper suggests that phased measures 
(in the form of local urban schemes) would be crucial as ‘stepping stones’ towards the 
countrywide solution, a view supported in the announcement of the Transport 
Innovation Fund to support such ventures. Evidence from the existing UK schemes 
suggests that continuous support to local schemes would aid the spread of the urban 
road pricing niche and a gradual acceptance of the policy at the local level. Combined 
with tolled roads and charging in urban centres the transition would become easier. This 
review of UK experience indicates that the key to this is the decision making and 
planning part of the overall implementation process. The role of transport professionals 
is not just implementation in the “old sense” – i.e. building roads – but implementation 
in a new sense of integrating decision making and planning. The need for a consistent 
and integrated approach to management and operations results from a series of drivers, 
including: growing and changing demands; unsustainable trends; increased user 
expectations; constraints on traditional approaches; and, the introduction of new 
communication and control technology. 
 
 
7. Conclusions - Concluding remarks 
The analysis framework described in this paper was not structured only for the UK 
cases and it is likely that it could be applicable if considered elsewhere. It also seems 
feasible that the relevance of road pricing would be enhanced as experience in its use, 
especially when introduced in policy packages with other measures, builds up. The TIF 
schemes, made known a year after the plans for an eventual national congestion charge 
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in the UK, could possibly provide stepping stones to such learning. The formation of 
local policy niches would help in building up people’s (both partners and actors) 
knowledge, experience and understanding of road pricing. But it is also important to 
contain all the important elements for learning that have been vital in previous 
successful schemes. 
In summary, the main issues observed in all cases examined have been grouped under 
six factors that capture the basic structure of a road pricing implementation process. 
These factors would support the implementation of integrated policies as the complex 
implementation networks would operate with more balanced motivations/expectations. 
In summary, possible key factors to consider are: 
- Managing the partner network for implementing a road pricing scheme can be a 
complex task. This can involve new skills and tasks than are normally involved in 
more traditional local transport measures; 
- Radical policies need a champion to spearhead their implementation; 
- Identifying and understanding core motivations of actors that the measure could 
support; 
- Protection measures to support the road pricing policies are needed most where 
demand management is involved and where tradeoffs between policies can endanger 
their efficiency and acceptability; 
- Understanding, informing and empowering actor groups is important for winning 
widespread acceptability; 
- Learning occurs at many levels and in many ways. It is important for a new scheme to 
build on existing processes and measures to promote learning. 
 
Policies reinforce each other and offer protection such as for example enhancing 
public transport before introducing restraint measures. This protection stems from the 
alignment of goals (expectations-motivations) of partners’ and actors’ and from the 
action (tradeoffs) one policy can have on the negative impacts of another. 
Combining policies into packages is necessary when considering the interactions 
between different measures. This is reflected in the government’s approach that “no 
single policy will meet all of our future transport needs, which is why our strategy is 
based around a broad package of measures” (DfT, 2007). Using a policy package 
approach does not guarantee success, but it offers opportunities to have potential or 
alternative routes to implementation for difficult and controversial policies such as 
urban road pricing. 
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